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ABSTRACT 
Coming to the Deng Xiaoping era, military professionalization could go ahead in 
the 1980s. This paper argues that the People's Liberation Army (PLA), delineated from the 
past revolutionary ideology and developed their own corporateness, became a rising interest 
group for interest articulations and resource acquisitions. To test this conjecture, the 
organizational process model and the governmental politics model are applied to the 1996 
Taiwan missile crisis for a case study. During the crisis, the military appeared as a unified 
national force in advancing their institutional interests and they acquired more capacity in 
foreign-policymaking. The tide of nationalism and the power transfer in the post-Deng era 
provided a favorable political circumstance for the PLA to bring their interests into the 
governmental politics, in which the PLA behaved in a fashion of a special interest group, 
both in the materialistic term of resource acquisitions and in the influence of the decision-
making in the foreign affairs they concerned. The case study of 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis 
verifies that the nature of the civil-military relations in China was changed to "advancing 
and placing the army's corporate institutional interests" between civilian leaders and 
military officers in the new form of political relationship. This essence of the civil-military 
relations constitutes a part in the whole picture of the post-mobilization period and signifies 
the profound changes of the regime nature in China -- from revolutionary ideology to 
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1.1 The Question: 
How the civil-military relations evolved during the post-Deng era? 
The studies of civil-military relations abound in political science and military 
sociology. Some significant research such as Hingtington's classic work start to correlate 
positively professionalization and civilian cont ro l�A central question asked in this study 
is how professionalization of the PLA affected the civil-military relationship in the post-
Deng China. In light ofthe 1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis, the following conjectures 
could gain some momentum for discussion: 1. Civil-military differentiation replaced the 
party-army blending; 2. Military institutional interests are emerging; 3. Thus the way for 
political leaders in China to win the army's support was changed from the “power 
sharing" in the past to "placing the army's corporate institutional interests" in the new 
form of political relationship. 
During Mao Zedong's era, party-army relations can be summarized in the model 
of "party-army blending". One can perceive this as the natural outcome of the 
revolutionary origin of the regime, the party-state system and the veteran "dual-role 
elites" who experienced the Long March. Mao even explicitly spelled out the pivotal role 
of the People's Liberation Army (PLA): "the ruling power grew out from the barrel of the 
gun." 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the state: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1957). 
1 
After the tremendous change within PLA in defining its role in politics under the 
Cultural Revolution, it is an urgent task for Deng Xiaoping to put the PLA in order. 
What Deng try to do is to disengage the PLA from politics and put them back to the 
barracks. Mao's romanticism in the warfare doctrine of "people's war" which emphases 
politicization and mobilization of the entire populace against the enemy, was given way 
"people's war under modern condition" as it seemed irrelevant to the situation in 1980s.^ 
Defense modernization and professionalization were going ahead for separation of the 
party and military, while the military was removed from domestic politics gradually. 
Civil-military separation and institutionalization of the PLA have been taken shape. 
However, it does not mean that the PLA would be a passive group under the 
party's absolute control. During the post-Mao era, the PLA has been back to the barrel, 
but at the same time they are becoming a institutionalized interest group in the defense 
and foreign policy items that they concem. 
The PLA is an interest group but it is institutionalized inside the government, 
deviated from the original concept associated with the pluralist democracy that is the 
shared attitude group setting out to advance their demands outside the government. The 
2 In 1980s, the political leaders in China no longer believed in the imminence of war. Despite Chinese 
strategic planners no longer subscribed to the Mao's concept that it is solely people and not guns 
determines the outcome of a war, human factors could not be discarded at once. Ngok Lee, China's 
Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1989), pp. 
138-144. Ellis Joffe also put forward the new military doctrine of"people's war under modem conditions" 
and he further it to examine the "nuclear war under modem conditions", see Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army 
After Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 71-93. 
3 David T. Truman provides a classic definition on the interest group: "Interest group refers to any group 
that, on the basic of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the 
establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitude." 
See David T. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion CN"ew York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 33. The Western concept of interest group has been used by some authors in 
analyzing the politics of the Communist regimes. While the group theories displayed as a tradition in 
American political studies, early attempt to develop the interest groups concept in Soviet Union was done 
by Skilling and Giffiths. See H. G. Skilling and F. Giffiths (eds.), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
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PLA is a group inside the government and not a pressure group embedded in society.^ 
However, both the PLA and the pressure groups have the same function in lobbying and 
forcing other actors within the government to process their demands. The affiliation as 
the military men does affect their behavior. But the distinguished point is that, unlike the 
other social groups in China, the PLA, as a hierarchical organized institution, possesses 
different channels inside the party to press for their demand, in both materialistic terms of 
resources allocation and governmental policy regarding national security. 
The changing nature of the PLA, from a political resource being exploited in 
ideological power struggle to an institutionalized interest group pressing for their 
demands, signifies the Communist regime transition. In this new form of civil-military 
relation, interest bargaining replaced revolutionary ideology and power sharing as the 
4 The book edited by David Goodman collects the works on the association of the interest groups and 
political process in China, followed by another books edited by Victor C. Falkenheim. Different groups 
such as peasants, workers, managers, teachers and dissident intellectuals were identified as bearing interests 
in the political participation, changing in nature from the official organized groups gradually. See David E. 
Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People 's Republic of China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1984). 
Victor C. Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese 
Studies, The University ofMichigan, 1987). 
5 Two questions should be addressed in borrowing the interest group concept in the Chinese military 
politics. In the first place, one may doubt the justification of using the interest group concept- a concept 
originated in explaining the pluralist democratic systems. The other precondition should be confirmed is the 
PLA as a unified group in advancing their interests. Both questions need to be resolved before further 
political studies in Chinese interest group concept could be advanced. 
As to the first objection of being theoretical over-sketching by transplanting the interest group 
concept to a Communist state, Peter Ferdinand defenses: "Although interest groups chiefly associates with 
liberal democracies and pluralist political philosophy, this does not mean that any regimes to which this 
approach is applied is presumed to be 'liberal，or 'pluralist'", and the interest group concept "intended to 
illuminate the PRC system, not explanation as a whole." See Peter Ferdinand, "Interest Groups and Chinese 
Politics," David Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People 's Republic of China (Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1984),p.l2. 
The other counter-argument casts the doubt on the PLA as a unitary, monolithic actor, for it composes of 
different departments inside; thus it may over-simplify the whole picture. Different divisions inside the 
PLA have their own organizational goals and contradiction will emerge, for example, the more combat-
oriented group and those more commercial-oriented "military businessmen". Nonetheless, facing the 
national issue of sovereignty like the Taiwan issue, there is little room for significant opinion cleavages 
inside the PLA. Their institutionally-driven interests were identified and the key military members pushed 
forward their interests in the Taiwan crisis. If the political motivation of the PLA as a group is proved to be 
a crucial part in the explanation for the outcome in the 1995-1996 cross-Straits crisis, the interest group 
theory can be valid in analyzing the case. 
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major scenario. Satisfying the army's corporate interests, rather than ideological 
correctness, is the way winning the PLA's support. For the political leaders, the red army 
is not a revolutionary force anymore, but acts in a pragmatic way for resource 
acquisitions. Actually, the changing civil-military relation constitutes a part in the whole 
picture of the post-mobilization period, in which the national goal had profound change 
from Mao's "revolution" to Deng's "modernization". The nature of regime was changed 
from revolutionary mobilization to post-mobilization, from ideological struggles to open-
door policy and economic reforms.® 
1.2 The Case of the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis 
This paper intends to investigate the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, a major event 
directly involved the active participation of both the civilian and military, to test the 
hypothesis of interest bargaining behavior of the PLA. In March 1996, Beijing's missile 
tests in the Taiwan Straits captured the eyes all over the world, all asking what would 
happen if the "Chinese people was fighting Chinese people" while two US aircraft 
carriers in the Taiwan Straits were ready for intervention. Eventually, Lee Tenghui was 
popularly elected for the first time as the president in Taiwan, under the intense threat at 
the brink of war. 
Since the beginning of the Deng era, Beijing had abandoned the policy of 
"liberating Taiwan" and adopted the stance of peaceful unification, possibly in the form 
of "one country, two systems". But the interpretation of "one country, two systems" 
6 Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in 
Communist System (Standford: Standford University Press, 1970); Richard Lowenthal, "The Post-
Revolutionary Phase in China and Russia," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 
1983)，pp. 191-203. 
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might be a tricky concept bearing various interpretations, making Taipei doubtful on its 
autonomous status if coming to negotiations with China. Internally, Taiwan had 
experienced profound changes in democratization and economic development. 
Expanding its "international space" was the next goal for the Taipei authority, manifested 
by Lee Tenghui's “flexible diplomacy" and the bid for membership in the United Nation. 
The developments in Taiwan and its move in foreign policy alarmed Beijing's 
leaders on the possibility of Taiwan independence, a tendency directly threatened China's 
sovereignty and regime legitimacy. After the diplomacy of Jiang Zemin's "eight-point 
proposal" and Li's return of "six-point proposal" in 1995, the Beijing authorities were in 
110 hope on negotiation with Lee Tenghui and started out on the preparation for military 
show-down. 
What intensified the strained situation is the visa issued to Lee Tenghui for his 
visit to the Comell University by the United States. Beijing protested against Lee 
Tenghui's visit as pursuing independence and the United State's breach of the three 
Communiqu_s assuring "one-China" principle, so Beijing conducted a series of 
extraordinary missile exercises in 15-23 August 1995. Obviously, the military exercise 
was more than a routine one but the fact that the Beijing authorities announced it publicly 
carried political overtones. 
After the 1995 August exercise, there were all kinds of sources predicting another 
coming missile drill during the period of Taiwan presidential election/ Deliberately had 
the timing overlap with that of the Taiwan presidential election, three waves of missile 
7 ln late November, China's military held large-scale land exercises on Dongshan Island, south of Jinman 
Island. Military exercises in March will be held on Pingtan Island, near Taiwan's defense perimeter. "PRC 
to hold military exercises on Pingtan Island," Tokyo KYODO (15 February 1996); FBIS-CHI (15 February 
1996),pp. 82-83. 
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test during March 1996 were conducted in an unprecedented high profile. The “war of 
nerves" not only warned Taiwanese the danger of pursuing independence, but also 
protested the US hegemony by sending two aircraft carriers intervening the "internal 
politics" ofChina. Most notably, the M-9 missile had a time passing very close to Taipei, 
Taiwan's capital.^ It was more than enough to show the strong intimidation on Taiwan by 
direct military threatening. 
1.3 The Framework: Allison's Models in Decision-making 
The war game in the 1996 Taiwan Straits offers a good chance to investigate the 
group behavior of the PLA in the Chinese policy-making process. Particularly, the 
Chinese military is sensitive to any hint of containment and drafts out the reaction to 
confront any signs of it. In order to explore the behavior of interest articulations of the 
PLA, as well as the legitimacy and capabilities for lobbying inside the government, 
Allison's organizational process model and governmental politics model are borrowed 
here for providing a general framework of analysis.® 
Allison's book presents three versions of the Cuba missile crisis in 1962 to the 
readers~the rational actor, organizational process and governmental politics, thus 
illuminating different "essences" in decision-making and reconstructing the whole 
phenomenon accordingly; "Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offense missile in 
Cuba? Why did the United States respond with a naval guarantine of Soviet shipments to 
8 About the M-9 missiles used and direct threat on Taipei city, see Barton Gellman, "US and China nearly 
came to blows in '96: Tension over Taiwan prompted repair of ties," The Washington Post (21 June 1998), 
p. A01. 
9 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971). 
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Cuba? Why were the missiles withdrawn? What are the 'lessons' of the missile crisis?"^° 
The fundamental concept in Allison's book is that the state is not a unitary actor in 
international politics. While it is dissatisfactory that the rational actors model could only 
simplify the phenomenon by confining the decision-making to the unified central 
leadership, the other two models are set out to capture the governmental behavior in two 
different orientations. 
The organizational process model conceives the policy outcome as the 
organizational output as various organizations limit the choice sets for final decision. The 
organizational process model puts forward the assumptions that “(1) monoliths are black 
boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making 
structure and (2) large acts results from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions 
by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of 
only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, political 
objectives." Therefore, "problems in international relations must confront the intra-
national mechanisms from which governmental actions emerge" and the "acts" and 
"choices" of the government are thought of as the “outputs of large organizations 
functioning accordingly to regular patterns ofbehavior.，，” 
The third model Allison described is the governmental politics model that 
believes "what happens is characterized as a resultant of various bargaining games among 
players in the national govemment."^^ The decisive force for the final outcome is the 
power of the players who are in the formal and informal positions in the government. The 
process is a bargaining game in which the players pulls and hauls in a bid to advance 
ioibid.,pp. 1-2. 
11 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, pp. 5-6. 
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their conceptions of national, organizational, group, and personal interests.^^ 
While the organizational process model emphases the "organizational output', the 
governmental politics model focus on the shifting political coalitions to explain the 
outcome. Both models examine the foreign policy-making by linking he domestic factors 
and external outcomes 
Nonetheless, this paper does not intend to make an account solely on the policy 
outcomes as the major focus, but to borrow both models as the framework to see the 
military role in the Taiwan Straits crisis. The organizational model could highlight the 
organizational goals of the PLA, namely, the demand for a larger pie in national 
resources. To mn this model on how the PLA influence the decision making in the cross-
Straits crisis, followings are the main focus discussed in chapter four: 1) the 
organizational interests and demands of the PLA 2) PLA's perceptions and priorities on 
the Taiwan issue, 3) system of rewards for the PLA after the missile drill. These 
institutional perceptions and interests contributed a significant part in framing the choice 
set to the political leaders in the war games. 
On the other hand, the governmental politics model is used to provide a 
framework explaining the political mechanism in which the PLA can take advantage to 
increase their sayings, thus bringing their points of view and institutional interests into 
the foreign policy-making process. In chapter five, focus would be on the political pulls 
and hauls among the civilian and military leaders; "who got the action" and why; to see 
how the PLA took advantage of the war games, the nationalist tide and the time of power 
transfer in the post-Deng period to bring their institutional interests into the governmental 
12 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, p. 6. 
13 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, p. 62. 
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politics. 
1.4 Data and Organization 
The reliable and sufficient data sources are the most difficult part in doing 
research concerning China, especially those topics being viewed as politically sensitive. 
It is hard to get through all the ways to do the interviews and get access to some data. But 
still, there are some possible materials available for researchers to make the works valid. 
For instance, the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) provides everyday 
translations of the major political, economic, social and military news in China and East 
Asia. In addition to the international information sources, particular newspapers and 
journals in Hong Kong and Taiwan are well respected for revealing some stories found 
helpful for researchers, though critical screening and comparison are necessary. Besides, 
the data viewpoints in this paper contain the materials getting from my fieldwork and 
interviews in Taipei. 
To make a comprehensive analysis of the civil-military relations focusing on the 
case ofthe cross-Straits crisis, I would like to include the following chapters in my thesis. 
The literature review in Chapter Two investigates how different scholars deal with the 
problems of civil-military relations and see the possibility of such intellectual resources 
enriching the researches in the Chinese context. Chapter Three reviews the civil-military 
relations after 1978 and elaborates such concepts as professionalism, civil-military 
differentiation and institutionalization. This chapter serves as a historical and theoretical 
foundation to highlight the evolving nature of the civil-military relations of China. 
Chapter Four and Five show the interactions between the civilian and military leaders 
9 
before, during and after the missile tests in 1995-1996, in two dimensions. Chapter Four 
adopts the angle of the organizational process model, while Chapter Five looks into the 
governmental process model for explanation. Finally, Chapter Six offers a summary of 
findings of the above chapters, other than the research prospects of the civil-military 




Theoretical Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations 
2.1 Non-Communist Regimes 
Before discussing the Chinese case, this chapter will first examine the concept of 
civil-military relations in different perspectives and get some insights from the research 
experience in different parts of the world, both communist and non-communist alike. 
Concepts of Professionalism and Civilian Control 
Nearly all researches on civil-military relations would begin at the work of 
Huntington, “The Soldiers and the State", by discussing the concept of military 
professionalism that shapes the center of debate for the subject. According to Huntington, 
military professionalism is based on three concepts: expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness.i After all, the most important feature of professionalism is the apolitical 
attitude of the soldiers. The professional soldiers are the technocrat servants of the state 
and their duties are confined only to those concerning national security. They would not 
• • • 2 
intervene in any political event and not be influenced by any kinds of political ideology. 
Thus, Huntington distinguishes two type of civilian control: subjective and 
objective. Subjective control is defined as the organizational, personnel and ideological 
mechanism to empower the civilian authority over the military. However, subjective 
‘Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the state: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The BeUmap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1957), pp. 8-18. 
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control could not work well because it would only induce the continuous military 
participation in the political games. On the other hand, objective control (the 
professionalization of the military) can make the armies remain apolitical and they dare 
not to compete with the civilian for power, as professionalization internalizes the 
apolitical attitude inside the military and constitutes the most effective way to secure the 
recognition of the principle of civilian supremacy.^ 
The other classic work on professionalism is Morris Janowitz's "The Professional 
Soldier." To Janowitz, the definition of professionalism also embodies the corporateness 
and expertise.^ Unlike Huntington, he does not mention responsibility so as to avoid the 
dilemma between responsibility and professionalism. A soldier responsible to the nation 
may well go beyond their barrack to take up the civilian role in political decision-making, 
or even launch a coup. 
S. E. Finer renders one of the criticisms against Huntington for his 
professionalism thesis. Finer finds that the professional military does indeed intervene in 
politics. The military views that state is their client and it creates a space that allows the 
military to define its own definition of the national interests. There may be the possibility 
that the military conceives the removal of the weak civilians as best serve to the state. 
They may actually believe that replacing corrupt civilians is part of their duties. The 
second reason for military intervention is that they may feel they are competent enough to 
judge matters related to the armed forces. This may lead them to collide with the 
civilians. The third reason is that professional officers are reluctant to be used against the 
dissidents against the government. All in all, Finers makes an attempt to prove that 
^Ibid, p. 15. 
^ Ibid, pp. 83-85. 
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professionalism is not the sole guarantee for making an apolitical army.^ 
Bengt Abrahamsson also argues in the same line against Huntington. He 
conceives that the expansion of the definition of professionalism may lead the army to be 
politicized. Cited the example from the countries in Latin America, the military can have 
their own definition on national interests that include the economic development, which 
is necessary to support the modern military modernization. Thus, the professional 
military would have a vested interest in intervening in various sectors in government 
outside the defense matters.^ 
Nordlinger in his book "Soldiers in Politics" conducts another early research on 
civilian control, three models of civilian control could be differentiated.^ First is the 
""traditional model" describes the situation in Western Europe when there is no 
significant differentiation between civil and military elites. The second type of civilian 
control is the "liberal model". It assumes the mutual respect between civil and military 
elites for each professional and specialized domain. Civilian control is based on the 
internal belief of both civil and military elites that civilian authority should control the 
military. The officers should stay away from politics and remain neutral. The liberal 
model is based on the limited scope of military operation defined by constitutional 
structures. Any actions by the military beyond what their duties related to national 
security are considered as military intervention. The third type is the "penetration model" 
which means civilian control by civilian penetration in ways of political indoctrination, 
also by different personnel and organization controls. It is widely adopted by the 
4 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier CNew York: The Free Press, 1960). 
5 S. E. Finer, The Man on HorseBack: The Role of the Military in Politics. T^ ed. (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1988). 
6 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hill, California: Sage, 1972). 
13 
communist states. 
It would be a good starting point to query the party-military relations of the PRC 
after reviewing the above early theoretical pieces. After 1978, Deng had put effort on the 
professionalization of the PLA. If the PLA will be like what Huntington suggests as an 
apolitical armed force, or as the interest group that Abrahamsson perceives? 
Praetorian Military in Latin America 
From the mid-1960s to 1970s, scholars focus on the relationship of the military 
and political and social development when studying the Latin American politics. Analytic 
tools for understanding the role of military were developed. Such attempts were done by 
scholars John Johnson, Alfred Stepan, Guillermo 0'Donnell, etc.^ After 1975, scholars 
shifted their attention to the explanations of the seizures of power in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
Huntington attributes the military praetorianism to the lack of political 
institutionalization in time of rapid social and economic modernization and the 
consequent political decay in most of the Third world countries, while all institutions 
become heavily politicized.^ From the Latin literature, we see that as military 
professionalism and modernization make the armed forces the most modem and best 
organized sector of the society, it is only natural for the officers to feel tempted to take 
7 Eric A. Nordinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1977). 
8 John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); 
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971); Guillermo 0'Donnel, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute 
of International Studies, University ofCalifomia, 1973). 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society CNew Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 
pp. 192-263. 
14 
over the often corrupted and inept civilian government. The collapse of the executive 
power is the precondition of the praetorianism/^ This point was also well developed by 
in Alain Rouquie's The Military and State in Latin America. From tracing the 
organizational transformation of the Latin American armies, Alain Rouquie argues it is 
the disjuncture between the rates of modernization of the armies and the civilian state that 
induced the military involvement in politics.^ All in all, the Latin cases cast a doubt on 
the correlation of professionalism and the apolitical behavior. There is the possibility for 
the praetorianism of the professional soldiers. 
Huntington's argument on professionalization of the military and objective 
civilian control renders little explanatory power in the 1960s and 1970s praetorian armies 
in Latin America, in view of their differential military modernization and 
professionalization that made the intervention more likely. In a rather opposite direction, 
different types of praetorian regimes could be distinguished. Perlmutter categorizes 
12 
praetorianism into autocracy, oligarchy, and authoritarian praetorianism. The praetorian 
13 
armies could be divided into mler and arbitrator. 
Stepan also has its own definition of the arbitrator or moderator model in his 
pathbreaking book, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil; in which 
� Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 89, 93-94. 
‘1 Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
12 Amos Perhnutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers, pp. 94-95. 
13 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers, pp. 102-114. The arbitrator army has the following characteristics: 1) acceptance of 
the existing social order; 2) willingness to return to the barracks after disputes are settled; 3) no 
independent political organization and lack of desire to maximize army rule; 4) a time limit for army rule; 
5) concern with improvement of professionalism; 6) a tendency to operate behind the scenes as a pressure 
group; and 7) a fear of civilian retribution. On the other hand, the ruler praetorian army is 1) rejects the 
existing order and challenges its legitimacy; 2) lacks confidence in civilian rule and has no expectation of 
returning to the barracks; 3) has a political organization and tends to maximize army rule; 4) is convinced 
that army rule is the only alternative to political disorder; 5) politicizes professionalism; 6) operates in the 
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Stepan describes the situation that the army is politicized and shares the existing social 
and political ideology. The Brazilian officer corps had changed its self-perception as a 
professional elite from a "moderating" power to the one that could exercise the 1964 
coup. However, the military intervention in politics is temporary and limited in scope and 
this intervention gains certain legitimacy from the political system]4 Stepan proposes the 
concept of “new professionalism" on the role of the military who envisages themselves 
incumbent on the national economic and social concerns, other than their confined 
military responsibility. It makes the contribution to the explanation on the co-existence of 
professionalism and politicized military in accord to the Latin cases�^ 
To have a clear summing up, there are four sets of explanation for the Latin 
American military rule in the period of 1965-1975，First is by the way of the 
modernization theories to analyze the early modernization of the army and late 
institutionalization of the state/，The second explanation relates to the Latin American 
history and culture: the perception of military as a corporate group, the hierarchical and 
organic societal views of Latin A m e r i c a n s ” The third theoretical attempt is the 
dependency approach that utilizes the Marxist-Leninist theories of imperialism to explain 
Latin American underdevelopment. The armies were depicted as the tool of control by 
the first world countries. The forth explanation is the bureaucratic authoritarianism by the 
open; and 7) has little fear of civilian retribution. 
14 Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), pp. 62-66. 
15 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 13-15. 
16 See Paul E. Sigmoid, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," Comparative Politics 
Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1993) pp. 111-122. 
17 see Robert Wesson (ed.), The Latin American Military Institution (New York: Prager, 1986). 
18 Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978); Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987). 
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influential book of Guillermo O'Donnel's Modernization and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism. The BA model points out that authoritarian rule was necessary in the 
bottleneck period of industrialization that requires control of the popular sector. Military 
regimes tend to be justified on the grounds that it is the most efficient path to generate the 
environment more amenable to democracy/^ 
The shifts of the study of the Latin military are related to the changing domestic 
and international environments. Except Cuba and Haiti, we see a series of democratic 
transition from 1974 onwards. From 1980s to 90s, the fast changing political context 
creates new literature of civil-military relations in the era of transition to democracy and 
democratic consolidation. Analyses were shifted to explained the de-politicization ofthe 
armed forces and the subordination of military to a democratic regime following the end 
of the Cold War. Then the following questions are raised: Why military regimes 
collapsed and gave way to the democratic transition? What are the roles the military 
played in the democratic transition and consolidation? How do we asset the legacies of 
20 
these former military authoritarian regimes? 
19 Guillermo 0'Donnel, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, 1973). 
2° Juan Rial outlines several trends that helped facilitated the normalization of the Latin civil-military 
relations. First, Latin America was free from large-scale inter-state military conflict in this century. Second, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic breakdown of Cuba, guerrilla and insurgent forces 
had been declining, except in Peru, Colombia and Mexico. Third, the military did not have the attempt to 
replace the civilian rule. Forth, the United State's isolation policy towards the military regimes helped to 
transfer the power back to the civilian authority, despite they still kept some kinds of military missions. 
Juan Rial, "Armies and Civil Society in Latin America," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (ed.), Civil-
Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 
47-65. 
Now the most pressing problem is to defme the role of military in the newly open regimes. Two trends 
have been standing out. One is that the Latin American militaries are increasingly used as the emergency, 
especially in cracking the drug crime. The other trend is that the military has been in the direction toward 
integration into the international alliances and projects. Deborah L. Norden, "Redefming Political-Military 
Relations in Latin America: Issues of the New Democratic Era," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 
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2.2 Communist Regimes 
The civil-military relations in communist countries were comparatively ignored in 
the academic circle because of several reasons. Not much effort was made to compare the 
communist and non-communist systems because the West scholars viewed the 
communist civil-military relations as essentially conflictual and the military was always 
subordinate to the party. Second, the dichotomy of military apolitical professionalism and 
praetorian intervention had dominated the discussion and the communist regimes did not 
21 
fall into either category. 
The assumptions based on Huntington, according to Suck-Ho Lee, are the 
following: 
1) military officers and civilians constitute two distinct groups; 
2) relations between both groups are inherently conflictual in nature; 
3) what keeps the conflict within bounds is subordination of the officer corps to civilians 
except on matters requiring military expertise; 
4) shifts in civil-military relations take place as a function of the degree of effectiveness 
of civilian control; 
5) the first necessity in analyzing civil-military relations is to examine characteristics of 
22 
the modern military. 
But these assumptions cannot explain the communist regimes. Suck-Ho Lee 
demonstrates the extreme case of cooperative party-military relations in North Korea that 
would be mismatched if using the assumptions above?^ The West concept of civilian 
control also does not fit into China model. Firstly, the guerrilla origin of the regime 
(Spring 1996) pp. 42433-437. 
21 Suck-ho Lee, Party-Military Relations in North Korea (Research Center for Peace and Unification of 
Korea, 1989)，p.30. 
22 Suck-ho Lee, Party-Military Relations in North Korea, p.30-31. 
23 Suck-ho Lee, Party-Military Relations in North Korea. 
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formation blurred the distinction of civilian and military elites. Second, another mentality 
of party-military relations should be used as the Chinese military was always invited to 
get involved in the political power struggles. The military leaders were not considered to 
be the expertise of military only. They were political activists and so the relations were 
not dependent on how much civilian control exerted on the military. Instead, the 
interaction of both sides and the general political environment are the main focus points. 
These conceptualizations of the Chinese case will be discussed later. Follows are the 
examination ofthe researches on the other communist regimes and their comparison. 
Soviet Union 
The book "Civil-Military Relations in Communist Regimes" published in 1978 
brings the scholarship attention to the controversy on the Soviet civil-military relations. 
Kolkowicz believes that the army and party were engaged in a chronic conflict, stemming 
from their incompatible outlooks and interests. Hence, the main theme of civil-military 
relations in Soviet Union is the civilian control. The control mechanisms ranged from the 
commissar system, the secret police to the party tactics of divide and rule and the checks 
and balances provided by the local government?^ 
Odom disagrees with Kolkowicz that the Soviet party-army relations were marked 
by conflicts. Instead, he proposes the congruence model and argues that it should be 
characterized by a general consensus in their ideological orientation and institutional 
interests. The problem is explained in terms of interest and value congruence between 
24 Roman Kolkowicz, “Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring 
and lvan Volryes, ed. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1978). 
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party and army.^^ 
Another debate on the concept of control is put forward by Colton. Colton's 
"participation" model argues that the Soviet civil-military relation features a structural 
inter-penetration, broadly compatible goals and the operation of informal cross-
institutional linkages. The party-army differentiation was high enough to present a case 
of civilian control effected by both subjective and objective means, but with a tendency 
toward predominance of the objective. Colton argues that the Soviet civil-military 
relations were the mixture of antagonism and harmony, depending on a bargaining 
process and among interested institutions, but it tended to be harmonious as the military 
26 
"corporate interests" were satisfied by the party. 
While the models of "conflict", "congruence" and "participatory" developed and 
became the main line ofarguments in the civil-military relations in Soviet Union, no rigid 
model has been adopted in China, despite it is empirically rich in the Chinese military 
politics—the Gao-Rao Incident in early 1950s, the purge of Peng Dehuai in the Lushan 
Conference, military support of power seizure in the Cultural Revolution, the rise and fall 
of Lin Biao, the arrest of the Gang of Four, up to the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. 
How can we construct the theoretical framework to the study of civil-military relations in 
China? The above historical incidents seem to support the "conflict" model between the 
civilian and the military. 
Perlmutter and Leogrande, on the other hand, argue that the role ofthe military in 
politics is complex and depends on the nature of issue. Thus different orietations and 
^^William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volryes 
(ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. 
26 Timolty J. Colton, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan 
Volryes, ed. Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems-, Timolty J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, 
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emphases in the multifaceted civil-military relations result in different conclusions. They 
also remind us the distinctive feature related to the impacts of the party-state system on 
the civil-military relations: "Serious conflicts, whether personal, ideological, or 
bureaucratic in genesis, are resolved within the Party, not between the party and nonparty 
institutions or non-party elites carry conflicts into the party, making every important 
conflict an inner-party conflict." Besides, "the relationship between the party and 
nonparty institutions (especially the armed forces and the state) is a complex combination 
of limited institutional autonomy within the context of political subordination to the 
party."27 
Regional Comparison on the Civil-Militarv Relations 
Michael C. Desch evaluates the civil-military relations by the model of threat 
perception. He concludes that military missions were closely related to the threat 
environment that a nation faces.^^ David Albright divides the communist nations in terms 
of the origin of power and draws relations with their civil-military relations. Among 
communist regimes who came into power through local guerrilla wars, China, 
Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos all displayed high degree of civil-
military congruence with little visible tension between the two. The other groups 
included Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Mongolia and North Korea which were founded through urban coup or foreign assistance 
shared the same feature of mutual suspicion and thus a source of conflicts between the 
and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1979). 
27 Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in uniform: toward a theory of civil-military 
relations in Communist political systems," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 
(December 1982), pp. 778-779. 
28 Michael C. Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
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party leaders and military officers. Albright proposes a set of factors that were much 
more important than the concepts of civilian control and professionalism, to determine 
the civil-military relations: 1) ways in which the regime came to power; 2) relations with 
outside powers; 3) degrees of role differentiation as a result of local politics and 
economic development; 4) emergence of major factional conflict; 5) bureaucratization of 
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politics; 6) changes in military doctrines; 7) threats to domestic order. 
Albright offers a systematic and comprehensive analyzing framework to make 
focus in the discussion. But the framework is for the general comparison and different 
countries would have their own weight in the above factors. In the Mao era, the first and 
the fourth factors would be dominant. In the Deng period, researchers began to talk about 
the third factor of differentiation when the State CMC was established in 1982. 
Nonetheless, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident brought the PLA into the party 
factional conflicts again. Despite this setback of de-politicization of the PLA in 1989, 
questions could still be asked regarding how institutiomalization in the military system 
affected the civil-military relations in the Deng period. Combined with the sixth factor-
the change in military doctrine, more comments could be rendered on the "red" and 
“expect” topology, as well as the political and ideological control system such as the 
political commissar.30 
(eds.), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, pp. 12-29. 
29David E. Albright, "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," World Politics, Vol. 
32, No. 4 (July 1980), pp. 553-576. 
30 Cheung Hsiao Shih challenges both the ‘party control' model and the 'civilian control' model paradigm 
by comparing the political commissar systems' origins, structures, institutional rationales, and political 
roles in the armies of the PRC and the ROC. He proposes that the political commissar system should be 
divided into two parts, one is the party work system that can buttress the party leadership. The other part id 
the political work system that can promote effectiveness and establish good civil-military relations. See 
Cheung Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the People's Republic ofChina and Taiwan: Paradoxes of 
Control (Boulder: Westview, 1990). For the other discussion on the political commissar system, see David 
Shambaugh, "The soldier and the state in China: the political work system in the People's Liberation 
Army," The China Quarterly, No. 127 (September 1991), pp. 527-568. 
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Perlmutter and LeoGrande also think that in the Leninist regimes, the military is 
the normal participants in politics, so it is wrong to apply the concept of military 
intervention in these cases. It is of no sense to differentiate the civilian and military 
leaders in the Party in those revolutionary Leninist regimes. Instead, the concept ofparty-
military elites provides more explanatory power. Various degrees of military autonomy 
are demonstrated vis-_-vis the party and these degrees are related to the stages of change 
over time in each country. Thus Perlmutter and LeoGrande suggest a model to evaluate 
the civil-military relations in the communist regimes: coalition, symbiosis and fusion.^^ 
Coalition means that the party and military benefit mutually by partnership and both are 
more independent. The interaction is on the upper level. The reason for the disagreement 
of Kolkowicz, Odom and Colton lies on their different focuses on the Soviet civil-
military relations. China in the Mao era represented a case of civil-military relation that is 
marked by a low level of differentiation between the military and civilian elites, thus 
creating a symbiotic relation, defined as interactions at all levels. The fused civil-military 
relation is best illustrated by the case of Cuba in which the army and Party are not distinct 
32 
and there is no hegemonic party to lead the proletarian revolution. 
2.3 Post-Communist World 
Although Huntington's concept of professionalism was criticized by several 
scholars listed above, the recent developments in the Eastern Europe and Latin America 
31 The Soviet Union underwent the stages of dependency, symbiosis, and coalition as the final stage. Amos 
Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary 
Soldiers (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977). 
32Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and 
Revolutionary Soldiers. 
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give much credibility to the Huntington's model. Related to his thesis of third-wave 
democracy, Huntington views most post-communist and Latin countries have better civil-
military relations than before under the authoritarian rule. Compared to the other 
emerging economic and social problems these countries encounter, civil-military 
relations are much better handled. The key to the effective control over the military is still 
his concept of professionalism and objective civilian control. Huntington points out that 
the civilian government has taken the military out from the “new professionalism" 
proposed by Stepan two decades ago and the future development depends on a large part 
on the action of civilian leaders. But still, four general problems affecting civil-military 
relations in various new democracies are prevailed: military intervention in politics, pre-
existing military privileges, the definition of roles and missions, and the development and 
diffusion of new military technology.^^ Onyszkiewicz was optimistic on the 
institutionalization of the military hierarchy subordinating to the civilian government by 
various reform tracks.^^ But Russia faces more challenges in putting their military in 
place, compared to the other East European countries. The difficulties include increasing 
crime, insufficient budget and spreading corruption. Also the September 1993 armed 
conflict between the president and his parliamentary opponents and the war in Chechnya 
had once again drawn the military into factional political struggles.^^ To some scholars, 
the danger for military coups and power seizures in Russia and Eastern Europe still 
remains.36 
33 Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner 
(eds.), Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, pp. 3-11. 
34 Janusu Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), 
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, pp. 99-109. 
35 Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Fragmented Armed Forces," Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), 
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, pp. 110-133. 
36 David Mendeloff, "Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: the 'Paradox of Disintegration' and Myth of 
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How to put the armies in place in the post-communist world is still an intense 
question. Can professionalism alone be the panacea to redefme the civil-military 
relations? It may fall into the trap of reductionism if viewing the professionalism as the 
only variable determining the civil-military relations. Instead, the analyses should be 
broadened to include other variables influencing the regime changes. 
Zoltan D. Barany conducts an extensive comparison in the role of military in the 
period ofdomestic upheaval and 1989 transition. He compares those countries in the non-
Soviet Warsaw pact 0sfSWP)- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania in their political involvement. He finds that on one hand, Poland and 
Hungary where the transition were most gradual, there was no armed forces contemplated 
violent interference in political process. The governments in Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany had considered using the armies. The extreme case is Romania in which the 
armies took the executive role to unseat President Ceausescu's regime. Besides, as to the 
other Balkan states, the military officers in Bulgaria had tumed against their Communist 
leaders.37 On the topic of post-communist transition, "de-politicization had gone farthest 
in the states of East Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), where the 
transition to democracy had been the most comprehensive. In the Balkans (Bulgaria and 
Romania), however, just as the questions remain on the extent of political transformation, 
38 
doubts are also entertained regarding the de-politicization of the armed forces." 
Barany furthers his study in drawing several variables to identify the transition of 
the role of military in Eastern Europe. The first continuum is the "professionalized" 
a Military Coup," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1994), pp. 225-245; Dale R. 
Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: The Potential for Praetorianism," 
Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 99-122. 
37 Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," East European Quarterly, 
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pattern in states like Hungary and Poland and the "politicized" type in states like 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania. It helps explain the variation 
between the armed forces during the 1989 regime transitions and the extent of the 
military's democratization in the consolidation period. It proves to be affirmative to 
Huntington's theory that a more professionalized army correlates positively to the 
absence ofmilitary interference in the transition of power. The other conjecture is that the 
strategic choices of forms of government, parliament or presidential, influences civil-
military relations under the new regimes. Those choosing parliamentary systems 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) have been more successful in developing stable and 
balanced civilian controls, than those adopting presidential systems (Romania, Poland). 
Finally, the author suggests that the more gradual the process of power transfer, the less 
likely the military will interfere politically. Also the liberal communist regimes 
(Hungary, Poland) maintain more professionalized armies while the more conservative 
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communist states developed politicized armies. 
After all, both the Latin and post-communist experience reveal that a new system 
of civilian control is an essential aspect of the ongoing democratizing process to ensure 
the political neutrality of the officers. This process may run into difficulties due to the 
resistance by the military and the unstable political environment. 
The past researches on civil-military relations are around the main themes of 
military intervention, civilian control, professionalism and the military role in democratic 
transition. J. Samuel Fitch reminds the scholars that it is still not sufficient for the 
XXVI, No. 1 (March 1992) pp. 1-30. 
38 Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," p. 15. 
39 Zoltan D. Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 30，No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 21-43. 
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analyses in the military non-intervention. Why the coup did occur or why it did not occur 
earlier? For instance, how to explain the case of 1992 coup attempt in Venezuela while its 
structure of civil-military relations had not experienced great changes before the coup?^^ 
Other examples of more politically neutral military could be found in East European 
countries and Soviet too. The cross-regional comparisons done by Zoltan D. Barney 
could be a good starting point to explore the behavior of military intervention and non-
intervention, as well as the correlation between the military and democratization. 
2.4 Military Politics in China 
Professionalism and Factionalism 
Same as the theoretical perspective discussed in the beginning of this chapter, 
some writers start their discussion of the PLA from the Hintington's professionalism. The 
main writers here include Ellis Joffe4i, Helen Jencks^^ and Paul Godwin.^^ The argument 
is that military modernization would de-politicize the PLA. Jencks presses for the link 
between professionalism and modernization, thus attaining the role separation. Joffe, on 
the other hand, puts forward the view that some officers are still involved politically. The 
civil-military relations are the mixed concept of "professionalism", "symbiosis", and 
40 Deborah L. Norden, "Redefming Political-Military Relations in Latin America: Issues of the New 
Democratic Era," ArmedForces andSociety, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 422-423. 
41 Ellis Joffe, Party andArmy: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964 (Harvard East Asian Monographs, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); Ellis 
Joffe, The Chinese ArmyAfter Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
42 Hadan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism: Politics and Professionalism 
in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) 
43 Paul H. B. Godwin, "Professionalism and Politics in the Chinese Armed Forces: A Reconceptualization," 
in Herspring and Volgyes (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1978), pp. 219-240. 
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"civilian control".^^ This is because the officers are not professional enough or they are 
the "party in uniform"-- The officers act in accord to their party identity not the military 
and intervene in politics to uphold the party's power, when confronting intra-party power 
struggles or internal crisis.^^ 
The second approach centers on the concept of factionalism. Factions within 
PLA, stressing the existence of personal networks and cliques, became the essence ofthe 
field army hypothesis. William W. Whitson argues that the alignment of the military 
personnel is determined by the five Field Armies that are formally organized in February 
1949. Then this field army hypothesis could be applied to the major military reshuffling 
and power struggle afterwards.^^ For example, pro-Lin Biao's clique is from the Fourth 
Field Army. Those officers supporting Deng in early succession of power in 1978 are 
mostly from the Second Field. Gordon Bennett also agrees to Whitson's concept that the 
“PLA loyalty systems" have been able to exert noticeable influence over the personnel of 
provincial Party committees after the Cultural Revolution.^^ Harvey Nelson also relates 
the factional behavior of the PLA to the organizational structures in both central and 
regional leveL^^ The counter argument is rendered by William L. Parish who argues that 
the Chinese military is a unified national force, so it can be better understood through a 
44 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
Joffe, Ellis, "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect," The China Quarterly, No. 146 
(June 1996^ pp. 299-314. 
45 Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in uniform: toward a theory of civil-military 
relations in Communist political systems," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 
(December 1982), pp. 778-779. 
46 On the research about the PLA and factionalism, see William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: 
A History ofCommunist Military Politics, 1927-1971 (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1973) ； William W. Whitson, Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution ofPower in 
China, 1956-1971 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1973). 
47 Gordon Bennet, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural 
Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 54 (April/ June 1973), pp. 294-307. 
48 Harvey Nelsen W., The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People 's 
Liberation Army (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981). 
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bureaucratic model rather than a factional modeL^^ 
To understand the Chinese military politics in the post-Mao era, the factional 
approach could capture the essence of some political phenomenon such as the purge of 
the "Yang's family village". However, this would blind the observer on the possibility of 
alternative explanations such as the bureaucratic and organizational base for conflicts. 
Professionalization is the most distinctive feature in the PLA's institutional 
development in the Deng era. How does this organizational development shed light on 
the evolution of the civil-military relations in China, ie. harmony or conflict? Among 
many questions regarding professionalization, the first question asked is who makes the 
drive for professionalization and why? 
It needs not to elaborate here the urgency for modernization and 
professionalization in the technical point of view. Instead, people often ignore the link 
between the consolidation of the PLA, the factional struggle and professionalization. As a 
matter of fact, contrary to Mao who insisted the "red over expect" as we see from the 
case of Peng Dehuai, Deng and Jiang very much highlighted the importance of 
professionalism. Surely, there is the urgency for military to catch up the standard with its 
Western counterparts, but professionalization is often utilized as a political tool to get rid 
of those forces in the PLA unfavorable to the rule of Deng and Jiang. Joffe shows that 
Deng allied with the group of professional military to counter the conservative factions 
and tried to impede the implementation of his policies.，。Jiang has followed the Deng 
policy on professionalism and utilized the process of professionalization to promote his 
49 William L. Parish, Jr, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 56 (October/ 
December 1973)，pp. 667-699. 
5° Ellis Joffe, Party andArmy: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964, p. 150. 
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followers and deepen civilian control over the PLA. 
In sum, the approach of professionalism and factional struggle are useful, though 
not sufficient tools to evaluate the civil-military relations. Besides, the contents of the 
above-mentioned concepts have been changing all over the time. As Ellis Joffe points 
out: 
The rationale for limiting the professional authority of officers no longer exists in the Deng era. 
Whereas in the Maoist period it was the professionalism of the officer corps that moved the 
leadership to curb its autonomy in military matter, under Deng it is this very professionalism that 
has moved the leadership to lift these curbs. 
I agree to the above statements but I would rather emphase that Deng was not 
forced to allow certain extent of military autonomy but did it in view of the technical 
need as the warfare doctrine had changed from the "people's war" to the “limited war". 
Professionalism was subordinate to the "red" army in Mao era but it was the way of army 
consolidation practiced by Deng and Jiang, other than the pure urgency to reform the 
military. Through professionalization those younger military expect could get promoted 
to replace the old conservative forces. Military autonomy was increased as a result of 
professionalization and such autonomy made possible for the civil-military differentiation 
and military disengagement from the politics. However, the picture was not described by 
Huntington's objective control in total correct. At the same time, such increasing military 
autonomy generated corporateness and institutional interests of the PLA that are new 
concepts in the Chinese civil-military relations. This point will be discussed in the next 
section. 
The notion of factional struggles is very popular among many Hong Kong 
journalists but collaborations about Chinese military politics drawn only from 
51 Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964, p. 167. 
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factionalism are clearly unwarranted. After the 1992 purge of Yang's brothers, the 
52 
atmosphere of factional struggle inside the PLA has been much diluted. 
Corporatness and Institutional Interests 
Fang Zhu argues that there is no corporateness in the PLA and it is power sharing 
rather then the satisfaction of the corporate interest explains the civil-military relations 
under the Mao era.^ ^ It is true that the dual role elite and the party-army blending because 
of the guerrilla origin of the power explain the lack of distinctive corporateness. Ellis 
Joffe also suggests the divisions within the PLA that obscure its corpotateness. Whenever 
there are political crisis, the PLA would split into several segments, roughly as the "red" 
and "expect". Both would be supported by different segments of the PLA. The pattern of 
differentiation depends on the issue of conflict at stake. If it related to the corporate 
interest of the PLA, the “military view" would unify the PLA to push forward their 
demand. If the issue is in a more political in sense, the PLA would be separated into the 
segments of "professional officers" and the senior military leaders. Deng and the 
professional armies could reach accord on modernization program but should put some 
effort in resolving the political disagreement with the senior military leaders.^^ The 
question of whether the PLA has their own corporate interests depends on the issues; if 
the agendas are combat-oriented or not. 
52 Henry Harding holds the other opinion that the factional struggles may go on while the military would 
probably ally with the conservatives, thus making the military intervention in civilian politics possible. See 
Harry Harding, "On the Four Great Relationships': The Prospects for China," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2, 
(Summer 1994^ pp. 22-42. 
53 Fang Zhu, Party-Army Relations in Maoist China: 1949-1976 O^MI Dissertation Service, Columbia 
University, 1994), pp. 13-14. 
54 Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-
1964. 
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Attempts of examining Chinese military as an interest group have been made by 
authors like Harry Harding who identifies the personal interests, corporate interests, 
programmatic interests (domestic and foreign interests) and leadership interests (demand 
the leaders to be responsive to the above interests).^^ In the arena of foreign policy, 
Gerald Segal argues that the PLA can hardly be perceived as a unified group as conflicts 
cut across the whole unit.^^ John W. Garver renders his criticism by projecting the PLA 
as an uncompromising hard-liner interest group in foreign policy, perceiving US efforts 
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as bullying and weakening China. 
In the Mao era, the military civilian conflicts centered on the personal, factional 
allocation of power. Factions were often mixed and did not represent observable 
institutional or corporate interest of the PLA. Factional interests preceded the corporate 
institutional interests. Thus the factor of personal cliques offers a sound explanation to 
the civil-military conflicts. But inthe new era under Jiang, the corporateness ofthe PLA 
is emerging. The increasing military corporateness and new emerging institutional 
interests will become important inputs in the new form of civil-military relations, 
replacing the traditional factional explanation. As the PLA is changing in their orientation 
from "red" to “expect，，，how to place their emerging corporate interest and keep the PLA 
in line with the Party will become an urgent task for Jiang. 
In sum, civil-military relations in the Mao era are characterized by "civilian 
55 Harry Harding, "The role of the military in Chinese politics," in Victor C. Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and 
Groups in Contemporary China, pp. 213-256. 
56 Gerald Segal, "The military as a group in Chinese politics," in David E. Goodman (ed.), Groups and 
Politics in the People's Republic ofChina (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 83-101. 
57john W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," in C. Dennison Lane, Mark 
Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (ed.), Chinese Military Modernization (London and New York: Kegan Paul 
International; Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1996), pp. 246-281. 
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control centered on Mao,” "power sharing with the revolutionary red army" and "party-
army blending in the form of dual-role elites". In the Deng era, the civil-military relations 
evolved as we can recognize the differentiation of "red" and "expect", parallel with the 
profound changes in the PLA under professionalization. Deng allied with the "expect" to 
fight against the “red，，. In the Jiang period, the emerging "expect" dominated in the PLA 
and Jiang should consider how to appeal to the military institutional interests such as the 
defense budget and acquisitions of the foreign arms. A new form of political relations 
concerning the institutional interests does merit serious considerations in postulating a 
general conjecture in the Chinese military politics. 
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Chapter Three 
Institutional Development of PLA: 
From Deng to Post-Deng Era 
"establishing a powerful, modernized, and professional revolutionary army." 
� D e n g Xiaoping' 
“Be political up to mark, have mastery of military skills, demonstrate a fine work style, be strict in 
discipline, and provided effective support." 
~ "Five Phrases" put forward by Jiang 
Zemin in 1996 as the guiding principles 
for the army. 
3.1 PLA in the Deng Era 
PLA and the Arrest of the Gang ofFour 
In the Mao and Deng era, the personal influence and ties with the military 
explain partly for no military coups taking all over the executive rules, except in those 
years during the Cultural Revolution. But still, political crisis and intra-party conflicts 
would give rise to the opportunities for military intervention in politics. The Cultural 
Revolution represented the climax of military intervention in Chinese Communist 
Politics. The PLA was involved in the politics under the slogan of "three supports and 
two militaries" (support industry, support agriculture, and support the board masses of 
the left; military control and political and military training). After the downfall ofLin 
Biao, the military still played a decisive role in the arrest of the Gang of Four. This 
could be manifested in the "October 6 Coup" initiated by the military leaders: Ye 
Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen who were on the side of Hua Guofeng 
against the Gang of Four. The incident again demonstrated the ability of the military 
in influencing the political succession. The “October 6 Coup" exhibits the following 
characteristics: 1. The military intervention was not praetorian in nature but would 
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support the civilian. 2. There was no absolute principle of “the Party control the gun" 
as Mao envisaged. 3. The political upheaval would provide opportunities for military 
• 2 
intervention and consequently expand its strength. 
Deng's Armv Consolidation- Ideological and Power Struggle after 1978 
Deng resumed position as PLA chief of Staff and was the Vice Chairman of 
the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission post in 1977. Since Deng 
returned to office, he had taken several measures to consolidate his power in the army. 
These include 1) moving pro-Deng elements into leading military position through the 
reshuffles of leadership personnel; 2) promoting structural reform in the PLA so as to 
2 
strengthen the Party's leadership over it; 3) strengthening political education. 
Taking the advantage of uprooting the residual influence of the Gang of Four, 
Deng put his followers to the important positions and eliminate the dissidents from 
the leading posts.^ Totally thirty military leaders were purged in 1977.5 In September 
1997, Deng appointed some of his followers, mainly the generals belonged to the 
second field, to the leading posts including Wei Guoqing (director of the General 
Political Department), Luo Ruiqing (secretary-general of the Military Commission) 
and Yang Yung (deputy chief of the General Staff). 
After the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng could assume the upper hand in the 
1 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, p. 349. 
2 Yu Yulin, "Politics in Teng Hsiao-ping 's Army-Building strategy (1977-1984)" Issues and Studies, 
Vol. 21, No. 10，(October 1985), pp. 34-57. 
3 Yu Yulin, op. cit., pp. 34-57. 
4 Those being purged were mainly the followers of the Gang ofFour but not Mao. This was because of 
Hua Guofeng's insistence not to widen the scope of attack, the resistance from various factions within 
the PLA and the lack of adequate political strength of Deng to make an all out campaign. See Yu 
Yulin, op. cit., pp. 34-57. 
5 Ho Pin, "Mainland China's Military Situation in 1977," Studies on Chinese Communism {Gongtan 
Wenti Ycmji), Vol. 27, no. 1，(January 1978)，pp. 25-26. The purged leaders included Hu Wei (deputy 
chief ofthe General Staff), Tien Weihsin (deputy director of the General Political Department), Chang 
Tzunghsun (director of the General Logistics Department), Ma Ning (commander of the Air Force), 
Mao Yuanhsin (political commander of the Shenyang Military Region), Sun Yukuo (deputy 
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power struggle but the "Whateverists" still had formidable strength in the PLA. The 
conservatives within the PLA were centered around Ye Jianying.^ 
The struggle between pro-Deng and pro-Hua centered on the ideological 
debates. Deng advanced his principle of pragmatism in the conference of the PLA 
political work in 1978 and in the Third Plenary Session. This led to some confusion 
and dissatisfaction in the military over what was perceived to be an attempt to 
downplay the role of ideology and to de-politicize the PLA. The veterans who had 
vested interests in the military were discontent on the lowest priority of the defense 
modernization among the four modernization. They were undoubtedly worried about 
losing their prestige and privileges, so they would tum out to be the conservative bloc 
inside the PLA as the countenance ofDeng's reformist force.^ 
Definitely, Deng confronted much resistance in his defense modernization 
program and indications revealed that Deng should soften his de-Maofication position 
to some extent. In 1979 Deng could not implement his military reform in due course. 
His reform plan was mainly on two aspects: 1) the streamlining of Military Regions 
from 11 to 6, 2) personnel cut back from 450 million to 300 million. But the proposal 
faced the resistance from the PLA inside. In view of this, Deng carried out another 
personnel reshuffle to consolidate his power aiming to reduce the conservative power 
inside the PLA. 
commander of the Shengyang Military region), Ting Sheng (commander of the Nanjing Military 
Region) and Liu Hsing-yuan (commander of the Chengdu Military Region).. 
6 Ye Jianying was well-known for his stress on incorrect political ideology in the army. In the speech at 
the All-Army Political Work Conference in 1978. Ye said, "Without political work to ensure the 
party's absolute leadership over the army politically, ideologically and organizationally, our army 
would cease to exit." "Political work is the lifeblood of our army under the new historical conditions 
just as it was in the past." "Political work is the lifeblood of our army," Liberation Army Daily editorial 
(10 August 1978); FBIS (11 August 1978)，E23-26. Ye stressed on the "past" and the army's "fine 
tradition in holding chairman Mao's great banner" indicated that there was some ideology conflict 
between the conservative side and the policies promulgated in the Third Plenum Congress. 
7 The PLA was an important arena for ideological debate, bi 1979, the Military Affairs Commission 
(MAC) issued the article emphasizing the need to carry out readjustment within the PLA and learning 
the experience from the foreign countries. This was well expressed in the article by Defense Ministry, 
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Therefore, it was not surprising that another personnel reshuffling was 
launched in 1980. Almost all of the military region commanders were replaced and 
many of whom had held their commands throughout the Cultural revolution. Some 
local military leaders were moved to the central to make room for the newer and 
younger leaders. Most notable should be the Deng's decision to give the post of the 
chief of the General Staff Department to Yang Dezhi. By doing so, Yang could 
succeed the Deng's post as he was his ardent follower and had contribution in the 
Vietnam War. Although Deng resigned as Chief of Staff, he still retained his Military 
Commission post. 
However, the role of Mao was still the apple of discord in the ideological 
g 
struggle between the conservative force within the PLA and Deng's faction • In 1981, 
campaign for Deng's principle of "truth" was launched inside PLA as the political 
indoctrination and as the effort to seek the PLA's support on Deng's modernization 
reform. The article "Unswervingly uphold absolute party leadership over the army" 
by Yang Dezhi in the People's Daily attracted much attention. The article was 
reported to facilitate the army consolidation at the time of power replacement from 
Hua Guofeng to Hu Yaobang. The principle of "party commands the gun" was 
necessary to let the new secretary Hu to build up his own authority and leadership 
over the army.^ 
Nonetheless, Deng could not help but make some concession to the leftist 
later. ^^The articles "Create a Good Atmosphere for Studying Mao Zedong Military 
Xu Xiangqian. The issuing of the article was an indirect way to declare the beginning of de-
Maofication and an ideological struggle against Hua Guofeng. 
8 Political pulls and hauls were still going on. The article by Wang Hezhen in 10 April Liberation Army 
Daily represented the strike for pro-Mao's line. But it was refuted and criticized by the pro-Deng's 
writer Xiao Jian. 
9 "Possible contradictions between party, army viewed," Hong Kong Cheng Ming (6 July 1981), p.l; 
FBIS-CHI(6 July 1981), p. W6. 
� Deng's retreat was manifested in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party 
since the Founding of the PRC" in the Sixth Plenum Party Congress. Deng softened criticism of Mao 
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Ideology" and "The 4 Basic Principles Should not be Violated" issued on 24 March 
and 20 April Liberation army Daily editorial in 1982 respectively served as the 
counterback of the conservatives and the "Whateverists" against the Deng's faction.^ 
The article “The Four cardinal Principles Should Not be Violated" placed a harsh 
criticism on the Film Script "Unrequited Love" written by Bai Hua. In that article, 
Deng's reformist policy was criticized for inducing the bourgeois liberation and 
individualism. Yielding to the pressure of the conservatives, the anti-liberation 
movement was initiated afterwards. 
Nonetheless, Deng would not make the all out compromise to the conservative 
power inside PLA. On one hand, Deng continue to take pain to secure the support 
from the PLA. He made the inspection tour, in foll military uniform, around the 
provincial organizations and military units. It was an attempt to pass the message that 
Deng was still in charge of the military and quell resistance for streamlining.^^ But 
the task could not gain the result as we soon saw the article by Zhao Yiya in 28 
August Liberation Army Daily criticizing Deng's modernization. The article "The 
Communist Ideology Is The Nucleus of the Socialist Spiritual Civilization" indicated 
that the conservative faction within the PLA still constituted a formidable influence 
and they insisted on their rights of political intervention. The PLA still maintained 
13 
their role of defender of the correct line in the Party and did not step down. 
However, situation was changed rapidly few months later when the article 
urging self-criticism was issued on September 1982 for cleaning up the leftist 
influence within the PLA. On 27 September 1982 a lengthy article covering a whole 
page was published as a self-criticism for Zhao Yiya's article in the Liberation Army 
and dropped charges against PLA's "support the left" role during the Cultural Revolution. 
11 "Jiefanjun Bao on Studying Mao Military Ideology," FBIS-CHI{25 March 1982), p. K3. 
12 "Deng 'is on inspection tour,'" Hong Kong South China Morning Post (5 February, 1982). 
13 Yu Yu-lin, op. cit. , pp. 46. 
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Daily. The title of the article was “An Article Imbued With Serious Mistakes." The 
self-criticism was beyond doubt of a blow on the conservative men of letters in the 
army.i4 After that, Deng gained the upper hand again and he could made the 
personnel arrangement to promote his trusted in the PLA in the coming 12仇 Party 
Congress . i5 
Most notably, in the 12出 Party Congress, the state MAC was established 
according to the new constitution issued in April 1982. The General Political 
Department was placed under the control of the state MAC. This new MAC changed 
the military leadership structure in that the armed forces would be placed under the 
state. Thus this would take away the day-to-day administration from the party and 
could facilitate Deng's effort in making the Army a regular force and strengthening 
the modernization program/^ The effort of forming the state MAC was a quiet 
revolution to reduce the power of the party MAC which was studded with elderly 
veterans officer. But this move of de-politicization did not mean that Deng was ready 
to give up the control of the Army. Deng still kept the military under his tight control 
by maintaining his post as the chairman in both the state and party MAC. Nor the set-
up of the state MAC signified a total separation of party, army and state. Party 
theoretical journals stressed that not only would the party control of the army stay on, 
14 "Army newspaper attacked Party's open policy and was compelled to make self-criticism because of 
the failure of its efforts," Hong Kong Ming Pao (2 October 1982), p. 5; "Ming Pao notes PLA paper's 
self-criticism," FBIS-CHI{A October 1982), p. W6-7. 
15 The Zhao Yiya's issue was uncommon as it occurred in the eve of the first plenary session of the 12 '^' 
CPC Congress. The fmal result on the power struggle was also clearly shown in the Party Congress, 
Wei Guoqing was stripped ofhis post as the chief ofthe General Political Department due to the article 
of Zhao Yiya. Besides, Deng could successfully remove those anti-Deng generals such as Xu Siyou. 
Those pro- Deng members Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi and Qi Qiwai were promoted. Most 
significant was the setting up of the Central Advisory Committee for those "retired" generals. In 
addition to Wei Guoqing, those relegated to the position of advisors were Chen Xilian, Xu Shiyou, 
Geng Biao and Su Yu. See "Two morejoin powerful MAC," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (5 
January, 1983). Secretary General of the MAC, Geng Biao, had already replaced by Yang Shangkun in 
1981. 
16 "New military council ends 'anomaly,"' Hong Kong South China Morning Post (21 January, 1982). 
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but would be strengthened. 
18 At the same time, the streamlining of the armed forces had began. It was 
under way in the direction of reduction in the commissions and administrative offices 
as well as the reduction in the training courses. These restructuring in various units 
entailed the retirement of many officers in senior ranks. Deng pointed out the 
streamlining was the issue of "shedding fat" to solve the problem of overstaffing and 
ineffective command. Cutting the personnel and military expenditure would create a 
favorable environment for state construction. Deng also believed “the most important 
thing is to set up a system of enlistment and retirement for officers."^^ This would 
upgrade the quality of officers and remove those elderly veterans to make room for 
the "new bloods." 
The first plenary session of the 12^ ^ Party Congress and the personnel 
2Q 
reshuffling of the PLA was followed by the continuous political indoctrination. 
^ 1 
Deng still had to fight hard in the battle of ideological debates. Campaign for army 
17 For Instance, the PLA General Political Department decided to set up a Communist Youth League 
general branch committee at battalion level throughout the army. The CYL units existed in the PLA 
before the Cultural Revolution but there were no CYL units at the regimental or battalion level before. 
The elevation of the CYL units from the brigade or division to battalion level is a clear indication of 
consolidating the party's hold on the military. The party secretariat Hu Yaobang, a former head of the 
Communist Youth League, might make this arrangement to pave the way for his ultimate control ofthe 
armed forces. See "Streamlining of armed forces discussed," SCMP (16 June 1982) p. 8; FBIS-CHI 
(22 June 1982),p. Wl-4. 
18 Guangzhou Military Region was the first of the 11 regions for streamlining process as the fourth 
field army of Lin Biao remained in the regions even after removing most of Lin Biao's followers. 
Guangzhou was set as first example for the similar moves in other sensitive regions such as Jinan and 
Fuzhou. Both had under strong influence of the Gang of Four. "Streamlining of armed forces 
discussed," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (16 June 1982), p. 8; FBIS-CHI (22 June 1982), p. 
Wl-4. 
19 "Deng Xiaoping on 'overstaffmg' of PLA," Hong Kong Wen Wei Po (1 July 1983) p. 3; FBIS-CHI 
(6 July 1983), p .Wl . 
20 The article "It is necessary to pay attention to eliminating the influence of 'leftist' ideology in the 
military realm" written by Yang Yong in 1981 was republished in Guangming Ribao. "Yang Yong on 
'leftist influence in military," FBIS-CHI (3 February 1983), p. K11-15. 
21 An article in People's Daily in April 1983 stated that leftist ideology still existed inside the Party. 
The 3-year rectification drive of Party organization struggled to purify the PLA was started in 
December by a report on correcting unhealthy trends in a unit in the Beijing Military Region. 
However, after the 2"^ Plenum of the CCP's 12^ CC Congress in October 1983, the situation soon 
developed into the anti-Rightist and anti-modernization movement. It went into the climax inside the 
PLA when the political indoctrination was switched in direction by the continuous articles eulogizing 
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consolidation and purification still went on that meant Deng could crack down his 
critics and again gain the upper hand in controlling the military. This provided the 
necessary condition for the 1985 massive streamlining and personnel reshuffling. 
The year 1985 marked the watershed in the PLA's development in Deng's 
reform. Li Desheng, one of the anti-Deng's commanders, relinquished his post as the 
head of Shengyang Military Region in 1985. Deng's proposal of streamlining had 
gone through all the ways for implementation. Since then, the Military Regions would 
be trimmed from eleven to seven by combining some Military Regions with their 
neighbors. A pruning of the four million armed forces by one million coincided with 
the personnel reshuffling made only three commanders who were well-known for 
their pro-Deng position could remain in their original posts, for example, Zhang 
Aiping (Defense Minister), Yang Dezhi (Chief of the General Staff Department), 
Hong Xuexhi (Chief of the General Logistics Department) and Yiu Qiuli (Director of 
the General Political Department). Although the top posts were still in the hands of 
the old guards, there were rooms for the second-tier leadership to move up. The 
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restructured regional commands were left for the younger generations. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the vice-chairmen of the Central Military 
Commission, Ye Jinying, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, as well as Zhang Aiping 
Mao in late December 1983. Moreover, sign of resistance from the PLA was revealed in a radio 
broadcast from Beijing in early 1984. The east China section of the party's Central Advisory 
Committee held a meeting in January during which a message from a central politburo member gave 
"high regards to Xu Shiyou and others." Xu, who had been the commander-in-chief both in the 
Nanjing and Canton military regions, also gave a remark in the meeting: "Consolidating the party? In 
my opinion, it is we ourselves that should be consolidated first." The article revealed the intense 
ideological struggle inside the PLA. Xu Shiyou was said to have become the enemy of Deng and the 
broadcast showed the resistance force in the party's rectification campaign began last year. 
But the resistance force from the PLA could not stop the issuing of the editorial in People 's Daily and 
the Liberation Army Daily negating the Cultural Revolution and the "Three Supports and Two 
Militaries" in 1984. Mingpao Monthly (October 1984). 
22 "Military shuffle paves way for party revamp," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (19 June 
1985). It is important to note that the vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, Ye Jinying, 
Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, as well as Zhang Aiping and Hong Xuezhi, resigned from the 
Politburo and the Central Committee and a number of younger leaders were elected to the Central 
Committee. 
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and Hong Xuezhi, resigned from the Politburo and none of the newly elected 
technocrats replacing them has military background. The Central Committee and a 
number of younger leaders were elected to the Central Committee, mading up the 
average age falling from 64.9 to 56.1?^ The clean-out in the top echelons lessened the 
influence of military seriously and the changes were designed to ensure the 
continuation of Deng's policies after his retirement. 
Tracing the ideological and power struggles between Deng's faction and the 
— � 
3 conservative force inside the PLA, one can see the intact ups and downs ofboth sides. 
From 1978 onwards, the issue of Deng's modernization was the core of debate. The 
leftist force was centered around General Ye Jianying and the conflict were apparent. 
The 1980 reshuffling could not stop the continuous opposition and Deng assumed a 
more compromising attitude in 1982 due to the high pressure aroused from the Bai 
Hua Incident and Zhao Yiya's article. However, the outcome of intense struggle 
turned to Deng's side manifested in the reshuffling in late 1982. Soon after the First 
Plenary of the 12^ ^ Party Congress, the 3-year rectification campaign was carried out. 
Still discontent existed inside the conservative force in the PLA until 1985 Deng 
could quell all these resistance and launched the grand plan of one million personnel 
streamlining. Generally speaking, although Deng had assumed a compromising 
attitude to the PLA conservative force as demonstrated in the modification of the 
evaluation of Mao and Cultural Revolution, he did not retreat all to the PLA. 
It should be emphasized that not all PLA leaders belonged to the conservative 
anti-Deng force. Ellis Joffe suggested the main source of PLA dissident came from 
the General Political Department. They exercised their influence through the 
23 "Military's influence declining," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (30 September 1985). 
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Liberation Army Daily and the informal ties in their military fields.^^ The 
oganizational interests of the General Political department drove them coming to 
emphasize the conservative political ideology. They safeguarded the Mao's doctrine 
and insisted the socialist revolution. The Bai Hua Incident revealed that the General 
Political Department was implicitly challenged Party guidelines on intellectual dissent 
and upholding the leftist tradition. 
Apart from the organizational reasoning suggested by Ellis Joffe, the question 
why the PLA would preserve their leftist tradition and become the resistance to the 
Deng's plan of modernization could gain some hints in the viewpoint of the PLA's 
social situation and interests too. First, the PLA was the big gainer in the Cultural 
Revolution. It was estimated about 4.45 million members of the PLA were under the 
influence of Lin Biao and a significant number of the PLA were promoted during the 
Cultural Revolution. The concept of negating the Cultural Revolution and "de-
Maofication" were perceived as a threat to the PLA when it related to the affair of Lin 
Biao. The officers at different levels were reportedly in early 1980s amid rumors of a 
massive purge following the trial of Lin Biao's leading followers and the Gang of 
Four. 25 The great apprehension and unrest in the ranking military leaders related to 
24 It should be emphasized that not all PLA leaders were belong to the conservative anti-Deng force. 
Ellis Joffe suggested the main source of PLA dissident came from the General Political Department. 
They exercised their influence through the Liberation Army Daily and the informal ties in their military 
fields. The oganizational interests of the General Political department drove them coming to emphasize 
the conservative political ideology. They safeguarded the Mao's doctrine and insisted the socialist 
revolution. Bai Hua Incident revealed that the General Political Department had implicitly challenged 
Party guidelines on intellectual dissent and upholding the leftist tradition. Ellis Joffe, The Chinese 
Army After Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 149-169. 
25 Apart from the organizational reasoning suggested by Ellis Joffe, the question why the PLA would 
preserve their leftist tradition and become the resistance to the Deng's plan of modernization could gain 
some hints in the viewpoint ofthe PLA's social situation and interests too. First, the PLA was the big 
gainer in the Cultural Revolution. It was estimated about 4.45 million members of the PLA were under 
the influence of Lin Biao and a significant number of the PLA were promoted during the Cultural 
Revolution. The concept of negating the Cultural Revolution and de-Maofication were perceived as a 
threat to the PLA when it related to the affair of Lin Biao. The officers in different levels were 
reportedly in early 80s in amid rumors of a massive purge following the trial of Lin Biao's leading 
followers and the Gang of Four. According to the information, the fear was particularly strong in the 
Military regions of Shengyang, Nanjing and Guangzhou. "Rumors of massive purge worry soldiers," 
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"de-Maofication" and negating the Cultural revolution pushed them to be offensive in 
Deng's reform policies. 
As the same in other governmental departments, the cadre personnel reform 
for professionalization may contradict to the interests of some officers. At the lower 
level, the officers were dissatisfied about the lessening of the system of "promoting 
cadres from the PLA officers." This was especially discredited by the soldiers in the 
villages. Moreover, discontent in the military hierarchy warranted much attention, 
such as the economic problems of wages and low military budgets. The system of 
"fixing farm output quotas for each household" (bao cha du wu) had its rewarding 
• 2 6 
achievements but the benefits were not extended to the soldiers. 
Deng's Strategies in Armv Consolidation 
The outcome of power struggle between Deng and the conservative force in 
PLA was uncertain until 1985 when the massive streamlining campaign could be 
passed through without severe resistance. Why Deng could clear up all the obstacles 
and hold a firm grip over the PLA? Concluding Deng's strategies in consolidating his 
power in the PLA, one could come up to three points. First was the personnel 
reshuffling of putting Deng's men in the leading positions while uprooting those 
against him. Deng took advantages in every occasion for personnel reshuffling, for 
example, during the time of arresting of the Gang of Four as well as the 
Tokyo Kyodo (20 February 1980); FBIS-CHI (20 February 1980)，p. L3. The great apprehension and 
unrest in the ranking military leaders related to de-Maofication and negating the Cultural revolution 
pushed them to be offensive in Deng's reform policies. 
26 The peasant households composed of a large labor force often became very prosperous. The army 
dependents, on the other hand, lack a strong labor force and the localities did not give any preferential 
treatment to them, so their living standard of army dependents was more carried out than before. It 
caused the mood of "it is a loss to become an armyman" comparing to the other much well-off 
economic sectors in the rural areas. The soldiers thus aspired to retum to the economic production for 
better family fortune. "Hu Yaopang demands overcoming discontent of rural armymen," Hong Kong 
Mingpao (26 December 1981)，p.2. "China post editorial on discontent in PRC army," Taipei China 
Post (5 September 1981), p. 4; FBIS-CHI{l5 February 1981) Vl-2. 
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implementation of the defense modernization and professionalism. 
The second strategy related to the ideological aspect. Deng's firm attitude in 
implementing the Four Modernizations and negating the Cultural Revolution was 
critical in dissolving the leftist influence inside the Party and the PLA. Through the 
"de-Maoification" campaign and criticisms to the leftist force for its "supporting the 
left" involvement in the Cultural Revolution, Deng could fight back against the 
conservatives. 
The third strategy lied on the professionalization of the PLA and it was side by 
side with the personnel reshuffles. Through the modernization and professionalization 
campaign, Deng could have a sound excuse to “inject the new blood" into the PLA 
and get rid of the old conservative forces by the new system of Advisory Committee. 
The strategy of professionalization could also facilitate the long-term goal of de-
politicizing the PLA. Despite the old veterans fought back by the slogan of 
revolutionary army and glorious leftist tradition, the conservative influence finally 
gave way to Deng's PLA rectification campaign. In addition to the strategic success 
due to the acumen of Deng, one cannot miss the factor on the achievements of the 
economic reforms that created a favorable environment for defense modernization and 
professionalization. 
In 1985, the grand plan of military restructuring signified a new changing 
civil-military relation was on way. Different from Mao's strategy in dealing with the 
military, Deng adopted a new path in toeing the military in line. The key concepts in 
Deng's thought were professionalization, regularization, differentiation and de-
politicisation. However, the PLA did not keep their hands off from the politics under 
the Deng's reform that emphased regularization and professionalization. What were 
the legacy of revolutionary armies and how it changed under the new modernization? 
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After almost a decade reform, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident suddenly caught 
the eyes all over the world on the PLA in Chinese politics again. The role of the PLA 
in the 1989 incident and in the next leadership succession still warranted much 
attention. 
The Tiananmen Square Incident 
�Setback to de-politicization and differentiation? 
The June Four Incident directly brought the PLA into the political dispute in 
1989. After the demonstration was crushed and the leadership struggle at the highest 
level was resolved, Deng "constitutionalized" Jiang as "the core leader" who 
integrated the party, army and state powers, by combining the offices of General 
Secretary, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman and State President in his 
person. 
Deng achieved much stability in military over the years up to 1989. But the 
army's propensity to intervene in politics remains a question mark after 1989. The 
CCP top leadership was alected by the uncertain response of the military during the 
crisis as the army might disagree to fire towards the demonstrators in 1989. Many 
indications demonstrated that there were objection and resistance to the decision to 
use force against the students in the army. But the fact was that PLA obeyed the 
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civilian leaders. 
After the incident, the PLA could probably get the rewards in exchange. Some 
sources reported that Yang Shangkun agreed to move against the demonstrators only 
after exacting Deng's pledge to allow the military a greater political role. Those 
servicemen acted bravely in the incident were awarded and a new tide of political 
27 see Andrew Scobell, "Why the People's Army Fired on the People: The Chinese Military and 
Tiananmen" 'mArmedForces andSociety ,Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 193-213. 
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education campaign inside the PLA was launched to reinforce the concept of the 
“Party commands the gun". Considerably, the June Fourth Crisis increased the 
bargaining power of the PLA, as once the PLA was called out, it was not so easily for 
28 . • • • 
military to withdraw from its role in decision-making process. The rise in military 
representation in the higher political echelons would be a reward for undertaking 
military repression in 1989. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to see that after 1989, the effort to restore control 
was nowhere more apparent in the military. Besides, the 1989 crisis reinforced the 
notion in the mind of the Beijing's leaders that the element of internal stability is of 
paramount importance today and the foreseeable future and the loyalty of the PLA is 
indispensable to achieve stability. Army is the head and core of coercion as the state 
apparatus of most authoritarian regimes. Even Deng had to spend several days lining 
up support from various military regions, so one cannot rule out the possibility that 
the military may not always support the Party in face of popular opposition in 
future.29 
3.2 PLA in the Post-Deng Era 
�Dismissing the elders and injecting the new bloods 
The 1992 Reshuffling 
There are totally three major personnel reshufflings regarding the top brass in 
28 Chong-pin Lin, "The stealthy advance of China's People's Liberation Army" in The American 
Enterprise, Vol. 5 (Jan./ Feb. 1994)，pp. 28-35. Right after the incident, June Teufel Dreyer predicted 
that the PLA will have tremendous increase in their political influence. But after a period of 
observation, she refuted this notion by staging that the military leaders were not promoted to leading 
positions within party and government in any greater number than before. See June Teufel Dreyer, 
"The People's Liberation Army and the Power struggle of 1989", in Problems of Communism Vol. 38 
(Sept./ Oct. 1989), pp. 41-48; June Teufel Dreyer, "The Role of the Military," China Political System: 
Modernization and Tradition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), 205-209. 
29 Some may argued that 1989 crisis is an evidence of army intervention in politics again, like the one 
in the Cultural Revolution. See A. James Gregor, “ The People's Liberation Army and China's Crisis" 
Armed Forces and Society Vol. 18，No. 1 (Fall 1991)，pp. 7-28 and Harlan W. Jencks, "Civil-Military 
Relations in China: Tiananmen and After" Problems of Communism, Vol. 40, (May-June 1991), pp. 
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the army during the time and after Jiang Zemin succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the 
chairman in the CMC. The reshuffling took place in the years of 1992, 1995 and 
1997. The year of 1992 is critical in a sense that the Party has to decide the future path 
of reform and Deng made his trip to Southern China to seek support for the 
continuation of his reform line. The struggle between the conservative and reform 
force inside the Party usually manifested in the results of the personnel 
rearrangements in the Party Congress. Early in 1992 before the 14^ ^ Party Congress 
held in December, all kinds of speculations focused on how Deng secured his reform 
line. The other major concern in the 14^ ^ Party Congress should be the Jiang's 
succession to the post of the CMC chairman and related personnel reshuffling to 
consolidate Jiang's power inside the PLA that involved the "purging" of the Yang's 
brother. 
Throughout the year of 1992, the urge for the army supporting the national 
economic reforms was much more apparent than before, ensuring Deng's line of 
market reform. After Deng's Southern tour in April 1992, the PLA General Political 
Department organized three batches of leading comrades to visit Guangzhou's special 
economic zones. These high-ranking generals reportedly pledged to forever remain 
staunch backers of the reform and opening up，In the same month, the navy also 
expressed their earnest continuous support toward the reform and the commanders 
pledged to uphold the stability for the national's economic development and further 
31 
opening to the outside world. 
According to a source from Hong Kong, Deng gave a speech in the meeting 
with the commanders and political commissars in March. In addition to stressing the 
14-29. 
3° "Generals pledge support ‘forever,，，’ Guangzhou Nanfang Ribao (22 April 1992), p.l , FBIS-CHI (23 
April 1992), pp. 19-20. 
31 "Navy to support reform," BeijingXinhua (23 April 1992); FBIS-CHI (23 April 1992), p.20. 
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development of science and technology, Deng emphasized particularly to the 
adherence to the principle of "Party commands the gun." Deng said, "Our people's 
Army has a good tradition, that is, the party commands the gun. The gun should be 
absolutely subordinated to the party's command and should most firmly and rapidly 
carry out the party's calls and orders. Thus it will provide a reliable guarantee for 
adhering to the party's basic line for 100 years." Moreover, Deng did call for the 
32 
continuous real action from the army to support and defend reform and opening up. 
The call of Deng soon had the response from the PLA. The Liberation Army Daily 
relayed Deng's theory of socialism in Chinese characters and urged for the integration 
of "planning" with the “market，？^ Evidence showed that Deng was successful in his 
strategic action in excuring escort from the barrel of the gun. 
In the wake of the high tide unleashed by the Deng's Southern tour, the focus 
was soon shifted to the controversies in the 14^ ^ Party Congress. The hints of 
reshuffling were revealed as early as May 1992, such as asking who could enter the 
Central Committee.^^ The sources from Hong Kong made the predictions that Deng 
would retire from his post in CMC and Yang Shangkun would also step down. It 
came out to be true that Yang Shungkun was kicked out from all military positions 
following the 14") Party Congress. In early 1992, Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, 
both had senior positions in the CMC, were accused of their alleged attempt to 
35 
dominate the military hierarchy through an extensive factional network. 
32 "Deng reportedly fetes high-ranking officers," Hong Kong Ching Pao, No. 178 (5 May 1992), p.40; 
FBIS-CHI{U May 1992), pp. 32-33. 
33 “philosophic not equals," Liberation Army Daily {Jiefangjun Bao) (13 May 1992), p.3, "Army paper 
praises Deng's Southem Tour Remarks," FBIS-CHI (28 May 1992), pp. 25-26. 
34 Willy Wo-lap Lam, "CMC reportedly to be reshuffled after congress," Hong Kong South China 
Morning Post (13 May, 1992); FBIS-CHI (13 May 1992), p. 31. "Report on Central Military 
Commission Meeting," HongKongKuang Chiao Ching, No. 236 (16 May 1992), pp. 12-13, FBIS-CHI 
(19May 1992), pp. 26-27. 
35 see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Leadership Changes at the Fourteen Party Congress" & Tai Ming Cheung 
"the People's Liberation Army in 1992: Political Power Plays and Power Projection," Kuan Hsinchi & 
Maurice Brosseau, eds., The China Review 1993 (Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Chinese University 
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However, it turned out to be a surprise on the resignation of Yang Baibing 
(Yang Shangkun's brother) when he reportedly had made his appeal in a military 
meeting to positively support reform and open-door policies in March 1992.36 yang 
Baibang kept his seat in the Central Committee but was relieved from all his posts in 
the PLA. 
The new list on the military leadership was, Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zheng 
were the vice-chairmen of the CMC. They also got the membership in the Central 
Committee. Moreover, Liu Huaqing became the member in the Politburo Standing 
Committee. A number of professional soldiers were promoted to some important 
posts as well. 
The removal of Yang's brother and the new personnel arrangement had 
several implications for Deng's design to smooth the way for Jiang to really succeed 
his place in the CMC. The first and foremost thing to do is to curb the factionalist 
struggles inside the military. The expansion of the power base of Yang's brothers was 
accelerated after 1989 as the rewards for their support to the Tiananmen crackdown. 
However, the Yang's "dynasty" irritated many senior but still influential generals 
especially Yang Baibing as he did not possess any actual military experience. Also the 
old generals were dissatisfied and worried about the impact on Yang's faction inside 
the military. Jiang was less influential in the military compared to the Yang's brother. 
Without the military background that can consolidate the military, Jiang surely had a 
hard time to seek total support from the PLA. As Deng envisioned the possible 
adverse impact on Yang's monopoly in military authority, the purge of the Yang's 
brothers became an essential part for a smooth transition of leadership. Just before the 
Press, 1993), pp. 2.22-2.24. & 6.2-6.21. 
36 "Sources Say Yang Baibing Urges Support for Deng," Tokyo KYODO (22 April 1992); FBIS-CHI 
(23 April 1992), p. 19. This showed that Yang Baibing was an opportunist as he made a U-turn from a 
hard-liner to a reformist. See Tai Ming Cheung, "The People's Liberation Army in 1992: Political 
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14th Party Congress from October to December, the Liberation Army Daily published 
12 articles urging the impartiality on the promotion of military officers only by the 
criterion of quality, not personal favorites. That implied Deng's action on suppressing 
factionalism inside military and it was seen as the foreplay on the purge of Yang's 
brother.37 Then we see the power base of the Yang's brothers was uprooted after the 
i4th Party Congress. 
Parallel to the move of removing the Yang's brothers from the military, it is 
equally important to inert those who would support the new leadership of Jiang. 
Those more professional in outlook and less involved in factional struggles were 
promoted in this Party Congress. Such senior leaders included Chief of the PLA 
General Staff Department Chi Haotian, Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, director of the 
PLA General Logistics Department (GLA) Zhao Nanqi and to CMC vice-chairmen 
Liu Hauqing. Those generals were more moderate and professional. They concerned 
their work were undone by Yang and appeared to align themselves behind Jiang.^^ 
One should notice the return of Zhang Zhen as the vice-chairman of the CMC. 
Deng's decision was under the considerations of his connection with many middle 
and senior officers and his sufficient respect in the military. Also another general, 
Zhang Wannian got his reward by replacing Chi Haotian as the new Chief of the 
General Staff. Chi assumed the title of defense Minister in the later Eighth NPC. Fu 
Quanyou became the new chief of the General Logistics Department. Yu Yongbo 
took over as the chief of the General Political Department. Another military 
appointment attracted notice was Wang Ruilin assumed the post of the Deputy Chief 
of the General Political Department. Wang had been the military secretary to Deng 
Power Plays and Power Projection," China Review 1993, p. 6.5. 
37 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Leadership changes in the Fourteen Party Congress," China Review 1993, p. 
2.23. 
38 Tai Ming Cheung, "The People's Liberation Army in 1992: Political Power Plays and Power 
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since 1977 and was regarded as Deng's most trusted lieutenant. He was assigned to 
the GPD to dismantle the power base of the Yang's brothers.^^ 
The reshuffling shortly after the 14^ ^ Party Congress involving 300 officers 
was arranged for the promotion of a new generation of professional soldiers. Many 
removals and transfers were targeted on those officers related to the Yang's brother. 
The overall picture was that Zhang Zhen, Liu Hauqing and Wang Ruilin ensured the 
stability in the central leadership, and a country-wide regional reshuffling was to 
uproot the remains of the Yang's empire. 
1995 Reshuffling 
Since 1992, Jiang had placed his trusted followers in the PLA. Jiang had 
promoted some loyal lieutenants from Shanghai and Shandong to key positions to 
build up his power base and appointed General Zhou Keyu, a Jiangsu native, as 
political commissar of the General Logistics Department. This probably had 
something to do with the gradual alignment of General Fu Quanyou, director of the 
General Logistics, with the Jiang camp, thus making the GLD became the first 
stronghold in the Army.如 
The 1992 reshuffle ensured the reliable PLA top-brass to escort Jiang in the 
late transition period. In wake of Lee Tenghui's visit to the United States, the PLA 
began a new round of reshuffling in the top-level. In addition to the reshuffles of 
several senior officials in the GSD, changes were made throughout the PLA. The 
Projection," China Review 1993, p. 6.3. 
39 Tai Ming Cheung, "The People's Liberation Army in 1992: Political Power Plays and Power 
Projection," China Review 1993, p. 6.10. 
4° "Among the 19 generals on active duty, six, or more than 31.5 percent, are from Shangdong. Among 
the 20 top-level promotions announced around the time the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th CPC 
central Committee was concerned, 75 percent were awarded to members of the Shangdong and Jiangsu 
factions, and only five top posts were left for the remaining 30-plus provinces and municipalities". 
"Inside story of ‘Unusual PLA Top-Level Changes" Hong Kong Chien Shao (1 February 1996 No. 2), 
pp. 38-40; FBIS-CHI (22 February 1996), pp. 25-28. 
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reshuffle carried several political meanings. The most significant was to prepare for 
the smooth transition of power. Zhang Wannian, Chief of the GSD, and Chi Haotian, 
the Defense Minister, were elevated to the rank of vice-chairmen in the CMC, 
alongside Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen. Besides, Wang Ke, commander of the 
Shenyang MR and Wang Ruilin, the number two in the GPD were admitted to the 
CMC. Fu Quanyou replaced Zhang Wannian as the new chief of the GSD. The move 
signified a gradual transfer of power from the old generation- Liu Huaqing and 
Zhang Zhen-- to the “new bloods". Thus Jiang could strengthen his grip over the 
41 
army. 
The personnel shuffle also made Wu Huizi, executive deputy chief of staff, 
and Li Jing, deputy chief of staff, stepping down. To replace their places, Cao 
Gangchuan and Wei Fulin were promoted. Reportedly, the military planned to 
rejuvenate its organization by strictly abiding by an age-limit system. While this 
shake-up was a routine one as both Xu Huizi and Li Jing had reached the age ceiling, 
it was also a sign that Jiang Zemin tried to bring the military under his control by 
using the means of "injecting the new bloods"^^ This biggest shape-up in the senior 
ranks of the PLA since the purge of Yang's brothers in 1992 was to ensure army 
loyalty in the potentially unstable period in view of the decaying health of Deng 
Xiaoping. 
After the massive reshuffling in the military in 1995, "dismissing the elders" 
and "Injecting the new bloods" continued to be the guiding principle for the army 
41 "Military old-guard reshuffle 'crucial'," Hong Kong Standard (29 September 1995). "Top general 
promoted in shake-up," Hong Kong Standard (6 October 1995). While Zhang Wannian was assigned to 
take over military aspects in the army, Chi Haotian would be mainly in charge of the political and 
personnel matters. "New military chief appears in public," Hong Kong Standard (12 October 1995). 
42 Xu and Li, both natives of Shandong province, were 62 and 65 respectively, just below the official 
retirement age of 65. "PLA reportedly carries out personnel changes," Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (10 
August 1995), moming edition, p. 9; FBIS-CHI (11 August 1995). "General Staff headquarters 
personnel reassigned," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao (29 August 1995), p. 1; FBIS-CHI (29 August 1995), 
pp. 34-35. 
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transformation. Jiang promoted a number of influential officers and retired them later. 
According to some sources from the military, five lieutenant generals and some other 
generals in large Military Districts, three services and the COSTND were ordered to 
"retire." Also the new generation of military leaders who joined the army in 1950s 
and 1960s, aged between 50 and 60, were promoted. ^^  According to the "Revised 
Draft for the PLA on Conditions for Officers on the Active List," a compulsory age 
limit was imposed on all officers on the active list. With very few exceptions, all 
officers past the retiring age were ordered to retire，In November 1996, before Jiang 
made his trip to India and Pakistan, he signed an order to replace more than ten 
generals in senior ranks, thus triggering off the personnel rearrangement in various 
departments. Some of the rearrangements were in accord to the rule for retirement 
such as Zhang Lianzhong, Yu Zhenwu, Ding Henggao, Zhang Taiheng and Gu 
Shanqing. They all retired in the age of 65.^ ^ 
The 1997 Reshuffling 
The i5th Party Congress was held in September 1997 marked the final stage of 
Jiang Zemin's power consolidation as the Party's leadership core in the post-Deng 
period. Other than the top leader Qiao Shi stepped down from the Politburo, two 
military strongmen Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen were retired. Their successors were 
Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian who were the new members in the Politburo. Zhang 
was believed to be incumbent more on military training and management, while Chi 
Haotian would concentrate on the military foreign affairs and strategy. In addition to 
Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, Yu Yongbo, and Wang Ruilin all could also get the 
43 Hong Kong Sing Tao Newspaper Daily (15 September 1995); Hong Kong Ming Pao (3 December 
1996), p.A12. 
44 Hong Kong Sing Tao Newspaper Daily (15 January 1996). 
45 Li Futao, "Gongjun Lindao Banzi Zi Xingkua Shizhi Tiaozhen," Studies in Chinese Communism, 
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seats in the Central Committee. Most notably, no military representative was selected 
in the Politburo Standing Committee. This signified the transition of a new 
generation~it was the party not any individuals could control the gun. It also merited 
attention that Jiang could make his next step in commanding the gun without the 
escort by the strong military leaders behind. Besides, it was a significant gesture to 
show the cooperation of the military in the national goal of economic construction. 
The Party Congress also defined the board principles of military reforms in the 
coming decade. While Deng had laid the foundation of military institutional reforms 
in streamlining and reorganization in 1985, the new leadership pushed ahead the 
"cross-century" reforms. Half a million of soldiers would be further demobilized in 
three years in accord to a new army-building concept. All in all, the principle of 
"party's absolute leadership over the army" was emphasized as the core in the PLA's 
political and ideological building. Winning the army's support was a crucial part in ; 
ensuring the smooth running of the "cross-century" national reform programs, as the 
army still played a critical role in the social and political stability. | 
i j 
“Political UP to Mark，， 
It was argued that there had been a dramatic decline in the amount of time 
spent by the military on political training as distinct from improving military 
proficiency. The time allotted to political training in the PLA had been reduced from 
40 percent in the 1960s to 20 percent in the early 1980s.^ ^ The PLA was no longer to 
be an "ideological army" during the reform era, but a "correct political viewpoint" 
again was important for Jiang to control the gun. Jiang said, "We must persist in 
{Gongtan Wenti Yanji) Vol. 23, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 43-53. 
46 Sam Rovit, "Chinese Military Modernization and the Open Door Policy," Fletcher Forum (Winter 
1988), pp. 116, 125-6; cited in A. James Gregor, “ The People's Liberation Army and China's Crisis," 
AnnedForces andSociety, Vol. 18, No.l (Fall 1991), p. 7. 
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upholding the party's leadership over the Army, and keep in line with the Central 
Committee." Jiang called for party organs at all levels of the military to strength and 
improve ideological work. The guiding ideology put forward by Jiang for work in the 
Army may be summed up in “five phrases," according to the source: "Be political up 
to the mark, have mastery of military skills, demonstrate a fine work style, be strict in 
discipline, and provide effective support".^^ The “political correctness" of the PLA 
was placed as the top of the guiding principle. The army must "attach importance to 
politics" was repeatedly emphasized, especially in 1995 and 1996. According to some 
sources, the servicemen were required to devote much more time to political 
indoctrination.48 丁^已 work of political indoctrination targeted at the officers rank-and-
file, urging the military to be loyal to the Party and Jiang as the "core leadership." 
As the central office of the CC, CCP announced, the sixth Plenum of the 
party's central committee would concentrate on the building up of the so-called 
“socialist spiritual civilization" . In September 1996, the military leadership 
apparently hoped to launch a campaign of ideological education to boost the troop 
morale and inject politically correct ideas into the soldiers. Defense Minister Chi 
Haotian also told the servicemen to obey Jiang Zemin's call for "emphasis on 
politics,” when Chi was in his inspection of the armed forces in Shanghai.^^ The call 
was the response to Xinhau quoted the military order as reporting, "show the sincere 
hope and requirements placed by the ‘cores’ of the third generation leaderships."^^ 
During the anniversary celebrating 69 years of the PLA, China's propaganda machine 
was gearing itself to promote Jiang's role as CMC chairman. State-run China Central 
47 "Inside story of ‘Unusual PLA Top-Level Changes" Hong Kong Chien Shao, No. 2 (1 February 
1996), pp. 38-40; FBIS-CHI{22 February 1996), pp. 25-28. 
48 One report said that the PLA devoted 70 percent of their time in political indoctrination. See Tai 
Ming Cheung, "Rank tasubordination," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 February 1990), p. 22. 
49 "Soldiers ordered to toe the party line" Hong Kong Standard (24 September 1996). 
50 "Big Three's message for troops" Hong Kong Standard (30 July 1996). 
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Television started a series of reports entitled "Chairman Jiang caring for the army's 
grass-roots construction".^^ 
Before the opening of the 15^ '^  Party Congress, the Chinese Commission of 
Military Sciences and the Academy of Military Sciences jointly published a book 
entitled "The Third-Generation Leadership Group of the Party and the Building of the 
Quality of the Armed Forces," which contained 49 papers. Among these 49 papers, 
the first 14 were written by the chief leaders of all military regions and all major arms 
and services. The CMC attached great importance to this book published before the 
i5th Party Congress and it manifested the political mobilization of the whole army to 
support the party and Jiang as the leadership core energetically, as well as the 
determination to reform the army with full implementation of reform plan in a firm 
attitude.52 
While the personnel arrangements and institutional subjective designs were 
utilized to control the military and build the Jiang's power base at the upper level of 
the military, the political work and the other measures enhancing the well-being of the 
army were the ways to secure the loyalty of the lower level. 
However, it is doubtful about the outcome and reaction of the military toward 
the political education in view of the increasing professional outlook of the officers. 
The government's efforts to affirm its absolute authority over the military might not 
be an unqualified success. Considerable resistance was found among the field-grade 
officers who find political interference in military affairs increasingly burdensome.^^ 
It suggested that in view of the changing environment and outlook of the PLA, the 
51 Ibid. 
52 Kuan Chachia, "Military regional commanders express support for Jiang Zemin, military works out 
developments plans for the 21st century," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, No. 30, (16 September 
1997), pp. 12-17; FBIS-CHI{X5 October 1997). 
53 A. James Gregor, “ The People's Liberation Army and China's Crisis," Armed Forces and Society, 
Vol. 18,No.l (Fall 1991), p.20. 
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effect of political indoctrination may not yield the same effect as in the past. 
3.3 Professionalization, Differentiation and Institutionalization 
Under Deng's reform, the military did not regard themselves so revolutionary 
as before. Ideologically revolutionary army was no longer needed in an atmosphere of 
internal stability. In the process of "de-Maoification," it was expected to have an 
institutional appurtenances of political system, including a professional and 
nonpolitical army. 
After Deng consolidated his power, the process of returning military 
commanders to the barracks was completed. Deng relieved some military leaders the 
formal political posts by reshuffling and replacing regional military posts so as to 
break up the informal power that the local military leaders had accumulated through 
long tenure in the same area.^^ The struggles against "mountain strongholds" were 
common scenarios in the Chinese history. The problem of localism would have posed 
a serious problem if not handling it with prudence. The PLA and the civilian officials : 
I: 
may have the possibility to collaborate in forming the "independent kingdom，，，when 
the PLA officers become deeply involved in various local business. To avoid the 
localism of the Military District, the military leaders in Beijing were rotated as a 
common practice. The reshuffling of the commanding elements in the various 
Military Districts and regions was also an effort to defuse dissidence in the military. 
These measures avoided the popularity for the local military leaders launching 
resistance to central authority. 
During the reform era, better-educated and younger PLA was created with 
improved weaponry. The regional officers withdrew from the domestic politics and 
54 Ellis Joffe, "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect," The China Quarterly, No. 
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became more military professionalized. The Cultural Revolution completely 
destroyed the distinction between Party and army at the local levels. In 1975, about 67 
percent of the PLA's activities reported were concerned with political/ ideological and 
social-military interaction, only 13.8 percent concerned with internal/ institutional 
issues. The picture of a more professional PLA was much clearer by 1986. Almost 
half of the reported PLA activities concerned military internal/ institutional matters. It 
revealed that the army was obviously more concerned with issues related to training, 
combat readiness and military exercise.^^ 
According to the official report, approximately 70 percent of the army had 
earned technical grade or qualification certificates. The proportion of cadres who had 
received two or more years of college education increased from 8 percent in 1978 to 
54 percent in 1996. Besides, the professional and technical cadre rank contained 50 丨 
i 
percent of the army's cadre. In the navy, by the end of 1995, the average age of high- ； 
I  
grade experts was 49 years, 11 years younger than it was in 1988^ Obviously, more \ 
i i 
J, 
emphasis was given to the modernization of the defense equipment and the \ 
{ 
professionalization of the troops. The PLA was much more confined to military ‘ 
compared to the Mao era. 
The separation and differentiation of civilian and military leadership was 
easier in local level. During the Deng era, top hierarchy of leadership was still 
interlocking though the percentage of military representatives in the Politburo and 
CCP Central Committee was decreasing, (see Table 3-1) 
146 (June 1996), p.303; also see Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 157-163. 
55 Xiaowei Zhang, "Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army," 
Journal ofNortheastAsian Studies, Vol. X，No. 3 (Fall 1991)，pp. 46-60. 
56 "PLA Enters New Stage ofModemization," BeijingReview, No. 31 (29 July 1996), pp. 11-13; FBIS-
CHI(! August 1996). 
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Table 3-1: PLA in the Politburo and the Central Committee, 8th to 15th Party 
Congress in 1956-1997 
T ^ - ^ " " " " ^ ^ ~ 7 ^ 1 严 i2tn n ^ r ? ^ r ^ ~ " 
Congress (1956) (1969) (1973) (1978) (1982) (1987) (1992) (1997) 
"member, 77f7 0725~~~6m 15723~™"UM~~~"TV1 2725 2722"""" 
Politburo 41.2% 52% 28.6% 52.2% 39.3% 11.8% 10% 9.1% 
member, 30/90 85/170 52/195 61/201 50/210 32/175 42/189 41/193 
CC 33.3% 50% 26.7% 30.3% 23.8% 18.3% 22.2% 21.3% 
Sources: Michael D Swaine, Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (RAND, 1995), p.23; Lin 
Chongdar, "The Study of PRC's Military Exercises (1990-1996)，，，(Taipei: National Zhong Shan ： 
University, master thesis, 1997); Hong Kong Kuang Kuo Ching (October 1997), p. 41. 
The trend of professionalism is on the way continuously especially at the 
I 
lower level of the PLA. New leaders within PLA were those more professional 
militaries. It was remarkable that some posts in the Political Commissar were given to ： 
I, 
the professional soldiers, for instance, in Shengyeung MR and Chengdu MR.^ ^ 
iJ 
Moreover, the CMC took pain to ensure that the promotion should be based on merits 丨 
't 
and service experience at all levels. ( 
I 
In a way, the emergence of professional soldiers with a distinctive career path 
and set of life experience, different form the past revolutionary ideology and the 
civilian leaders will reshape the party-army relations. The younger generation of the 
PLA commanders had no share of common experience with other party elites. Some 
95 percent of military leaders have had careers in the military only. Only 3 percent of 
the provincial military leaders are former soldiers.^^ The officer corps are increasingly 
dominated by career soldiers emerging from military academies in peacetime. These 
all show that a corporate identity of the PLA is emerging. Besides, for the first time, 
“China Times Business Weekly, No. 155 (18 December 1994), pp. 6-10. 
58 Xiaowei Zhang, "Professionalism and the Leadership Transition in the Post-Mao Chinese Army," 
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. X, No. 3 (Fall 1991), p.52. 
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the PLA has freed itself from the control under the system of supreme political 
strongman. If there is no outbreak of major turmoil, the PLA would have a chance to 
mn its own affairs autonomously. 
Concluding Remarks 
For the past history of the PRC, it is the leader atop the central leadership who 
controlled the gun. Under the professionalization in the Deng era, although the top 
leadership still has some characteristics of civil-military interlocking, separation has 
been taken shape especially in the local military. The new military leaders will not 
have the authority to cross the boundary between party and army like their previous 
revolutionary "dual-role elites". Professionalization has created an entirely new 
situation of party-army relations that are favorable to separation. Recent report 
revealed that Jiang Zemin has given go-ahead signal to the research on such topics as 
election, the rule of law and the separation of the military and the party. The direction 
( 
of the separation will reduce the power of the Party CMC, and transfer it over to the ‘ 
i' 
^Q '^  
Ministry of Defense under the State Council. 
While the military units set out to achieve certain professional objectives and 
values, and control the selection and socialization of the members, professionalization 
will work toward institutionalization.^^ 
In Huntington's terms, institutionalization is the process by which an 
organization "acquires value and stability" as an end in itself.^^ The word "value" 
denotes the acquirement of a distinctive identity and acting norms in the way of 
59 "Jiang Zemin orders research on democracy," China News Digest (24 July 1998). 
6° For the discussion on the parallel relationship between professionalization and the institutionalization 
of values, see Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hill, 
California: Sage, 1972)，pp. 112-128. 
61 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society CNew Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968.), p. 12. 
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institutionalization. Then what would the value possibly be institutionalized under the 
ongoing professionalization of the PLA? 
One could be toward the trend of a regular and apolitical force under absolute 
civilian control. An important tool to institutionalize the army is the strict 
administration based on legality. Regulations governing the work of various 
headquarters were promulgated in 1996.62 In 1997 before the 15th Party Congress, six 
new work regulations were promulgated covering six senior PLA organizations of the 
Logitics Department, the COSTND, the Navy, the Air Force, the Second Artillery and 
the Police, setting out to form the legal foundation for improving operations of senior 
military organizations.^^ In the military routine level, administrative laws were also 
revised to suit the new situation, for instance, "Routine Service Regulations", 
! 
“Disciplinary Regulations", “Formation Regulations", and “Garrison Regulations". ‘ 
( 
These common regulations cover a wide range of applied measures. The Jiefangjun :丨 
Bao {Liberation Army Daily) claimed that it was significant to standardize the basic � 
conducts, modes, and legal consequences of the military units in the new period and ' 
changes of the combat task, in accord to Chairman Jiang's instructions on 
"accelerating the study of new characteristics and law of military administration under 
the new situation." After all, these regulations were particularly important to correct 
the irregularities in some military units, such as failure and laxness to enforce law, 
62 These regulations included "Regulations Covering the Headquarters of the Chinese PLA", 
"Regulations Governing the Work of the Military Regions of the Chinese PLA", "Regulations 
Governing the Work of the Headquarters of the Divisions, Brigades, and Regiments of Combined 
Armed Units and Group Armies of the Chinese PLA", and "Regulations Governing the work of the 
Headquarters of Provincial Military Districts and Military Subdistricts and of Reserve Divisions and 
Regiments of the Chinese PLA." These all constituted a new generation of headquarters regulations 
"Jiang Zemin promulgates PLA headquarters regulations," Beijing Xinhua (7 November 1996); FBIS-
CHI (27 November 1996). 
63 "Jiang signed the decree to promulgate six command regulations in the PLA," Hong Kong Singtao 
Daily (24 June 1997). "Jiang Zemin signs order on rules for top PLA organs," Beijing Xinhua (23 June 
1997); FBIS-CHI(23 June 1997). 
62 
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loose management, and slackness in style and d i s c i p l i n e . 
Not only military discipline was emphasized in the course of 
institutionalization, effort was also put in the personnel arrangement of retiring ages 
in different ranks, according to the PLA Officers on Active Service revised in May 
1994.65 
Nonetheless, there is also a possibility for the rising of an uncompromising 
corporate military group, accounting for a difficulty to the process of formulating an 
institution acceptable to both groups and to change the long tradition of flexibility of | 
the military's role expansion. Chapter four and five will elaborate the point that the ？ 
i  
； 
PLA was reported to have interests in the foreign policy especially, by looking into ' 
the details of the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996. Besides, the PLA exerted much 
I 
influence in the issue of arms sale to Taiwan by France and the United States, the 
Spratly Island conflicts, the arms sale to Pakistan and the Middle East and the 
'j 
technological transfer from Russia.^^ It seemed that the PLA could increase their say ;l 
whenever they viewed necessary in foreign affairs beyond their military role. | 
1 
64 "Code of conduct of officers and men of the whole army ~ written on the promulgation of the new 
common regulations and garrison regulation," Liberation Army Daily {Jiefangjun Bao) (10 October 
1997), p. 1 ； "Editorial on new PLA common regulations," FBISl-CHI (24 Octoberr 1991). 
65 Age limits for the PLA officers announced in 1994: 
(Major military regions) principal leading officer: 65 
deputy officer: 63 
army: 55; division: 50; regiment: 45; battalion: 40; company: 35; platoon: 30 
Xinhua News Agency report (Domestic Service), 13 May 1994; cited in Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State 
in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 254-253. 
66 See Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy, and Asian Regionalism," in Pacific 




Organizational Interests of PLA in the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
�Military Options and Resource Acquisitions 
Foreign policy especially those related to national sovereignty are always of great 
�, 
concern to the PLA. This chapter would adopted the analytical models from Graham T. : 
I i' 
Allison in his book Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which , 
'( 
three sets of explanation were offered. These are the rational choice model, the i： 
；' 
'i I, 
organizational process model and governmental politics model. The PLA as an 
'i 
organization had considerable influence in the whole process of the decision making in ‘ 




organizational process model. Through exploring the role of the PLA in this particular 丨 
I 
foreign policy, we would probably get some insights on the civil-military relations in the '| . 
facets of both foreign policy decision making and domestic resources acquisition. ‘ 
4.1 The War Games and the Policy Handle 
In the 15-23 August 1995 military exercises, the artillery pieces fired from the 
borders between Fujian and Zhejiang with the 100-km splash zone. Apart from the 
coastal artillery, the artillery of naval vessels also took concerted action. About twenty 
live ammunitions were used in the August exercise meant an upgrade in the warning on 
Taiwan authorities. It also hinted that if Taiwan failed to dispatch its military exercise in 
October 1995, Beijing would take more drastic action. 
64 
j 
The August 1995 exercise was conducted under the command of Admiral Zhang 
Lianzhong, the PLA Navy commander, and Vice Admiral Wei Fulin, newly appointed 
deputy chief of staff responsible for military operations. The naval test operations 
involved a possible military action against Taiwan. It has been learned that the General 
Staff Headquarters and the CMC were satisfied with the exercise" 
After the 1995 exercise, troops deployed along the coastal area, the Nanjing war ^ 丨 
I 




types of quasi-military action. Taiwan's National Defense Minister Chiang Chung-ling ^ 
i 
also got the information that the upcoming military exercise would be the nearest to | 
I 
f, I, 
Taiwan in many years, but that the number of troops involved will not exceed 150,000, i 
f� 
not 400,000 stated in some Hong Kong reports.^ '； 
ij 
i 
Overlapping with time of the Taiwan presidential election, three waves of missile j 
»i 
test during March 1996 were conducted in an unprecedented high profile. The first wave ;i 
I 
was from March 8 to March 15.The Chinese government announced that they would send i 
I 
‘These included confrontation between warships, attacks by warships against planes, attacks by shipborne 
planes, attacks by and against submarines, and naval blockade. CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing, who 
carried out investigations in Shanxi and inspected the guided missile base there, often inquired about the 
exercise. Zhang Zhen, who was in Beijing to take care of the CMC's routine work, also often gave 
instructions. "Possibility of cross-Straits 'conflicts' foreseen," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao (25 August 1995), 
p, 2; FBIS-CHI(25 August 1995), pp. 34-35. 
2 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "PLA circulars urge 'quasi-war' preparations," South China Morning Post (16 
January 1996)，p. 8; FBIS-CHI{l6 January 1996). 
3 The troops participating in the military drills in Fujian Province will comprise four army divisions, two 
coastal guard divisions, an airborne regiment, and air force and naval units. According to Chiang, at the 11 
mainland airports within 250 miles of Taiwan, the Chinese military has total of 138 aircraft deployed. For 
the drills, he pointed out additional eighty-eight military aircraft and four landing vehicles will be 
mobilized. Still, the Chinese troops lacked the capability to launch an amphibious offensive against Taiwan 
for now. "Mainland's military exercise ‘nearest，in recent times," Taipei CNA, (14 February, 1996); FBIS-
CHI (14 February, 1996), p. 64. 
U.S. defense ministry spokesman Michael Doubleday told reporters in early February, “ We do have 
indications that the Chinese are planning some kind of military exercises. But he said it was "not unusual" 
and "not at all surprising" since "this is the normal period of time they conduct such exercises." Both China 
and Taiwan stage military drills before the lunar New Year to display their defense capabilities. 400,000 
troops for large-scale war-games try to intimidate the nationalist-held island. "Security Chief terms PRC 
military exercises 'routine', HongKongAFP (February, 1996); FBIS-CHI (9 February, 1996), pp. 84-85. 
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a total of four M-9 rockets into the target areas within a dozen miles of Kaohiung, the 
Taiwan's largest harbor, and the Keelung harbour of the northern Taiwan.^ This was to 
show that China had the ability to disrupt Taiwan's Maritime communication with the 
outside. The second wave was a combined navel-air force operation in the south of the 
Taiwan Straits from March 12 to 20 1996. The PLA's warplanes flew very close to the 




before the Taiwan's presidential vote on March 23 1996, the third wave military exercise 丨 
丨  
•i ij 
was carried out from March 18 to 25. Beijing announced that the PLA would conduct ；, 
,i 
joint ground, navel and air exercises in and over a sea area in Pingtan. It was a simulation : 
of cross-Straits landing operation.^ Most notably, the M-9 missile had a time passing very 
close to Taipei, Taiwan's capital.^ It was more than enough to show the strong 
intimidation on Taiwan by direct military threatening. , 
Facing the External Threat~~Policy Handle in the Taiwan Question 
What are the intentions of Beijing in the missile drill in view of the unfriendly 
attitude of both Taiwan and the United States? What outcomes did Beijing hope to get 
from conducting these series of military exercise in escalation, despite it will risk its 
4 "China Says Maneuvers Will Last Through Taiwan's Elections," The New York Times (16 March 1996), 
p. 5. Also there was a source saying that should the PLA decide to upgrade the scale of military action, it 
would either seize one or both of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu that located just offFujian province, or 
fire missiles at military bases on Taiwan. "PLA circular proposes seizing outlying Taiwan islands," South 
China Morning Post (8 March 1996)，p. 1 ； FBIS-CHI (8 March 1996). 
5 For a detailed discussion on the three waves of military exercises by Beijing and its impact on the Asian 
international relations, see Weixing Hu, "the Taiwan strait and Asian Pacific security," The Journal of East 
Asian affairs, Vol. XI，No. 1 (Winter/ Spring 1997), pp. 149-182. 
6 About the M-9 missiles used and direct threat on Taipei city, see Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China nearly 




relations with other Asian countries? The first answer comes to people's mind was that 
Beijing want to bring down Lee Tenghui in the presidential election. 
To Beijing, Lee Tenghui had long adopted the path for Taiwan independence. In 





Following "Taiwan's community of life," "separation and rule by separate governments between the I 
two sides," "the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan," and "sovereignty belonging to the People," Lee | 
Tenghui has put up another political advertisement "Managing Great Taiwan and Building a New ； 
Central Plain," in an attempt to deceive the public and continue his path toward "Taiwan ； 
independence." Obviously his "great Taiwan" refers to the "Taiwan state" on the equal status with the i 
mainland, and with independent sovereignty internationally. This can be further proved by Lee 丨 
Tenghui's making of the "Li (Tenh-hui)- Shiba (Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba) Conversation in 丨 
1994," which describes his train of thought for "Taiwan independence," the last chapter of his book j 
"Managing Great Taiwan."^ ,[ 
But the Beijing's decision-makers would not ignore the fact that Li finally can get 
54% of the votes in the election. It seemed that Beijing's policy was wrong. However, if 
viewed from the Beijing's perspective, she had no choice other than the psychological 1 
war. In the first place, Beijing wanted to get involved in the domestic election Taiwan. 
By exerting external pressure on any independence force and showing her great impact 
on Taiwanese society. The threat of blockade or direct attack against Taiwan in the 
aftermath of the election was proved to be very real. In military terms, the island has only 
four months of oil reserves and seven months of food reserves for civilians. Naval 
officials have admitted that they can conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW) at certain 
areas in the Taiwan Straits for only 72 hours at a time.^ Also there were reports on the 
7 Long Quan, "Comment on Lee Tenghui's political advertisement 一 "Managing Great Taiwan and 
Building a New Central Plain," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service (12 February 1996); "Lee Tenghui's 
‘feeling，for independence criticized," FBIS-CHI(U February 1996), pp. 77-78. 
8 "Taiwan's troubles in the Strait," The Asian WallStreetJournal (1 February 1996), p.8. 
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delay or scale down of the Taiwan's planned military exercises due to the strong pressure 
from Mainland China. ^ But the Taiwan's Defense Ministry later denied it.^ ^ 
The Chinese military exercises in 1995 and 1996, just before Taiwan's election. 
The drills were widely believed to be a psychological war. Beijing wished to show that 
she held the upper hand in the cross-Straits problem for the longer-term and inform the 
Taipei leaders taking additional steps towards independence was only to risk larger 
\ 
^ I I ？ 
response by Beijing. Despite Li was elected despite of the war threat by Beijing and it i 
•丨 
I i 
seemed to be in exact opposite to the wish of Beijing, the missile test sent a strong : 
.•‘ 
message to the Taiwan voters on the catastrophic effects of Taiwan independence. As to 丨 
ii 
Lee Tenghui, Beijing knew that they had to deal with him in future problems in cross-
Straits relation. Therefore, by creating such environment of external threat, Beijing would 
like to force Li to curb his pro-independence diplomatic policies and be back to the | 
negotiation table with Beij ing again. ^  ^  | 
Another purpose of Beijing in conducting the missile tests would be to force the 
United States be back to her promise made in the "Three Communique" (the 1972 
Shanghai Communique, the 1979 Communique on Establishing Diplomatic Relations, 
and the 1982 Taiwan Arms Sales Communique) and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. 
9 "Taiwan delayed the joint tri-service military exercise condemned "Han Kuang No. 12," which was 
originally planned for mid-November, to early May in Yilan. The exercise would be scaled down 
substantially as a result of strained cross-Straits relations. General Luo Pen-li, chief of the General Staff, 
said that the purpose of the exercise was to test the military's training achievements, not showcase military 
strength. The military source stressed: The east serves as a protective screen with reserve fighting power 
during the latter stage of defensive operations in the Taiwan Strait. Because of the Chinese Communists' 
gradual expansion of their maritime power, the east has been upgraded from a second-line to a first-line 
battlefield that is as important as the West." See “ ‘Scale down，military exercise planned for May," Taipei 
Tzu-Li Wan-Pao (15 February 1996), p. 3; FBIS-CHIQS) February, 1996), pp. 69-70. 
10 "Defense Ministry denies canceling all exercises," Taipei CNA, (14 February 1996); FBIS-CHI (14 
February 1996), p. 64. 
‘‘Weixing Hu, "The Taiwan Strait and Asian Pacific security," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XI, 
No. 1 (Winter/ Spring 1997), pp. 153-156. 
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‘A 
To Beijing, both Taipei and the US did not act with co-operative manner in 1990s. 
Moreover, the Taiwan's democratization and the disputes with the United States over the 
issues of arms proliferation, trade, intellectual property rights and human rights were all 
to the dismay ofBeijing. When all these issue were worsening the Sino-US relation, the 
act of Lee Tenghui visiting in the Cornell University was not an isolated fact anymore. 




with the United States and "invited a wolf into the house," calling the United States to | 
'j 
] 
focus more attention on the cross-Straits situation. Beijing saw the visa for Li as an ； 





Making the situation during the missile tests even more intense, the Beijing elite 
went into fury on the passing of the US Nimitz aircraft carrier that was utterly a display , 
1 j 
• '1 of strength and a provocation to China. Beijing felt that United States would adopt the |j 
new containment policy towards China and the long-term potential for Japanese < 
armament. The Sino-US relation is of great importance in Chinese security. United States 
is the only country in the world that has the combination of military capabilities and 
political will to constitute a threat to the national security of the PRC. The intervention 
represented that the US was playing a patronizing posture in which the US could hold all 
the cards towards China. Also the United States may take this opportunity to breach her 
promise of upholding the principle of “one China." Thus, the US intervention cultivated 
the distrust of the PRC and made Beijing to change the policy even more coercive.^^ The 
spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shen Guofang assured the US that 
12 Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," The China Journal, No. 36 (July 1996), p.91. 
13 Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," p. 90. 
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the Chinese army could "deal a blow to the head" of American forces if they venture 
through the strait.^^ 
Because of the US factor, Beijing became even harsher and closed the door of 
negotiation in Taiwan question and other matters. This limited the political alternatives 
for Taiwan and make the relation become tense. The result of Sino-US naval 
confrontation reduced the incentives of cross-Straits negotiations that are essential to a 
settlement/^ The US intervention induced Beijing to feel a new sense of urgency to solve 
the Taiwan question, no matter it will need a greater means to do so. The escalation of 
missile test was the only way Beijing viewed to force the United States back to the "3 
Communiques" which stated the principle of “one China." 
4.2 Applying the Organizational Process Model 
The missile tests were intended to pose warning towards Taiwan's independence 
force and pressure on United States to make keep her words in the principle of “one 
China." Certainly, it is an accurate explanation just as the analysts explained the Cuba 
missile test in 1962 as a probe of American intention. The national leaders recount the 
aims and calculations of nations and adopt the action they foresee will seek the best 
outcomes. The decision making process relies on the centralized leadership to calculate 
reasonable solutions for the strategic problems, given the nation's objective. But Graham 
T. Allison points out these explanations are assumed "the governmental behavior can be 
most satisfactorily understood by the analogy of the purposive acts individuals" and 
14 The New York Times (22 March 1996)，p.lO. 
15 Chas. W. Freeman, Jr, "Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics," Foreign Policy, No. 104 (Fall 1996), 
p. 14. 
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“treating national governments as if they centrally coordinated.. .But this simplification -
like all simplifications~~obscures as well as reveals."^^ 
In a bid to improve the rational actor model, Allison proposes another two models 
in explaining the Cuba missile crisis — the organizational process model and 
governmental (bureaucratic) politics model. While the rational actor model assumes the 
unified national governments as one singular actor in international politics, the 
organizational process model proposes the alternative explanation as the "decisions from 
the organizational interactive output" and the governmental politics model highlights the 
process as the "political bargaining resultants." 
The approach of this paper is first, to apply the organizational process model in 
the cross-Straits crisis to get the insights in the recent development of the party-military 
relations in China. 
The organizational process model, in one perspective gets less explanatory power 
in the context of decision making process in China as it emphasis the "government 
consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures 
17 
and programs." 
The second difficulty in adopting the organizational process model is that the 
model imposes the assumption that the government is a large organization that it is 
impossible for central leadership to handle all sorts of problems. In the case of cross-
Straits crisis, certainly no one will doubt the central party leadership did fully involve in 
all critical stages of decision making process. From this perspective, it is incompatible to 
use the organizational process model if the power of decision making is not fractured. 
16 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971), p. 3. 
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However, the model offers another relevant framework to capture the essence of 
the organizational capabilities that exhaust the effective choices open to the leaders; the 
final outcome of the government depends on how different organizations within the 
government positioning and lobbying. In the case of the cross-Straits crisis, the PLA is 
conceived as a principal agent for lobbying inside the party to seek more war-like action 
toward Taiwan, according to the organizational model to make the tentative statement. 
Characteristics and Operation 
According to the organizational process model, the basic units of analysis are the 
organizational units inside the government. Followings are the major characteristics of 
the model: 
First, the governmental action and actual occurrences are counted as the 
organizational output. The decisions of the government leaders trigger organizational 
routines. Most of the behavior is determined by previously established procedures. 
Second, existing organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities 
constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any 
problem. Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow 
constraints of which leaders must make their "decisions" about an issue."^^ 
As such, the organizational actors in the events would not be a monolithic 
"nation" or "government" but rather "a constellation of loosely allied organizations on 
top of which government leaders sit." This leads to the factored problems and 
fractionated power inside the government. Surveillance of the multiple facets of foreign 
17 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, p. 68. 
18 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, pp. 78-79. 
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affairs requires that problem be cut up and parceled out to various organizations. Thus 
each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of 
actions in quasi-independence.^^ 
Each organization's operational goals emerge as a set of constraints defining 
acceptable p e r f o r m a n c e . The organizational goals are formulated as constraints. The 
necessity for decentralization runs headlong into the requirement for coordination. 
However, the central direction and persistent control over organizational activity is not 
possible. The relationship among organizations and between organizations and 
government leaders depend critically on a number of structural variables, including 1) the 
nature of the job, 2) the performance measures and information available to government 
leaders, 3) the system of rewards and punishments for organizational members, and 4) the 
procedures by which human and material resources get committed. 
To run this model on how the PLA influence the decision making in the cross-
Straits crisis, the following aspects would be discussed: 1) the organizational interests 
and demands (organizational constraints) that are related to the nature of the military 
operation; 2) the perceptions and priorities of the PLA towards the Taiwan issue; 3) the 
human and material resources available in the PLA for the missile tests; 4) how the 
military options framed the choices to the government leaders; 5) the system of rewards 
for the PLA after the missile drills. 
19 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, pp. 79-80. 
2° Here the mechanism for resolving the existence of conflict among operational constraints is the device of 
sequential attention. When situations cannot be construed as standard, organizations engage in search. The 
style of search and its stopping point are largely determined by existing routines. Organizational search for 
alternative courses of action is problem oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort that must be avoided. 
In response to nonstandard problems, organizations search and routines evolve, assimilating new situation. 
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The organizational process model's explanatory power is achieved by uncovering 
the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs that comprise the 
puzzling occurrence. The organization's interest is controlling, rather than presenting the 
choices. It is in limited flexibility and incremental change, and inducing long-ranged 
planning. Incompatible constraints originated from different organizational goals make 
the organization satisfying one while neglecting another. In the case of Taiwan crisis, 
satisfying the goal of the PLA may neglect the interests of the organizations that very 
much concerned about the cross-Straits business, such as the provincial leaders in the 
coastal area. 
4.3 The Organizational Interests and Demands of the PLA 
External Crisis Unified the PLA 
During the mid 1990s, the most pressing demand of the PLA was to increase the 
defense budget. The military technology self-reliance and modernization were also 
important for the PLA that was still quite backward. These should be done by increasing 
the defense budget, R&D, technology transfer and arms acquisitions from abroad. 
Besides, to safeguard the geo-political interests of the nation is the ultimate aim for a 
socially responsible state army. Therefore, the PLA pays especially concerns over the 
potential threat to China's sovereignty and security such as the South China Sea problems 
21 
and the Taiwan question. 
The problem of unification is a long-term question but any move by the actors 
within the strategic triangle among Beijing, Washington and Taipei triggers off the 
21 Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy, and Asian Regionalism," Pacific Focus, Vol. 
X, No. 2, (Fall 1995), pp. 101-124. 
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national security problem to Beijing immediately and it is the prime concem ofthe PLA. 
It is not to say that the goals of national reunification, protection of China's territorial 
integrity, the control of Taiwan and the maintaining international strong power statues 
were not emphasized by the civilian leaders. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
for example, would pay more attention to the international trade matter that may make 
the policy contradictory to the goals oriented toward the security issues. 
External crisis unified the factions within the PLA; then we can say it is an 
apparent interest group in the event. Different factions inside the PLA were unified 
against the independent trend of Taiwan and US, and to uphold the principle that China 
should be respected as a major power. 
The Defense Budgets and the Discontent in the Armed Forces 
The PLA had different dissatisfaction such as the insufficient budget as the focus 
was on the economic construction and the impact of Tiananmen Square Incident. War 
could boost up the morale and fulfil the sense of achievement of the whole group. 
Of the Deng's Four Modernizations, the defense modernization was the last 
priority. Over the period of 80's economic reform, Deng repeatedly urged the “soldiers to 
tolerate" as the national interest as a whole should be considered first. The defense 
budgets did not have any real increase in Deng's era. 
After Jiang succeeded Deng as the "leadership core," the PLA tried harder in 
pressing their demand for a larger budget. In 1991, the deputies from the PLA to the 
National People's Congress have unanimously supported an increase in military 
spending. They considered the 12 percent rise in the budget rise underlined the 
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importance of defense modernization to the country's development. General Chi Haotian 
emphasized that the Gulf War "has further demonstrated the importance of national 
defense construction and raising the level of defense modernization in China." General 
Liu Hualing also stressed that more efforts should be added to defense development so as 
to ensure a stable environment for national development?^ However, the defense budget 
in 1991 was still tight. Zhao Nanqi, member of the CMC addressed to this issue and said, 
"The tight military budget is an important factor hindering the modernization of our 
Army Forces. Thus, we should pay attention to quality and ensure the needs of priority 
5,23 
projects when budgeting military expenses." 
Table 4-1: Defense Expenditure ofthe PRC 1987-1997 
Year Defense Expenditure Increase Over Previous Year Inflation O^rice index, 
(billion RMB in current market (Percent) retail price change) 
price) (percent) 
"T987 2 L 0 L 5 T ^ 
1988 21.8 2.6 18.5 
1989 25.1 12.6 17.8 
1990 29.0 15.5 2.1 
1991 33.0 13.8 2.9 
1992 37.8 14.5 5.4 
1993 42.6 12.7 13.2 
1994 55.1 29.3 21.7 
1995 63.7 15.6 14.8 
1996 71.5 12.3 5.6 
1997 80.6 12.7 
Source: Ming Pao, China Statistical Yearbook 1998 and 1997 Economic Outlook For East Asia'^ 
22 "PLA backs proposed defense budget increase," Hong Kong Standard (29 March 1991), p. 10; FBIS-CHI 
(29 March 1991),p.3. 
23 "PLA logistics directors on task, 'tight budget,，’ Xinhua (8 December 1991); FBIS-CHI (10 December 
1991),p. 3637. 
24 "PLA fmancial conference advises tighter budget in 1996," Ming Pao (31 December 1995)，p. A9; FBIS-




In 90s, although Jiang pledged to upgrade the defense budget , but it has no very 
concrete evidence to show the actual increase of the defense budget in 1990s. Although 
the percentage increases of defense expenditure in 1994 and 1995 are 20.3 and 14.6 
respectively, actually the increases were offset by the high inflation rates (24.1 percent in 
1994 and 17.1 in 1995)?^ (Table 4-1) 
The Chinese official reported also stated that the actual military spending could 
only cover 71.65 % of the required military spending that kept up with the inflation rates. 
In 1994, the defense spending in the total government spending dropped from 5.1 % to 
1.3 o/o.27 
Table 4-2: China's Official Defense Expenditures 
(in current and constant RMB), 1990-1996 
80 ^ — 
7 0 ^ ^ 》 — — 
6 0 ^^^^<"^ 
_ " “ j y . — ^ 0 Defense Expenditure 
5Q ^ " ^ (billion RMB in current 
^ 0 > ^ market price) 
4。 ‘ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t ~ ^ 
3 0 _ ^ <r---^=#======^ 
M Defense Expenditure 
2 0 — (billion RMB in constant 
1 0 1990 price) 
0 •! 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 
Sources of GDP deflators: 
78-95 Statistical Survey of China, p. 6. 
94-95 China Statistical Yearbook, p. 42. 
China Statistical Yearbook 1996, p.231. 
25 Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (15 March 1996). 
26 For the figures and analysis of inflation in China, see Rober A. Mundell (ed.), Inflation and Growth in 
China (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
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The inflation rate in the defense hardware market is always higher than that in the 
retail market, so it would be safer to look at the inflation rates of GDP deflators. After the 
figures are deflated by the official GDP deflators, there was also no significant increase 
in the defense expenditure. (Table 4-2). 
People may doubt the reliability of the official figures showing the static budget 
in 1990s. Different researches such as CIA and Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIRR) may come out sharply different figures for Chinese defense budget. The 
Chinese official figures were particularly disputed by International Institute for Strategic 
Studies on London (IISS) and their estimated figures were almost four times the official 
ones, (see Table 4-3)28 Taiwan even estimated almost five times the official figures.^^ 
Table 4-3: Defense Expenditure of the PRC provided by IISS and the Chinese 
official, 1990-1996 
^Year IISS estimated Def Exp (USD)# Chinese official Def bdgt (USD)* 
—1990 ~ ~ ~ ~ $11.3bn~~ $6.1bn ~~ 
1991 $11.9bn $7.6bn 
1992 $21.8bn $6.7bn 
1993 $27.4bn $7.3bn 
1994 $28.5bn $6.7bn 
1995 $33.0bn $7.6bn 
1996 $38.0bn $8.6bn 
# PPP est incl extra-budgetary mil exp. 
* Def bdgt shows official figures at market price. 
Sources: The Military Balance (London: IISS) (1989/ 1990, 1990/ 1991, 1991/ 1992, 1992/ 1993, 1993/ 
1994, 1994/ 1995, 1995/ 1996, 1996/ 1997, 1997/ 1998.) 
27 "Abstract o f the Chinese Defense White Paper," in Chinese Military in World Military Yearbook 1997 
(Jiefangjun Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 4-9. 
28 For the estimations, see International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), "China's Military 
expenditure，，，and "Table 1: International Comparisons of Defense expenditure and Military Manpower in 
1985, 1994 and 1995," TheMilitaryBalance 1995/96 (London: IISS, 1995), pp. 270-275, p.308. 
29 See Jiande Wu, "Liang An Jubshi Zhanlue Fazhan Zhi Bijiao Yanjiu," Studies on Chinese Communism 
{Gongdan Wenti Yanjiu), Vol. 22, No. 10 (October 1996), pp.50-65. 
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The real figures could not be confirmed without further evidence. But one point 
could be observed was that the national goal of economic construction was still the higher 
priority for the new leadership. Up to the mid 1990s, Jiang had been struggling to balance 
the demands of the military for defense modernization and the urgent funding requests in 
the other civilian budget for economic development. His slogan is that the spending on 
the armed force should keep up with the growth of economy. Besides, strong and 
continuous callings for practicing frugality and leading a simple life in the armies were 
made in the General Political Department in the PLA. 
According to the official "white paper" on defense issued in 1995, China "has 
placed defense spending in a position subordinate to and in the service of overall national 
economic construction."^^ That means the resources for defense items were still 
considered in the priority behind economic endowment. It was in accord to the most 
critical national consideration of economic development, but it also implied the 
insufficient defense budget in view of the overall state financial situation in China. In 
1996, the defense budget increased by 11.3 percent but it can only catch up the inflation 
mte.3i Under the tight budget, the following principles were adhered: "the grass-roots 
level first, officers later; remote and border areas with harsh conditions first, the 
hinterland later.，，�� On average, each soldier in China could only have not more than 
US$1 expenditureperday,33 
30 Wang Hao, "China is no threat," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July-August 1996), p. 
19. 
31 "Talks team defends arms budget rises," South China MorningPost (16 March 1997). 
32 "PLA financial conference advises tighter budget in 1996," MingPao (31 December 1995), p. A9; FBIS-
CHI (5 February 1996), p. 22. 
33 Ming Pao (3 March 1997), p. A15. 
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The PLA had definitely been affected by economic reform in China. The monthly 
incomes of low-ranking officers and soldiers are extremely low compared to the other 
people in society. The budget matter annoyed the PLA and pushed the soldiers to do 
business for extra revenues. China's economic boom was eroding the defense sector and 
pushing the skill workers moving to those more profitable jobs in private sector. 
Insufficient budget, social development and opening up have exerted adverse impact on 
the military training and the morale of the army.^^ 
Insufficient budget hindered the defense modernization. The military expressed 
that "the limited budget and research efforts should be focused on the aspects that are the 
most important, most urgent and most influential to the overall environment."^^ The 
defense modernization would still be in the service of the overall economic development. 
This made the military discontent as the PLA would be eager to shorten the lag in defense 
level compared to the Western countries. Moreover, the tight budget directly had an 
impact on the armed forces materially and spiritually. All in all, such grievances and 
discontent in the armed forces would be transformed into a pressure for military 
achievement so as to press for their demand more forcefully. 
4.4 How the PLA Framed the Available options on the Taiwan Issue 
Perceptions and Priorities of the PLA towards the Taiwan Issue 
As mentioned before, the generals of the PLA felt dissatisfied with the 
insufficient defense budget. Moreover, the Tiananmen Square Incident worsened the 
34 "Paper warns of army instability, discontent," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao (25 January 1995), p. 1; FBIS-
CHI (27 January 1995), pp. 22-24. 
35 "Jiang Zemin placates the PLA deputies, pleads to quicken the defense modernization," Hong Kong Sing 
Tao Daily (15 March 1996). 
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civil-military relations in society. Therefore, the PLA wanted to enhance the status ofthe 
Armed Forces through action in the future. In view of the widespread dissatisfaction in 
the army because of insufficient budget, a large-scale military action could boost up the 
morale with the spirit of enduring hardship and the servicemen's sense of honor which 
were eroded dramatically in the era of economic reform. 
A military source also said that the up-and-coming generals and middle-ranking 
officers were those calling for the solution of Taiwan issue by force.^^ But it was believed 
that the PLA had the sight for a long-term planning rather than an immediate military 
action. A military officer in the interview by the Singapore Straits Times expressed that 
the PLA was not in a hurry for resuming the sovereignty of Taiwan as it was "too easy." 
He also pointed out that if Party had not showed off their capability and determination, 
maybe Clinton would have continued his containment policy toward China. Now the 
37 
PLA was just waiting for all conditions ready in future as they had full confidence. 
There were several possible reasons for the generals to push forward more forceful 
intimidation on Taiwan issue. They could take this opportunity to push for restoring the 
sense of honor in the army. The Taiwan Crisis was a good chance for them to release 
their grievance and reverse their negative perception by the achievement of safeguarding 
the national integrity and being tough toward the United States. Most importantly, they 
could possibly get promoted in this military action. 
It should be emphasized again in this chapter that direct military attack on Taiwan 
was not a sustainable choice among all military actions in view of the disastrous 
36 '"Military source: CMC meets, no decision to attack Taiwan," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (14 March 
1996), p. A5; FBIS-CHI{X5 March 1996) 
37 The China Times (29 May 1998). 
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outcome. The PLA surely would have their own priority by looking at their military 
capability and presented the option accordingly for the final decision making. 
Human and Material Resources for the War Games 
�Evaluation of the PLA's military capability 
As Deng set out to concentrate in economic modernization, national resource put 
in the defense modernization was lesser compared to the other priorities in the Four 
Modernizations. In 1985 Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang admitted that the PRC 
38 
currently did not have the military capability to attack Taiwan in an interview. 
Even now the PLA may not have the military capability to strike a successful 
attack on Taiwan. Naval analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in 
London declared that despite China's huge army and its acquisition of some new 
weapons in recent year, most of its equipment is old and “capability to fight in a modern 
environment remains in considerable doubt." China's military capacity is overstated in 
the West, its weapons quality is low and most Western arms sellers have stopped 
supplying Beijing.^^ 
The following tables can show the important figures on the comparison of the 
military capabilities in both sides by the year of 1996. 
38 Lu Keng, "Hu Yaobang fangwen ji," ("Transcript of Interview with Hu Yaobang"), Pai Shing (Hong 
Kong), No. 97 (1 June 1985). Cited m Roger Cliff, "China's Peaceful Unification Strategy," American 
Asian Review, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (Winter 1996), note 21, p. 106. 
39 "Asian-Pacific politics and policy: analyst sees heavy costs to China of Taiwan invasion," The Asian wall 
Street Journal (9 February 1996), p. 7. 
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Table 4-4: Military Strength ofChina and Taiwan in 1996 
一 . “ China Taiwan “ 
Total armed forces 2.93 million active 425,000 active 
(including 1.27 million conscripts) 
Reserved Armored vehicles 1.2 million 1.65 million 
Mainbattletanks 7,500-8,000 309 
Light tanks 1,200 230 
Armored personnel carriers 2,800 720 
(APCs) 
Naval vessels 
Aircraft carrier ~ "" 
Submarine 50 (including 5 nuclear) 4 
Frigates 37 11 
Aircraft 
Medium-range bombers 120 ~ 
Light bombers 350 ~ 
Ground-attack bombers 600 --
Fighters 4,600 371 
Missiles 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles 14 (4 with multiple warhead --
capability) 
Intermediate-range ballistic 60 ~ 
missiles 
Sources: The Washington Posf^ 
Table 4-5: Arms Deliveries to China and Taiwan, 1987-1995 
(US$m at constant 1994 prices) 
Year ~ “ C h i n a ~ • Taiwan 
"1987 8l9 1,891 
1988 413 1,092 
1989 453 697 
1990 223 723 
1991 214 1,179 
40 Keith B. Richburg, "Neighbors confront China's power," The Washington Post (17 March 1996), p. A01. 
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T ^ ^ 5 1 ^ 
1993 510 816 
1994 130 950 
1995 480 1,200 
Source: The Military Balance 1996/1997 (London: IISS), p. 280. 
The military doctrine of the Chinese military has been changing to the new 
principle of limited war in advanced military technology and the co-ordination of the 
three armed forces. Zhang Wannian also stressed that the hi-tech research in the PLA 
should be tumed into actual fighting capabilities.^^ Even though the weaponry the PLA 
still had no match with their Western counterparts, the military exercises in the East Sea 
and the Fujian Province could be viewed as the actualization ofthe training items. 
Particular attention should also be paid on the timing of the PLA maneuver. 
According to the review of a Taiwanese officer, it was a time when the fighters had not 
yet delivered to Taiwan and the vessels available were insufficient to withstand the 
external military threat.^^ The Military Balance disclosed that a total amount of US$ 
1,200m hardware was delivered in 1995, so it was possible that the PLA might take this 
opportunity to launch the military exercises before Taiwan could get all these hardware. 
The PLA could also take this chance to test the military capability of Taiwan.^^ 
41 Army Daily (26 July 1995). 
42 The China Times (25 June 1998). 
43 For instance, after the war games, the PLA got to know that Taiwan's radar system was not so incredibly 
strong as reported. "Beijing plans the Air Force exercise against Taipei," Hong Kong Mingpao (29 
November 1995), p. A1. 
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Military Action against the Taiwan Independence Force 
Military options including sea blockade and military drills had long been used to 
give political signals to Taipei when Beijing envisaged the situations were strained and 
political means alone could not be forcefiil enough. When Chiang Ching-kuo took office 
as president in 1978, mainland China also conducted exercises code-named "East China 
Sea No. 1" in Pingtan, which was most provocative.^^ 
In 1981, Ye Jianying made his nine points on the cross-Straits relation. The final 
point emphasized the honor of reunification of Taiwan with the motherland in the 
interests ofpeace in the Far East and the world. Implicit threat was underlined in the final 
point by holding of military maneuvers in the Strait and the PLA parades in Fuzhou. 
The PLA has constantly conducted military exercise not only for testing its 
combat power but also provided an option ready to be pursued. The force applied had 
been depended on the level Taiwan pushed forward its "independence path" since Taiwan 
embarked on its path of democratization. 
On 13 October 1991, the DPP made the establishment of a "Republic of Taiwan" 
as part of its party platform for the upcoming National Assembly election in December. 
Beijing reacted by threatening force, and Hau Pei-tsun pointed this out to the electorate. 
As a result ofthis unusual CCP-KMT collaboration, the DPP got only 23.9 percent of the 
vote. Beijing perceived that the threat of force would deter independence.^^ 
Although Beijing turned its strategy on Taiwan issue from explicit rivalry to 
peaceful unification based on “one country, two systems," the military option was still 
44 "Special dispatch" by Taiwan-based staff reporter Lai Hsiu-ju: Fugian Coastal ‘Ports Blockaded； 
People's Liberation Army war games to start soon," Hong Kong Mingpao (15 February 1996), p. C1; 
"Mainland said ‘blockading’ Fujian ports for war games," FBIS-CHI (15 February 1996), pp. 22-23. 
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kept in case the worst situation happened. The military hierarchy still insisted that the 
PLA was obliged to prevent Taiwan independence. Therefore, the PLA had conducted 
various operation exercises annually with Taiwan as the imaginary target especially since 
1991. Infuriated by Taiwan's pursing pragmatic diplomacy and constantly moving to 
rejoin the United Nation, the PLA had staged even more military exercises.^^ In 
September and October in 1994, the naval and air joint operation exercise was conducted 
on Zhouxhan Islands that was pointed out, to "warn" Taiwan against taking the path of 
independence again.^^ 
Several military operations were rendered as choices for the policy makers: 
bombardment and possible invasion of Jinmen and Mazu; deploying large numbers of 
armed fishing boats around Taiwan; naval blockade of Taiwan's major ports of entry; 
strategic strikes against Taiwan naval and air force bases; destroying its industrial 
capability; sending special forces to support a coup; or a large-scale amphibious invasion 
of Taiwan.48 
The military analysts estimate that Beijing's invasion would be extremely costly. 
It would disrupt the schedule of unification with Hong Kong and Macau, jeopardize the 
relations with Japan and other Asian countries. Needless to say, it will induce Taiwanese 
counterattack. Therefore, a blockade or threatening with force might be more feasible. It 
45 Lowell Dimmer, "China's Taiwan Policy," American Asian Review, Vol. XIV, no. 4 (Winter 1996), p. 
87. 
46 "Infuriated by Lee Tenghui's announced plan to stage war game in October, Mainland China plans to 
conduct war game at the same time in a show of force to Taiwan," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao, (10 August 
1995), p.l; "PRC military to stage Oct landing operation," FBIS-CHI{lQ August 1995), pp. 20-21. 
47 "Infuriated by Lee Tenghui's announced plan to stage war game in October, Mainland China plans to 
conduct war game at the same time in a show of force to Taiwan," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao, (10 August 
1995), p.l; "PRC military to stage Oct landing operation," FBIS-CHI{lO August 1995), pp. 20-21. 
48 See Paul H. B. Godwin, "The use of force against Taiwan: potential PRC scenarios," in Parris H. Chang 
and Martin L. Lasater (eds.), If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait (Lanham, MD: University press of 
America, 1993), pp. 22-23. For analyses of the military maneuvers ofboth Beijing and Taipei, see Weixing 
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would take four months for the PLA to mobilize and be ready for an attack on Taiwan. 
As of February 1996, the ROC Defense Ministry had not detected such movements and 
that implied the possibility for breaking out real war was not so high but forceful military 
pressure should be made in the situation. ^^  
Since 1990, more than 20 military exercises had been conducted and had already 
been more than the total numbers in the 1980s.^^ But these exercises did not make in such 
publicity as in 1995 and 1996 by Beijing's official strong vocal condemnation. Some 
special points should not be neglected: First, the location of the military exercise. Before 
1994, the CCP usually conducted the drills in the sea outside Zhejiang not near Taiwan. 
But after 1994, the locations were changed to the sea nearby Taiwan. Second, from 1994 
onwards, the PLA conducted the landing exercises in Dongshan Island again. Third, the 
military exercises were becoming more technologically sophisticated.^^ The nuclear-
capable M-9 and the missiles passing through almost directly over Taiwan's capital, 
Taipei before landing off the coast all signified an unprecedented provocation by the 
Chinese military.^^ 
The 1996 missile tests had the particular meaning of forceful intimidation. But 
still, the military operation also had its own organizational routine characteristic. The war 
games were the response to the Taiwan Independence tendency just as the past but this 
Hu, "The Taiwan Strait and Asian Pacific security," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 1 
(Win/ Spr 1997),pp. 149-182. 
49 "Taiwan's troubles in the Strait," The Asian Wall StreetJournal (1 February 1996), p.8. 
49 “ ‘Scale down, military exercise planned for May," Taipei Tzu Li Wan Pao (15 February 1996), p. 3; 
FBIS-CHI (20 February 1996), pp. 69-70. 
5° Moreover, 11 nuclear tests were performed from 1990 to 1996. See "Review of the PRC's military in 
1996," Studies on Chinese Communism {Gongdan Wenti Yanjiu), Vol. 23, No. 3 (March 1997), pp. 64-77. 
51 Ibid. 
52 About the M-9 missiles used and direct threat on Taipei city were discussed in the Barton Gellman, "U.S. 
and China nearly came to blows in '96: Tension over Taiwan prompted repair of ties," The Washington 
Post (21 June 1998), p. A01. 
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time, extra-ordinary force was used to intensify the strained atmosphere. The high profile 
and level of military action in this exercise were in accord to what Beijing perceived as 
the ‘‘seriousness of the Taiwan independence force." 
According to the source from Beijing, “as Lee Tenghui claimed that Taiwan 
would conduct a "considerable exercise" in October, Li had, in the view of the mainland 
hierarchy, taken the initiative to make armed provocation against the mainland after the 
latter ended its missile test firing ahead of schedule. After Li got the visa going to the 
United States visa, Beijing had no more hope on Li. Added to the fury on Li's announced 
plan to stage war game in October 1995, the military hierarchy was “seriously，’ 
considering taking advantage of the exercise to show Taiwan “by the way” its combat 
power."" What attracts more particular attention is, the source stated that the naval, 
ground, and air landing operation exercise "was planned long ago," and “is primarily 
aimed at demonstrating the PLA's operation capability with the coordination of 
numerous services rather than responding to Taiwan's October exercise However, 
Li’s public announcement to display the 'powerful firing power，of Taiwan's three 
services has aroused the ‘strong concem' of the PLA hierarchy."^^ 
So it was the Taiwan independence move triggered off the organizational action 
to flame the available policy option to the decision makers. Military intimidation was 
long an available option for pursuing whenever any significant Taiwan independence 
tendency was detected and all other political means to resort it failed. 
53 'infuriated by Lee Tenghui's announced plan to stage war game in October, Mainland China plans to 
conduct war game at the same time in a show of force to Taiwan," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao (10 August 
1995), p. 1 ； "PRC military to stage Oct landing operation," FBIS-CHI (10 August 1995), pp.20-21. 
54 lbid. 
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4.4 The Resource Acquisitions of the PLA 
Although war did not break out, the NPC deputies from the military had attracted 
unprecedented attention at the NPC meeting in March 1996.^ ^ But in real terms, can this 
war-like assignment benefit the PLA as an organization for more resources acquisition? If 
yes, which division in the PLA benefited most from the exercise? The long-term 
development of each specific division takes time before any conclusion can be reached, 
but some hints from different sources can be helpful in making some observation for 
further analyses. 
Defense Budget 
As stated in the above section, the PLA encountered difficulties due to 
insufficient budgets. Thus the war-like exercises were good justifications for the PLA to 
acquire more resources from the state. A considerable amount of money had been spent 
on the exercises. In 1996, the defense expenditure was 71.5 billion yuan and had the 
increase of 11.3% over previous year. There was no significant increase in the official 
figure and the percentage increase could only be a little more to cover the inflation, just 
like the years throughout 1990s. 
However, the military exercises certainly consumed a very significant amount of 
money from the annual defense budget. Some sources disclosed that the huge expenses 
on the military exercises led to the objection of war (and even the exercises) from the 
55 "PLA exercise said to target ‘entire island of Taiwan," Hong Kong Ming Pao (7 March 1996), p. C1; 
FBIS-CHI{1 March 1996). 
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ministries and commissions of the State Council.^^ Therefore, it had reason to think that 
the exercises required some other extra-budgetary funding. Some analysts proposed the 
funding might be form the central and local budget revenues, which could be called out in 
case of armed conflict? 
China's military budget will be geared to the military strategy of solving the 
Taiwan issue in the next few years. The sources also pointed out: Although the budget 
would not increase sharply during the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), the military 
hierarchy had decided that the defense expenditure was to be geared to the strategy of 
solving the Taiwan issue; that is, more money will go to Nanjing and Guangzhou MR to 
upgrade the equipment of the ground, naval and air forces, with priority being given to 
upgrade the equipment used in a possible war against Taiwan.^^ Jiang also agreed to the 
suggestion that certain governmental departments might share the burden of the military 
spending, for example, the Department of Electronic Mechanical Industry bearing a part 
59 
on the weaponry. 
Looking at the official budget increase in 1997, the Military Balance analyzed 
that was largely because of the increased spending on Operations and Maintenance 
56 "Mainland China works out plan to launch surprise attack on Quemoy," Hong Kong Apply Daily (13 
March 1996), p. A1; "PLA reportedly plans to attack outlying Taiwan islands," FBIS-CHI (13 March 
1996), pp. 35-36. 
57 The source pointed out that central and local budgeted revenues, as funds in reserve, totaled 10.7 billion 
yuan last year, up 48% over the previous year. These revenues will be used for extra-budgetary defense 
spending. "China has over 10 billion yuan in reserve to be used as military exercise in case of war," Hong 
Kong Sing Tao Daily (12 March 1996)，p. A8; "reserves said set aside for use in case of war," FBIS-CHI 
(13 March 1996), pp. 39-40. 
58 "China has over 10 billion yuan in reserve to be used as military exercise in case of war," Hong Kong 
Sing Tao Daily (12 March 1996), p. A8; "reserves said set aside for use in case of war," FBIS-CHI (13 
March 1996), pp. 39-40. 
59 The China Times (6 January 1996)，p. 9. 
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(0&M), notably the missile tests against Taiwan. China's defense procurements still 
relied on Russian exports to some extent， 
On the whole, despite the official figure did not have any surprise in the 
increasing level, more actual resources from the state would possibly be acquired by the 
PLA for its defense modernization, which would be necessary for preparation on future 
regional conflicts especially against Taiwan. Half a million personnel in the PLA was 
announced to be cut off in the future years that could make more military resources 
available for hi-tech weaponry construction too. 
Weaponry 
Right in the middle between the two missile test series in 1995-1996, an enlarged 
CMC meeting was held in Beijing in mid-December in 1995 and lasted 10 days. All 
CMC members and commanders and political commissars of all military regions, arms, 
and services attended the meeting. The meeting focused on discussing the issue of army 
building for the next five and 15 years (1996-2010). Most noteworthy, it was the first 
time that a comprehensive review and study of army building had been concluded since 
Jiang Zemin became the CMC chairman in 1990. Also it was in the time of strained 
cross-Straits relation in which Taiwan was under intense mainland's military pressure. 
Thus it was the prime time for the PLA to push forward their demands and the outcome 
of the meeting could be an indicator for the organizational bargaining power ofthe PLA. 
According to the source, the Communique of the meeting pointed out: Viewed from the 
trend of military developments in the world, all major countries, including some of 
China's neighbors, were intensively readjusting their military strategies and accelerating 
6O77ze Military Balance 1997/1998, (London: IISS, 1998), p. 167. 
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the development of high-tech weaponry in order to seek a new advantage. The PLA 
would face a more severe challenge. With regard to the Taiwan issue, the meeting 
emphatically pointed out that the policy toward Taiwan as defined by the party Central 
Committee was "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems，’ but never 
renounce the use of force.^^ Based on these justifications, the hi-tech weaponry 
acquisition was a higher priority than before. 
In 1996, weapons in the amount of USD450 million was sold to Taiwan by the 
� O 
United States and that took almost 140% increase compared to last year. In view of the 
Taiwan's purchase of new weapons from the United States and France, the PLA badly 
needed for quality improvement to catch up with Taiwan，� According to the research 
done by The Military Balance, China imported 24 SU-27s during 1996. Two 636-class 
Kilo in 1887-98, and two Sovremenny-class destroyers were ordered in late 1996. The 
imported defense equipment was worth an estimated US$1.5bn.^^ 
China's purchase of modern weapon still had its limitation in sufficient funding, 
so its delivery share of arms sales was kept in a relatively low level. However, in view of 
the upward trend of the regional arms sales since 1992 (Table 4-6), the demands for 
weaponry procurement would probably be heightened especially after the missile crisis 
against Taiwan. The leaders would feel a new phase of urgency for defense 
modernization. 
61 "PRC military commission outlines PLA development plan," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (10 January 
1996), p. A8; FBIS-CHI{22 January 1996), pp. 28-29. 
&Hong KongApple Daily (20 February 1997), p. A17. 
63 According to Yu Bung, Taiwan succeeded in acquiring La Fayettes frigates from France, and Knox class 
frigates, E-2T early waming systems, attack helicopters, and M-60 main battle tanks from the United 
States. Also Taiwan was keen on its own R&D of some high-tech weapon systems, including home-built 
FFG7 class frigates, anti-ship cruise and anti-aircraft missiles. Beginning from 1996, Taiwan could get the 
delivery of the F-16s from the United States and Mirage-2000v from France. See Yu Bung, "Behind the 
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Strategic Manoeuvering and Policy Options," p. 235. 
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Table 4-6: International Arms Deliveries in East Asia, 1987-1996 
(constant 1995 US$m) 
Year �US$m % regional 
distribution 
in the world 
~~Ym r w i rT9 
1988 9,793 12.7 
1989 7,539 10.9 
1990 6,825 11.4 
1991 6,136 14.4 
1992 6,007 16.7 
1993 6,664 18.7 
1994 6,993 21.4 
1995 6,535 23.1 
1996 8,900 13.0 
Source: The Military Balance 1997/1998 (London: IISS), p. 265. 
Navy 
A navy officer expressed the following viewpoints in an article in August 1995: 
The U.S. Navy's strategy has changed from "on the sea" to "from the sea," meaning that formerly the 
United States mostly prepared to deal with the military threat from the USSR on the sea, but now this 
has changed to the delivery of combat forces from the sea to world danger spots to intervene militarily 
on land from the sea.....Since the role of the ocean in international warfare is constantly increasing, 
regional hegemonist forces will seek to control local sea domains.... The outbreak of lar|e-scale 
warfare is possible. Therefore, ... make necessary combat preparations for a future sea warfare. 
64 The Military Balance 1997/1998, (London: lISS, 1998), p. 167. 
65 Li Yaqiang, "Will large-scale navel recur?" Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi {Naval and Merchant Ships) (8 
August 1995); "Navy officer on likelihood of large-scale naval war," FBIS-CHI (30 January 1996)，pp. 24-
27. 
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In the perspective of the navy, sea warfare was critical in the battle against 
Taiwan and they saw the sea controlling power was the “source of hegemonic power". In 
the Army Daily, the PLA also called for "inculcating a strong concept of the oceans as 
national territory, and of cherishing every inch of China's ocean territory that was a 
matter of major importance having a bearing on the survival and development of China's 
posterity. We must manage, use and defend our marine territory for the sake of the 
national interest."^^ 
The Navy did a significant part especially in the August 1995 exercise. The main 
distinguished feature in the August 1995 exercise was that the area designed for the 
exercise was rectangular rather than circular, which would suggest an exclusively naval 
exercise.67 Moreover, the location of the test sites had special implications. Some 10 
years ago, in 1985, the mainland naval force conducted the second undermarine-launched 
missile test in the same maritime area. The test proved an extraordinary success, and was 
praised by Deng Xiaoping. The 1995 exercise was directed against Lee Tenghui and was 
also designed to mark the successful launching 10 years ago. The submarine that 
68 
launched the missile 10 years ago took part in the exercise. 
Certainly the Navy had attracted much attention in the course of the military 
exercises. In mid-October Jiang Zemin inspected naval vessels and fight units. Jiang 
Zemin was in particular emphasized the role of the navy and called for giving top priority 
66 "Managing the oceans - continental shelves, increasingly a focus of world attention," Jiefanjun Bao (22 
August 1995), p.6; "China's continental shelves defmed," FBIS-CHI(6 February 1996), pp. 26-27. 
67 "Analysts view missile, artillery tests," Hong KongAFP (11 August 1995); FBIS-CHI (11 August 1995), 
pp.13-14. 
68 "People's Liberation Army accelerates modernization of equipment, 2ne Artillery Corps has been 
equipped with new missiles," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (7 February 1996), p. A4; "PLA's 2"^ Artillery 
Corps equipped with new missiles," FBIS-CHI (7 February 1996), pp. 25-26. 
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to the development of the Navy and the building up of the "blue navy".^^ The 
streamlining of the PLA mainly took place in the army. The Navy has expanded its 
personnel since 1996. In 1995, 260,000 persons were in the Navy. The number was 
increased to 265,000 in 1996 and 280,000 in 1997.7� 
Speculation was widespread that China would purchase an aircraft carrier from 
Ukraine (Varyag) or from the transfer in the Russian Pacific Fleet. The other option was 
71 
to build two 40-50,000-tonnes aircraft carriers in Chinese shipyards. However, neither 
these option could gain enough evidence for confirmation. General Xu Xing, the 
president of the China International Strategic Society and former vice of the General 
StaffDepartment in the PLA, stated that the navy really wanted to have their first aircraft 
carrier but could not achieve this objective because of the funding limitation. General Xu 
Xing told the Hong Kong reporter, "US$ 100 million is absolutely a serious figure to 
China! The Americans told me that they (the Chinese Navy) badly need an aircraft 
carrier. I replied if I am a navy officer, I would also wish to have one. But is this possible 
in the reality?，’?： The other sources released that the option of buying an aircraft carrier 
was still speculated through different sources after the missile tests. But due to the lack of 
funding in the PLA, negotiations still went onP 
The Chinese Navy still confronted the major problem in sufficient funding despite 
it has attracted more attention and the number of personnel has been increasing in the 
69 According to the source, the Chinese air-cushioned landing craft was capable of transporting large pieces 
of equipment in a direct assault on beaches. It constituted a serious threat to and worries the Taiwan 
military. See Huang Dong, "Recent exercises spotlight advances in PLA weaponry," Hong Kong Kuang 
Chiao Ching {Wide Angle) No. 278, (16 November 1995), pp. 10-15; "Journal spotlights recent PLA naval 
exercises," FBIS-CHI(l February 1996), pp. 25-28. 
7° The Military Balance 1995/1996, 1995/1996, 1997/1998, (London: IISS). 
71 The Military Balance 1993/1994, (London: IISS, 1994), p. 148. 
72 The Asiaweek (31 March 1997)，pp. 50-52. 
73 Hong Kong Apple Daily (4 March 1997)，p. A3. 
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recent years. But it is believed that their voice for more resources would be louder as the 
sealift resources especially the amphibious ships were not sufficient for a full-scale 
invasion of Taiwan.^^ This would lower the intimidation on Taiwan. 
The Second Artillery Corps 
Mainland China's top hierarchy has increased funds for the missile units of the 
PLA to speed up the modernization of their equipment. Since the beginning of 1995, the 
Second Artillery Corps had received the obvious attention of the top military hierarchy 
Jiang and other high-ranking military officers of the Central Military Commission 
inspected the Second Artillery Corps eight times in 1995. When Jiang made an inspection 
tour of the northeastern region last summer, he made a special trip to Jilin to inspect a 
base of the Second Artillery Corps there7^ 
In view ofthe still-possible outbreak of military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait 
and the local wars in various hot spots, the Second Artillery Corps had been equipped 
with new models of missile. They were engaged in intensive training in order to develop 
combat strength as quickly as possible. It was reported that China had already added six 
intercontinental ballistic missiles up to the early 1998. The production was much beyond 
the speculation by the official in the Pentagon7^ More resources would probably be put 
into the units particularly in the procurement of missiles and other hi-tech information 
military equipment. 
74 It was the opinion by General John M. Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. See 
Barton Gelknan, "U.S. and China nearly came to blows in '96: Tension over Taiwan prompted repair of 
ties," The Washington Post (21 June 1998), p. A01. 
75 "People's Liberation Army accelerates modernization of equipment, 2ne Artillery Corps has been 
equipped with new missiles," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (7 February 1996)，p. A4; "PLA's T^ Artillery 
Corps equipped with new missiles," FBIS-CHI{1 February 1996), pp. 25-26. 
76 "China has added 6 intercontinental ballistic missiles to its arsenal，” AFP (21 July 1998). 
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Air Force 
It is understood that in the review sessions, senior PLA officers showed overall 
satisfaction with China's missiles and naval capabilities. But a source from Hong Kong 
disclosed that the generals expressed dissatisfaction over the performance of the Air 
Force. After March 15, the air force units had undergone new training sessions. Part of 
this training was carried out with the help of a state-of-art electronic simulator recently 
acquired by the Air Force. The focus of the generals' attention, according to the source, 
• y y 
was to get more funding to beef up the modernization of the Air Force and other units. 
After the military exercises, it is believed that the PLA would have even more 
justification to call for the speeding up of China's armament program to thwart "farther 
American intervention" in the Taiwan Straits. But due to the lack of national funding in 
the PRC, the goals for a truly modem military as their Western counterparts still had a 
long way to go. Despite a large part of the defense expenditure would go first to the basic 
living expenses of the troops^^ and the maintenance costs, weaponry modernization was 
still a high priority of the PLA. Zhang Wannian, the vice-chairman of the CMC, pointed 
out in the all-army weaponry meeting: The 15^ ^ National Party Congress has set an even 
higher demand on scientific research for national defense and on developing weaponry. It 
is the duty entrusted to us by history to conscientiously follow the path of building 
weaponry with Chinese characteristics, and raise the modernization ofweaponry to a new 
77 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Hawkish elements within the PLA have called for the speeding up of China's 
armament program to thwart 'further American intervention' in the Taiwan strait," Hong Kong South China 
Morning Post (12 April, 1996)，p. 10; "PLA ‘hawkish elements' said to want faster arms program," FBIS-
C///( l5April 1996), p. 42. 
97 
level.79 Jiang Zemin also expressed his concern on defense modernization by demanding 
that "the development of national defense science and technology and the weaponry 
building of the army must be put in a conspicuous position."^^ 
Various divisions in the PLA were attracted more attention in the missile tests, 
particularly the Navy. More resources may be put into the Navy and its naval air force in 
the coming years. Then how to balance the departmental interests inside the PLA while 
achieving overall weaponry building would be an agenda for military leaders. Zhang 
Wannian also stated this point in the PLA meeting, urging for “being determined to break 
out of the limits of unit and departmental interests as well as out of set patterns that lag 
81 
behind the development of the situation". 
Conclusion 
Military action was always one of the options for the policy makers dealing with 
Taiwan, when the issue could not be resolved by other political means. Any signs of 
Taiwan Independence or Taiwan's action to raise its bargaining power would trigger off 
this mechanism of deterrence, while the PLA provided a ready option for the decision 
makers. As such, the missile crisis could be viewed as the organizational output by the 
PLA. The cold response ofLee Tenghui's six-point proposal and his high-profile speech 
in the Comell University revealed the failure of using the political means in resolving the 
issue. At this point, Jiang realized that he had to go with the ready option of military 
78 The salary of the troops was increased and RMB 1 increase in the each meal of the troops was effective 
in 1997. 
79 "Zhang Wannian meets PLA meeting representatives," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service (1 December 
1997); FBIS-CHI(5 December 1997). 
80 "Zhang Wannian meets PLA meeting representatives," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service (1 December 
1997); FBIS-CHI{5 December 1997). 
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intimidation. Then previous procedure and the repertoires against the Taiwan 
independence in the past decades set the track of the 1995-1996 exercises. But certainly, 
this time was an unprecedented intimidation in view of using the nuclear-capable 
missiles. 
The organizational goals of the PLA mainly focus on the defense modernization. 
Any military advancement would provide chances for the PLA to outcry their demands. 
The PLA called for a faster pace in defense modernization after the gulf war. The missile 
drills again would probably provide even more justifications for resource acquisitions, on 
Navy, Second Artillery and other divisions. Organizational goals are the constraints 
defined in the organizational process model. The PLA's organizational interests had 
pushed their way to frame the available choices to the decision-makers. How the military 
development will affect or even control the available choices for the central authority 
would be a subject of great concern in the cross-Straits relations, as well as the 
manifestation of the party-military relations in the PRC. 
81 "Zhang Wannian meets PLA meeting representatives," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service (1 December 
1997); FBIS-CHI(5 December 1997). 
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Chapter Five 
Bringing the PLA Interests into Governmental Politics 
�PLA，s Capacity in Decision-making 
"As long as Taiwan is not liberated, Chinese people's historical humiliation is not washed away; as 
long as the motherland is not reunified, out people's armed forces's responsibility is not fulfilled." 
� Z h u De 
"If China renounces the use of force, peaceful unification will never be possible." 
� J i a n g Zemin's attitude on Taiwan 
question reported by a Japanese 
journalist in 1996.^ 
Chapter four discusses how information processing of the PLA as a corporate 
institution led to the final outcome in the Taiwan Straits crisis, in the framework of 
the organizational process model. However, this paper does not intent to overlook the 
importance of the decision-making circle in the top brass leadership in Beijing. The 
PLA has the long tradition in participating in politics outside the military domain, 
despite the PLA's retreat from politics are on the way, particularly in the local 
regions.2 
Why did Beijing undertake such action in the Taiwan Straits crisis? Besides 
the strategic calculations, some other special features related to domestic politics also 
mert attention here~the last stage of power transition, the high-tide nationalist 
aspiration in the state and the specific traditional role played by the PLA in the 
Taiwan issue. All these factors shed light on the correlation of Beijing's internal 
1 The Ninties {Jieshi Niandai) (September 1995), pp. 8-9. 
2 In 1985, no top leaders and first secretaries of the provincial committees were in military background. 
See Michael D. Swaine, "Political-Military Leadership Trends, ” China: Domestic Changes and 
Foreign Policy (RAND, 1998), p. 23. 
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politics to the foreign policy toward Taiwan and the United States, other than the 
strategic considerations. In light of the governmental politics model, this chapter 
explores how the shifting political coalitions, involving Jiang Zemin, those military 
PLA figures and others, drove the way to the policy outcome in the Taiwan Straits 
crisis, thus uncovering the role of the Chinese military in foreign policy making. 
5.1 Employing the Governmental Politics Model 
Compared to the organizational model puts forward the proposition that policy 
outcome is based on the organizational routine output, the governmental politics 
model proposes the decisions and actions of the government as the political resultants. 
Resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results 
from compromise, conflict, and confusion; political in the sense that the activity from which 
decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among 
individual members ofthe government. Following Wittgenstein's employment of the concept o f a 
"game," national behaviour in international affairs can be conceived of as something that emerges 
from intricate and subtle simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions in a 
government. ^ 
The players inside the game have different parochial priorities and perceptions on 
the issues, in accord to their personal, groups or organizational interests. Their power 
inherent in their formal and informal positions determines each player's impact on the 
results. The operational device is the bargaining games in which the players 's 
positions hook them on the action-channels. "Action-channels structure the game by 
preselecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the 
game, and distributing particular advantages for each game. Most critically, channels 
determine ‘who's got the action.'" Once entering the game, "each player pulls and 
hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception 
of national, organizational, group, and personal interests." Therefore, the final 
3 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, p. 62. 
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outcomes of the government decision are the mechanism of choice and "the resultant 
of bargaining among the individuals and groups within the government." What is 
more, as each player focuses not only on the strategic problem but also on their 
interests, the final "solutions" of the strategic problem have the important 
consequences for each player, other than the mere strategic national impacts.^ 
The highest leadership in the CCP has always set the critical policy towards 
Taiwan, while different institutions handle different aspects of cross-Straits relations.^ 
The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995-1996 was the tensest situation since the threat in 
1958. Any miscalculation or every step would have the possibility to come to war. 
Certainly, the top central leaders bear all the decision making and outcome. To 
explore the party-military relations in the context of governmental politics model, 
different angles could be considered. First, how Jiang intended to consolidate his 
power base in the Taiwan policy, especially on building up a balanced relationship 
that upheld the principle of "party controls the gun." Second, how the military leaders 
perceived the Taiwan policy and their reaction, how they put forward their demands, 
especially in the way of their coalitions with the hard-liners in the party. 
It is difficult to acquire such information as evidence to construct a complete 
illustrative account for the whole decision-making process. The lack of information 
on the actual perceptions and actions of the individuals involved in the war games in 
4 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba Missile Crisis, pp.162-180. 
5 There are three organizations dealing with the Taiwan affairs. One is the CCP's Central Leading 
Group for Taiwan Affairs Office (CLOTA), the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office (SCTAO) and 
the Association for Relations Across the Straits (ARATS). The CLGTA was headed by Jiang Zemin, 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was the deputy head, and Wang Zhaoguo was the secretary general; 
other members include Jia Chunwang and Xiong Guangkai (both intelligence officials) and Wang 
Daohan (a diplomat). Wang Ahaoguo headed the SCTAO, with Chen Yunlin as executive deputy 
director, Tang Shubei and Sun Xiaoyu as deputy directors, Li Qingzhou as assistant to the director and 
spokesman. Wang Daohan, with Tang Shubei as Executive vice-chair and Zou Zhekai as secretary-
general chaired ARATS. Much overlap was existed in the membership among the institutions. Informal 
factional divisions appeared to cleave the whole group into three: those from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Tang Shubei, Sun Xiaoyu), the Fujian group (Zou Zhekai and Sun Yafu) and those from the 
military (Li Qingzhou). See Lowell Dittmer, "China's Taiwan Policy," American Asian Review, Vol. 
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the Taiwan Straits limit the confidence to explain the government actions and the 
party-military relations in top leadership. However, in spite of the limitation, still 
there are some pieces of evidence and information found in the official news 
statements, press release and the reports in the newspapers from Hong Kong and the 
West, helping us to enhance our understanding on the whole process in the war 
games. 
5.2 Perspectives of Jiang Zemin and PLA on the Taiwan Issue 
Jiang Zemin's Perspectives on the Taiwan Question 
What were the perceptions and thoughts of the Party's leader core, Jiang 
Zemin in the cross-Straits crisis? Some clues could be pointed out on Jiang's personal 
basic views on the Taiwan issue from his dialogue with Shen Junshen, the former 
president of the Taiwan Qing Hua University and an insider of the Taiwan policy 
making network, from 1990 to 1992. The basic tone of Jiang's speech was in accord 
to the principle of "one China" and peaceful unification. But Jiang did not rule out the 
possibility of using force on Taiwan when facing the necessary situation.^ Jiang had 
uphold this principle in the coming years. 
Foreign policy is always a necessary part for the Chinese core leaders to 
assume their ruling legitimacy. After the cold war, local phenomenon became much 
more significant. Taiwan question remains the top agenda for the Chinese leaders and 
no one could bear the consequences of any kinds of Taiwan independence. Jiang 
understood it well. Jiang expressed in Jakarta in 1994, "Taiwan question relates to the 
sovereignty of China, the completeness of the ruling territory and the unification of 
XIV, no. 4 (Winter 1996) p. 67; Chen Te-sheng, "Mainland China's Taiwan Affairs Organizations and 
Personnel," Issues andStudies, Vol. 30，No. 7 (July 1994)，pp. 44-61. 
6 See Peter Nan-shong Lee, "Jiang Zemin versus Lee Tenghui: Strained Mainland-Taiwan 
Relationship," Maurice Brosseau and Kuan Hsin-chi (eds.), China Review 1997 (Hong Kong: The 
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the Chunghua nationality. To the 'Chinese' government and the Chinese people, it is 
a very important matter of principle. If the Taiwan authority pursues the path of 
‘Taiwan independence,' and the foreign authorities intervene, the situation in the 
Taiwan Strait will be in total chaos. We absolutely will not sit idly and do nothing."^ 
Jiang's “eight-point proposal" in January 1995 marked a new stage of 
Beijing's Taiwan policy. The "eight-point proposal" recognized Lee Tenghui as the 
person for negotiation and suggested talk and trust could be the foundation in 
resolving the cross-Straits difference. 
However, Jiang's had not softened his posture toward the United States in the 
Taiwan issue. In January 1995, Jiang pointed out in the occasion of meeting the 
former U.S. government officer, “The Sino-U.S. Three Communique have made clear 
the basic principles for both of us and laid out the good foundation for the long-term 
stable development of the Sino-U.S. relations. However, the Sino-U.S. relations in 
recently years have been disrupted by continuous troubles. The deep-rooted reason is 
that the United States contravenes the principles in the Sino-U.S. Three Communique. 
Some people in the United States always want to stir up quarrels in matters related to 
the sovereignty of China. The Taiwan question is the most outstanding in these 
outcries....As to the sovereignty of China, the completeness of the Chinese territories 
and the big question of unification, the Chinese government and Chinese people are 
standing firaL..."8 After the military exercise in August 1995, Jiang reiterated this 
point once again when meeting the former U.S. president, George Bush. Jiang also 
expressed that the United States government offended the Sino-U.S. Three 
Chinese University Press, 1997), pp. 109-113. 
7 Xi Lai Wang, Eshiyi Siji Zhongguo Zhanlue Daiche Hua (Beijing: Hongqi Chuban She, September 
1996), p. 391; cited in Yuan I, "Yijoujouwu �Y^oujou l iu Taihai Weiji, Zhonggong De Guangdian: 
Sange Fenxi Jieceng De Luenzlieng," (Taipei: paper in the Seminar of the Sino-US Relations: 1995 � 
1997, 1998.), p. 16. 
8 Xi Lai Wang, Eshiyi Siji Zhongguo Zhanlue Daiche Hua, pp. 391-392. 
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Communique by issuing the visa to Lee Tenghui for his visit.^ 
PLA's Perspectives on the Taiwan Question 
Apparently, the standing of Beijing on Taiwan question was changed from a 
more compromising to a tougher one. Beijing and Taipei could not reach a common 
ground for negotiation and the US intervention also complicated the whole picture. 
Beijing's tough attitude can be explained by the perception of civilian elite for the 
national integrity and the sense that China should be respected as a major power; its 
internal matter should not be subject to the interference by other hegemonic power. 
The nationalist sentiment was particularly prevalent among the military elites who 
believe that the United States is secretly encouraging Taiwan's bid for 
independence.^^ The tough stand is not totally unique to the military side as some 
civilian leaders also share the similar veiewpoints, but it merits attention on military 
role in the Taiwan question as it played a relative significant part. 
Garver in his paper presents that of the two-dozen Chinese officials and policy 
analysts he interviewed confirmed that PLA had been pushing a tougher attitude to 
the US since 1992.n In 1992, Deng made a concession on human rights issue in 
exchange for President George Bush's support on the extension of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status for China. Nonetheless, the compromise was made before the 
public announcement of the US decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. However, Deng 
• ” 12 
decided to respond by the way of "great gesture and little real action." 
9 Xi Lai Wang, Eshiyi Siji Zhongguo Zhanlue Daiche Hua, p. 392. 
1° For the analysis of the conservative nationalism in the military and the state-centered nationalism 
prevalent in the party-government leaders, see Michael D. Swaine, "Political-Military Leadership 
Trends," China: Domestic Changes and Foreign Policy (RAND, 1995), pp. 3-40. 
11 John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," C. Dennison Lane, 
Mark Weisenbloom and Dimon Liu (eds.), Chinese Military Modernization (London and New York: 
Kegan Paul International; Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1996)，pp. 259-260. 
12 John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," pp. 259-272. 
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Garver speculates that the PLA had the grievance toward the civilian leaders 
such as Li Peng who were responsible for the repressive internal policy of Tiananmen 
crackdown. Thus the PLA tended not to be cooperate with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs which was led by Qian Qichan, who had no guanxi in military. At the same 
time of this repressive internal policy, the foreign policy is weak and humiliating. 
That led to a more assertive foreign policy attitude in PLA toward the United States 
andTaiwaii.i3 
Military leaders were annoyed by this soft-line attitude and they demanded 
strongly for a tough stand towards the arms-sale issue. In early November, the CMC 
leaders Liu Huaqing, Zhang Zhen and Chi Haotian wrote a letter to the CCP Central 
Committee. The letter stated, "Defending national sovereignty and independence 
should take precedence over all other and over transient economic interests. The 
Chinese nation has already stood up and should play a role in safeguarding world 
peace." Besides, five generals Qin Jiwei, Hong Xuezhi, Yang Dezhi, Liao Hansheng 
and Zhang Aiping wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin, saying that the Party should 
'persistently and vigorously oppose any form of hegemonies, power politics, and any 
act constituting intervention in China's internal affairs; and to struggle without 
compromises and concessions and in a tit-for-tat manner". In November and 
December 1992, the CCP central Committee and the CMC received letters form 
different military regions urging the central government to respond strongly to the 
United States and France for the arms-sale to Taiwan. This had never happened 
before. i4 
The PLA adopted a hard line in the issue of Spratly Island too. In the enlarged 
13 John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," pp. 274-275. 
14 "Beijing Political Situation- CCP Makes New Policy Decision on Army Participation in Government 
and Political Affairs," Hong Kong Hsin Pao (11 December 1992), p.2; "Column Views Army 
Participation in Government" FBIS-CHI(14 December 1992), p.28-30. 
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meeting of the central Military Commission in the end of 1995, the PLA assessed the 
current political situation. A military document held that the conflict in Spratly Island 
is unavoidable, sooner or later and the PLA will set eyes on local warfare under 
modern technology. ^ ^ 
The attitude of some veteran generals partly could be in some official 
interview. In an interview by Xinhua News Agency, Hong Xuezhi, a veteran general 
expressed that patriotism aimed at pursuing unification and unity was the ‘law’ of 
history. "But now some people of the Taiwan authorities rampantly engage in 
activities to split the motherland. What these people have done runs against the 
Chinese nation's tradition of patriotism and infringes upon the fundamental interests 
of all Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." Also Hong Xuezhi cited the 
history of Japanese War to prove the determination of the Chinese people in 
safeguarding the land and sovereignty. 
PLA Chiefof Staff and the person in charge of the Taiwan missile drill, Zhang 
Wannian also stated clearly that the PLA would never sit idly when a single inch of 
territory was split off China, and opposed all attempts to create “Two Chinas" or 
“One China, One Taiwan."^^ 
During the National People's Congress meeting held in the middle of the 
March 1996 exercise, many generals made resolute response in the interviews: Our 
Army's basic principle is to defend the motherland and peace. We do not expect a 
war, but we will protect the motherland's sovereignty and territorial integrity. If 
someone interferes and invades our territory, he will certainly repent! ^ ^ 
15 Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (12 January 1996)，p. A8; FBIS-CHI, (22 January 1996), pp.29-31. See 
Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy, and Asian Regionalism," in Pacific Focus, 
Vol. X, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp.101-124. 
16 "PLA will 'safeguard' territorial integrity," BeijingXinhua (24 August 1995); FBIS-CHI (24 August 
1995), pp. 38-39. 
17 "PLA generals at NPC comment on movement ofU.S. ships," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao (13 March 
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Here are the statements made by some generals: 
Ding Henggao When asking was he afraid of U.S. warships, Ding 
(Minister of the replied: What is there to be afraid of? How was the 
COSTND) Korean war fought? Have we not defeated Japanese 
aggressors with rifles coupled with millet? It is our 
Army's sacred mission to safeguard the motherland's 
territorial integrity. Certainly modern weaponry plays an 
important role in the war it is not the sole decisive factor 
deciding the outcome of war. Even Americans 
acknowledge this. It must be understood that our basic 
principle is to safeguard peace. 
Zhang Chuanmiao We do not allow Lee Tenghui to push for "Taiwan 
(Army Major independence," nor do we allow foreign intervention. 
General): The United States owns aircraft carriers while we do not; 
but if they interfere with China's internal affairs we will 
smash them to smithereens! 
Wang Hongfu If the United States does not interfere the cross-Straits 
(Lieutenant general of tensions will not worsen, 
the Second Artillery 
Corps): 
Wang Jiying The PLA's military maneuvers are normal drills, what is 
(Lieutenant general there to be surprised atL. We are capable of defending 
commander of the our territory. 
North China Sea 
Fleet) 
Gao Yuanfa (Jsfavy the U.S. move is provocative behavior. The United states 
Lieutenant is more powerful than we are in terms of national 
commander): strength but we are confident that the Chinese territory is 
inviolable. 
Li Yongtai (Air Force The United States boasts aircraft carriers and we do not. 
1996); FBIS-CHI{n March 1996). 
18 Ibid. 
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Lieutenant General): It must be understood, however, aircraft carriers cannot 
play a decisive role in a war. It is man rather than 
weaponry that decide the outcome of a war. 
Although many leaps could be forward in the cross-Straits relation in 1990s, 
the co-operative atmosphere reversed much in 1995-6. Jiang Zemin's "Eight-points" 
calling for further negotiation was responded by the cold Lee Tenghui's "Six-points". 
It was perceivable about the Jiang's sense of humiliation at the hands ofLi. It seemed 
that the Jiang's "Eight-points" was his own wishful thinking and Jiang was criticized 
by some hard-liners for being too soft dealing with the Taiwan question. Again the 
hard-liners were dissatisfied with what they perceived as the fruitless outcome of the 
Wang-Koo cross-Straits negotiations. The military was unhappy with the "lenient" 
mamier of Jiang and regarded the Jiang's Eight-points was his own wishful thinking. 
The PLA perceived the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen as "soft on hegemony" since 
the GulfWartoo. 
Nonetheless, despite the top brass in the PLA pursued a harder approach in the 
Taiwan question, they did not perceive war as the sole solution in view ofthe strategic 
considerations as outlined in the previous chapter. 
5.3 Political Pulls and Hauls in the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
As mentioned in the introduction part, the Taiwan question is of great 
significance to the Beijing's leaders and no leaders could bear the risk in losing in the 
Taiwan question, a matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the succession 
politics, the Taiwan question is critical in the power consolidation ofthe new leaders. 
Under this background, it is worthwhile to explore how the political games inside the 
leadership circle influence the final outcome of the Taiwan missile crisis, and further 
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our understanding on the PLA's political role especially in foreign policy arena. 
Given their patriotic and tough attitude on the Taiwan question, the PLA was 
likely to voice out their viewpoints through different channels. The PLA may ally 
with the other hard-liners inside the Party to intensify the pressure for a tougher 
outlook.i9 Some hard-liners had been highly critical toward the "eight-point proposal'. 
They had thought that Jiang's speech contained too much blandishment and not 
enough threat and they went into fury when a visa was granted by the United States to 
Lee Tenghui. The head of the National People's Congress, Qiao Shi may have 
adopted this position. He expressed his tough attitude, "China has extensive land. If 
Taiwan attacks Xiamen, we still have Fuzhou. But Taiwan has only a few places. 
After Taipei, Keelung and Kaohsiung, what else can be left?" Qiao Shi even disclosed 
that if using force was necessary against Taiwan, the Beijing authority would 
disregard the military intervention by the United States?^ This showed that Qiao Shi 
had adopted a hard-liner attitude on Taiwan policy even if it meant war. 
So on the Taiwan question, the Hong Kong press widely reported that Jiang 
had continued to come under pressure from army general and Qiao Shi, who pushing 
for a hard line to Taipei,^ Also, the state Council's Taiwan Affairs Office which was 
in charge by Wang Zhaoguo, had come under pressure from the military and hard-
22 
liners who were discontent with the fruitless effort of the cross-Straitss talks. 
Taking the opportunity when Jiang Zemin was on his trip to Poland and 
Germany, CMC vice-chairman Liu Hua-qing and Zhang Zhen, and Li Peng had 
drafted the plan of military exercise in the East Sea as they received over 600 letters 
19 Lee Tenghui had his hard time winning trust from the military too. In the post-Chiang period, the 
military integrated behind with Hau Pei-tsun against Lee Tenghui. 
2° Hong Kong Mingpao (12 January 1996), p. C1. 
21 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "PLA circulars urge ‘quasi-war’ preparations," Hong Kong South China 
Morning Post (16 January 1996), p. 8; FBIS-CHI{X6 January 1996). 
22 "Military reportedly increases say on Taiwan issue," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (7 February 1996), 
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from the PLA in different fields. It was the high time to have the plan ready before 
Jiang's return, to avoid possible opposition from him. In this sense, the military 
exercise was explicitly the waming signal to Lee Tenghui, but implicitly it was the 
protest against Jiang's "right-wing" U.S. policy. Jiang had noticed that there would be 
huge consequences among the PLA top brass if he disapproved the plan. Jiang's 
posture could show his attitude of upholding the principle of sovereignty and resolute 
opposition to Taiwan independence. As such, Jiang could grip firmly the initiative in 
the policy making in the military exercises and fended off the crisis of challenging his 
leadership in the Party?^ According to the source, Qian Qichen and Jiang Zemin were 
both forced to make self-criticisms to the CMC in mid- 1995?^ 
Taking the time when Jiang Zemin had changed his tone from more lenient to 
showing force to deter the Taiwan independence and the U.S. intervention. It is 
possible that Jiang had gone with the army hard-liners and acquiesced to launch the 
missile drills at the end. Since then, Jiang and the hard-liners had come to a consensus 
in the military exercises and Jiang had to let the PLA take more active role in the 
Taiwan question. 
For instance, the PLA enhanced their initiative by setting up a new office to 
handle Taiwan affairs, including the possible use of military force against the island. 
Sources familiar with Beijing's Taiwan policy say the center is under the direct 
control of the PLA's CMC and General Staff Department. Western military analysts 
said the center played a pivotal role in recent war games. The Liberation Army daily 
reported yesterday 100 senior naval officers and as many "expects and professors" 
had held special conferences in September and October to discuss combat techniques 
p. A4; FBIS-CHI{1 February 1996), p.23. 
23 Jieshi Niandai (The Ninties), No. 305 (October 1995), pp. 32-34. 
24 David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's responses," 
International Security, Vol. 21 (Fall 1996), pp.180-209. The author stated that the information was 
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0 ^ and methodologies. 
Nonetheless, Jiang did not lose all his initiative. The PLA reshuffle in October 
1995 and the official propaganda of the event apparently sought to show Jiang had the 
absolute backing of the PLA. The official coverage also quoted the PLA vowing 
under Jiang's rule to "safeguard the reunification of the motherland." Xinhua said 
commanders and soldiers in the drills vowed to toe the party line and obey the CMC, 
with Jiang Zemin as its "core."^^ Besides, in the same period, the Liberation Army 
Daily were seen as unusually insistent and for the first time, placed Jiang at the "core" 
• 27 
of the party's military leadership. 
The August military drill and the call for loyalty to Jiang in the PLA carried 
some political significance. While the PLA and the hard-liners in the Party could 
advance their plan toward Taiwan with Jiang's approval, Jiang could also took this 
occasion to boost up his status in the PLA. Now the Party had come to a unanimous 
view in dealing with the Taiwan issue and the coming Taiwan's presidential election 
in March 1996. Peaceful unification was still the long-term basic principle for 
unification, but in the meantime, forceful threatening was necessary to convey a clear 
message to Taiwan. 
Coming up to 1996, Li Peng's speech repeated Jiang's speech last year almost 
word by word. Li attributed the policy of peaceful reunification to Deng Xiaoping. 
Interestingly, the moderate position enunciated by Li has been embraced by the 
Liberation Army Daily, the official military newspaper. In an editorial, it asserted that 
Jiang had expounded on "Deng Xiaoping's idea of peaceful reunification." The 
Liberation Army Daily went on to say, "We will do our best to realize peaceful 
from the interview with some knowledgeable military sources in Beijing, 16 July 1995. 
25 Willy Wo-lap Lam, "PLA opens new Taiwan Affairs office," South China Sunday Morning Post (26 
November 1995), p.5; FBIS-CHI{21 November 1995), p. 25. 
2 6 "PLA in show ofstrength for Jiang," Hong Kong Standard (19 October 1995). 
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reunification without Chinese fighting Chinese." However, the editorial cited Chinese 
Constitution as having given the PLA the "sacred duty" to safeguard China's unity 
and security and defend her territory, territorial waters and air space. "We will never 
permit a single inch of China's territory to be split from our motherland or any foreign 
anti-China force to interfere in China's affairs,” it emphasized，Once again, the 
editorial reinforced the principle of "peaceful unification but not renouncing the use 
of force" in the Taiwan question. 
The signal to Taiwan and the United States are clear, and the situation became 
intense when the presidential election day was approaching. In early February, Xiong 
Quangkai was appointed as the deputy chief of general staff of the PLA and the 
deputy general commander for war against Taiwan. Xiong Quangkai was reported as 
one of the high-ranking generals who took a hard line toward Taiwan affairs. When 
he headed a delegation to US in 1995, he openly conveyed Deng's warning, "The 
Taiwan issue is a crucial point in Sino-US relations. If it is not handled well, the 
m 
consequences might be explosive." Chas. W. Freeman Jr., the assistant secretary of 
defense of the United States, recalled his conversation with a Chinese officer whom 
was speculated as Xiong Quangkai. Xiong conveyed a very tough message to 
Freeman even by nuclear attack on Los Angeles if the United States took military 
action on the Taiwan issue， 
The promotion ofXiong Quangkai means that the proportion of the hard-liners 
in the PLA was fairly large and their influence on Taiwan issue should not be 
neglected. All kinds of sources identified the intense atmosphere in the Taiwan 
2 7 "PLA calls for loyalty to Jiang," HongKongStandard (17 October 1995). 
28 Frank Ching, "China keeps mild Taiwan line: Beijing unlikely to take military action without new 
provocation," Far Eastern Economic Review (15 February 1996), p. 29. 
2 9 "Zhang Wannian said general commander of Fujian exercise," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (6 
February 1996) p. a2; FBIS-CHI{1 February 1997). 
30 "U. S. and China nearly came to blows in 96: Tension over Taiwan prompted repair of ties," The 
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Straits. There was a report telling that 500 PLA generals submitted ajoint letter to the 
CCP Central Committee and the CMC calling for the need to further intensifying 
pressure on Taiwan to press down the arrogance of "Taiwan Independence." It was 
the time to launch the military assignment before the arrival of weapons, which 
Taiwan had purchased from other countries.^^ It is also learned that PLA leadership 
stratum stated that they "would bury American naval forces now in the Pacific ifthey 
came too close to China's coastline.，，�] The Chinese side will make the strength and 
impetus of the "military action" accurately correspond to the loudness of Lee 
Tenghui's voice in pursuing Taiwan's independence, and will definitely give Lee 
Tenghui “satisfaction’’ this time. If Lee Tenghui proclaims Taiwan independence 
33 
today, the Chinese side dares to liberate Taiwan the same day. 
Some sources released the discrepancies between Jiang Zemin and the PLA.^^ 
The Party mouthpiece newspaper denied it, "It is biased for foreign reports to say that 
the current military exercise is the result of Jiang Zemin yielding to pressure from the 
military. It is true that the military intends to increase pressure on Taiwan and has 
even asked for the restoration of the Fuzhou Military Region. However, Jiang Zemin 
also wants to exert pressure on Taiwan in order to express his discontent at the 
Washington Post (21 June 1998); p. A 01. 
31 "PLA generals' letter said to urge attack on Taiwan," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (10 March 1996), 
p. A1; FBIS-CHI{U March 1996). 
32 Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily also quoted a well-informed military source pointed out that the PLA 
was stationing 400,000 troops along the coast. But actually 400,000 troops was nothing, because 
800,000 troops were available at any time. “ ‘Expert，Says Cross-Straits War Possible at Any 
Moment," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (11 March 1996), p. A4; FBIS-CHI (11 March 1996), p.56-57. 
33 "Zhang Wannian said general commander of Fujian exercise," Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily (6 
February 1996), p. A2; FBIS-CHI{1 February 1997). 
34 A Hong Kong newspaper revealed that in early 1996, the generals were keen to push ahead the 
military action for unification but were wamed by Jiang Zemin. Jiang stated that such action could 
wreck reunification with Hong Kong and Macao. Military action would damage the Hong Kong 
economy and the confidence on the part of the overseas investors along the entire coast. Therefore, 
Jiang stated that Taiwan issue should not be tackled until Hong Kong and Macao were resumed to 
China. The "eight-points proposal" should still be the guiding principle in the Taiwan issue. However, 
the Jiang's statement could not persuade the generals who urged Jiang to take "speedy action to solve 
the Taiwan issue once and for all", waming that Taipei was about to acquire sophisticated weapons. 
See "Jiang said to Caution PLA on Attacking Taiwan," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (7 
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negative response from Taiwan to his eight-point proposal." ^^  
Such demarcation to identify Jiang as peace while PLA as war cannot capture 
the whole picture. It is true that the PLA was a pressure to put forward a more forceful 
means and Jiang had to consider their perspective. But Jiang did not lose all his 
initiative and he did not stick to the policy of peaceful unification and negotiation in 
view of all the ongoing situation. At least, like the PLA, Jiang did not renounce 
resorting to force in the Taiwan Strait. Jiang Zemin told Bill Clinton explicitly in 
1995 that if it was the case, “will inevitably employ non-peaceful methods."^^ Now 
the eight-point proposal was perceived as a failure and the fury arose as a result of 
Lee Tenghui's visit in the United States, Jiang had the reason to go with the PLA. It is 
a common practice that whenever the new policy was in vain in the Taiwan issue, 
military means was employed so as to save face, send signals, or change the 
situation.37 
Still it was conceivable that there might be disputes between the "hard" and 
the "soft" sides who urging for peaceful settlement of Taiwan issue. The perceivable 
force would be the Party leaders emphasizing economic development and foreign 
trade, especially in the coastal area. It was reported that some senior Fujian officials 
including party secretary Jia Qinglin had lobbied for cautious policy in handling 
Taiwan question. Jia Qinglin pointed out that “we must not be rash in our approach 
but take an overall view" and proper assessments should be made on the impact ofthe 
February 1996), p.l; also in FBIS-CHI{1 February 1996), p. 98. 
35 "Missile tests targeted at ‘Taiwan independence'," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao (12 August 1995); 
FBIS-CHI (17 August 1995), pp. 16-17. Also see the source from Taiwan expressed the same point. 
"Mainland exercises to ‘pressure，Lee Tenghui," Hong Kong Lien Ho Pao (24 August 1995), p.l; 
FBIS-CHI(25 August 1995), pp.33-34. 
36 Xiaobing Li, "New War of Nerves," Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 
1997), p. 65. 
37 The military force was served as a means for political ends. This practice was originated from the 
"dual strategy" of Mao Zedong, combining militancy with diplomacy. Without other policy 
alternatives, Jiang emulated Mao's old-fashioned strategy for his war policy toward Taiwan. See 
Xiaobing Li, "New War ofNerves," pp. 65-92. 
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sabre-rattling on the coastal economy. This view was circulated among the leaders in 
Beijing. However, because of the general's protest, the party leadership decided to 
stop circulating it. The military had squashed the opposition put up by the leaders in 
Fujian and gained the upper hand in Taiwan affairs.^^ Besides, they had seized control 
of the Communist Party's Leading Group on Taiwan Affairs, the country's decision-
making body on the reunification issue and granted general Zhang Wannian full 
• • 39 
authority to organize the maneuvers and wage ‘missile diplomacy' against Taiwan. 
The other relatively moderate departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Taiwan Affairs Office had been “side-lined，’,。 
After a week of missile drill in 1996, a military source stated that the PLA was 
largely satisfied with the results of the Taiwan presidential election in view of the 
lowering ofthe vote share by DDP. The generals have also indicated their readiness to 
thwart a possible “armed intervention" in Taiwan affairs by the United States despite 
the study inside the PLA wamed that China's military force could not be compared to 
the United States. After all, the army leaders such as Zhang Wannian still retained a 
big say on Taiwan matter.^^ 
The Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group is the highest decision-making body 
011 policy towards Taiwan. Jiang is the chairman and Qian Qichen is the deputy head. 
But the civilian leaders had to take consideration and compromise with the hard-liners 
and military. The Taiwan case shows the distinct role of the military in shaping the 
policy related to security. Their intelligence to civilian leaders is particularly 
38 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Generals Reportedly Quash Opposition to Taiwan Policy," Hong Kong South 
China Morning Post (27 February 1996), p. 10; FBIS-CHI (27 February 1996). 
39 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “ ‘Hard-line generals' take over Taiwan Affairs Office," Hong Kong South 
China Morning Post (12 March 1996),p. ll;F5/5'-OT/(12March 1996). 
4° "PLA circular proposes seizing outlying Taiwan islands," Hong Kong South China Morning Post (8 
March 1996), p. \\FBIS-CHI{^ March 1996). 
41 "Cadres Divided on Next Policy Move Towards Taiwan," Hong Kong South China Morning Post 
(28 March 1996)，p.lO; FBIS-CHI (28 March 1996), p. 15. 
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significant. If compromise cannot be reached between the civilian and the military, 
some critical issue such as the Taiwan question will be subject to veto or significant 
revision by the military leaders. 
“Action-Channels，，of the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
As mention in the very beginning of this chapter, "Action-channels" determine 
"who got the action" in the game. What are the factors determining the initiatives and 
power among the players in the cross-Straits crisis? Formal positions decided a part 
but obviously it was not the most critical. Jiang was not totally succumbed to the PLA 
but he had to let them take much initiative. There are several factors to structure this 
situation. First is the time period of leadership transition and Jiang as a comparatively 
weak civilian leader as mentioned in the previous section that made it the best 
opportunity for the military to cry out for their demand. Second is the interaction with 
the Taiwan authority. The eight-point proposal could not get a favorable response 
from the Taiwan side and it provided a sound justification for the PLA and the hard-
liners to take the initiative to reverse the policy orientation. The high profile of Lee 
Tenghui at the Cornell University further intensified the intense situation and no other 
alternatives feasible than a “war of nerves" could be provided. The third factor is that 
the PLA and the hard-liners in the Party could line up in putting forward for their 
proposal. 
5.4 Legitimacy and Leadership Succession 
In the post-Deng period, other than the economic performance, nationalism 
constitutes a significant component in the legitimacy build-up for the new leadership. 
Traditionally, the PLA symbolizes the nationalist posture and the Taiwan issue is one 
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of the most critical matter in the ideological build-up process. While the PLA would 
not retreat in any sense, no Chinese leader could bear the cost of losing out in the 
sovereignty problem of Taiwan. Thus in the issue of sovereignty pertaining to 
Taiwan, despite some policy cleavages in the early 1995, both the civilian and 
military could come to a consensus as both sides shared the vital interest for the 
legitimacy in the existing regime. Both insisted the principle of "peaceful unification 
of Taiwan" but "not renounce the use of force". As such, on one hand, the cross-
Straits crisis reveals the nature of both conflicts between the civilian and the military. 
On the other hand, it sheds light on their common interest in securing the legitimacy, 
neither could risk in losing out in the sovereignty issue. 
In the time of power transfer, the new leader should secure a wide range of 
support. Jiang Zemin, as the successor of Deng, is a weaker civilian compared to Mao 
and Deng. He has no military background and guanxi in military. Therefore, Jiang 
might meet with obstacle for getting support from the military leaders who thought 
his qualifications were too superficial. Although Jiang is the superior leader in the 
military and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the military seemed 
not to respect him just like the former leaders in the early 1990s. For example, Jiang 
was interviewed by the CNN in April 1993. Jiang was already the Chairman of the 
PRC and this was the first time Jiang had a speech on an important foreign mass 
media. All the official media except the Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangfun Bao) 
reported this issue on the front page. The Liberation Army Daily {Jiefangjun Bao) just 
reported it on the fourth page.^^ 
Furthermore, Jiang would probably confront the difficulties in consolidating 
his power in the PLA by the means of use of law. Signs were shown on the conflicts 
42 The China Times Business Weekly, No. 155 (18 December 1994), pp.6-10. 
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with the conservative military force concerning the issue of corruption cases in 1994-
1995 (the cases of Chen Xitong, Wang Baoseng, and the Capital Steel Corporation), 
as quite a significant number of the PLA officers had committed in various business 
activities. Also to the surprise of many observers, the military did not relay the 
"eight-point proposal" announced by Jiang and no nationwide study campaign was 
conducted in the military camps.^^ 
When the party structure was highly personalized, much uncertainty may arise 
in maintaining party leaders at a time of political transition. The problem of the new 
leader to exercise the control of military power become complex, especially when 
Jiang is a weaker civilian leader and the military has always been exploited in the 
power struggle. Jiang's authority rests on institutional position in early 1990s, not on 
personal stature and long-standing ties. 
Therefore, Jiang was very much aware of building up his own power base in 
the military. Jiang visited different military regions to show his concern over the 
soldiers. In 1993, Jiang offered positive response to the wage reform of the PLA that 
allowed the increase in wage in 1994 and suggested that military industries should be 
purchased in a fair price, in a bid to show his extraordinary effort in safeguarding the 
military interests in the rank-and-file officers, who consider the level of commitment 
to Jiang based on his contribution to their well-being. 
Jiang also granted promotion to "win the soldiers, heart", in addition to using 
the strict administration of army. The report of his attempts to court military favor 
was effusive. From 1993 to 1998, 39 army leaders were getting promoted to 
lieutenant general. Deng Xiaoping only offered the same title to ten PLA leaders 
43 The China Times (25 June 1998). 
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when Deng was the Chairman of the CMC. (see table 5- l /^ 
Table 5-1: The Lieutenant Generals Promoted in the Jiang Zemin Period (1993， 
1994，1996,1998) 
XWWW<<<W<<<<<<W<W*WtW{WW<eWWW<*tWWW<WWWWtWWWMW9WtOWWKWWWWtwewWWeWaWWWWtWaWWWOWWWWtTOWWMWtWWWWMWM<WaWW*WWWWWWWWWWW*WWWWWWWWWaWWWtWMWWWW<WWW8WWWWWWWWWWWWMWMWWWHaWWWWMawmCW*WWWWW*Wi<<WtWMWMWWt*WWWWWMMMMroMWWOMiWWW<MWWWWWWWCWCWWW 
Name Date of Place of Post when being promoted 
Birth Birth 
1993 � 6 were promoted 
Zhang Wannian 1928 Shandong Chief,GSD 
Yu Yongbo 1930 Laioning Chief, GPD 
Fu Quanyou 1930 Shanxi Chief, GLD 
Zhu Dunfa 1927 Jiansu Chancellor, NDU 
Zhang Lianzhong 1931 Shandong Commander, Navy 
Chao Shuanmi 1929 Heinan Commander, Air Force 
1994 � 1 9 were promoted 
Ding Henggao 1931 Shandong Director, COSTND 
Li Laizhu 1932 Shandong Commander, Beijing MR 
Gu Shanqing 1931 Liaoning Political Commissar, Beijing MR 
LiXilin 1930 Hebei Commander, Guangzhou MR 
Si Yuxiao 1933 Sanxi Political Commissar, Guangzhou MR 
Zhang Taiheng 1931 Shandong Commander, Jinan MR 
Song Qingwei 1929 Shandong Political Commissar, Jinan MR 
Liu Jinsong 1933 Hubei Commander, Lanzhou MR 
Chao Washeng 1930 Hubei Political Commissar, Lanzhou MR 
Li Jiulong 1929 Hebei Commander, Chengdu 
Dai Xuejiang 1930 Jiansu Political Commissar, COSTND 
Gu Hui 1930 Liaoning Commander, Nanjing MR 
WangKe 1931 Jiansu Commander, Shenyang MR 
Zhou Keyu 1923 Jiansu Political Commissar, GPD 
LiWenqin 1930 Shandong Political Commissar, NDU 
Wang Ruilin 1929 Shandong Deputy director, GPD 
XuHuizi 1933 Shandong Assistant to C/GSP 
Li Jin 1930 Shandong Assistant to C/GSP 
Yang Dezhong 1923 Sanxi Chief, Police Department 
“ Sing Tao Newspaper Daily (24 January 1996); Sing Tao Newspaper Daily (23 April 1996). 
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1996 � 4 were promoted 
Yu Zhenwu 1931 Laioning Commander, Air Force 
Ding Wenchang 1933 Anhui Political Commissar, Air Force 
Xui Yongju 1932 Liaoning Political Commissar, Second 
Artillery 
Zhou Ziyu 1935 Shandong Assistant to C/GPD 
1998 ~ 10 were promoted 
Cao Gangchuan 1936 Heinan Former minister, COSTND 
Yang Guoliang 1938 Hebei Commander, Second Artillery 
Zhang Gong 1936 Shanxi Political Commissar, Military 
Academy of Science 
Xing Shizhong 1939 Shandong Chancellor, NDU 
Wang Maorun 1937 Shandong Political Commissar, NDU 
Li Xinliang 1937 Shandong Commander, Beijing MR 
Fang Zuqi 1936 Jiansu Political Commissar, Nanjing MR 
Tao Bojun 1937 Jilin Commander, Guangzhou MR 
Zhang Zhijian 1935 Shanxi Political Commissar, Chengdu MR 
Yang Guoping 1935 Hubei Commander, PAP 
w»wwMw~»x�~^»\vi:^>>>frx«"»w»wwwwtwww«tc»is¢i¢KMaM¢ww<Wi«waw»»<wft»^»wwwx<«^w»¢M¢<*»^wwwwMM««¢wwwww»Mwwww«w»www^w»»»3»¢HH，M¢«MawMW»Mw__>»Mawcww¢o>^»TO¢w9»Kyo¾<c”）>^ww^^^www»r•v^ «^^ f^lt\v^«^rlMow¾xa•w>w^^^ w^ww%v¾wv'xf^v^•^^ ->w3MWM\^ »^^lMlW¢c•:了y:ooy¢owtww^^^w^wf^^ »w 
Sources: "1996 Review ofthe PRC's Military," Studies in Communism, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March 1997); 
"Armed police rise in status as Jiang promotes 10 generals," Hong Kong Standard (28 March 1998); 
"Jiang Zemin promoted ten Lieutenant Generals," Hong Kong Wide Angle (April 1998), pp. 50-53. 
After the 15th Party Congress, in March 1998, Jiang Zemin ordered the 
promotion of ten military officers to the top rank of full general, in a move to further 
cement his grip on the armed forces. Most notably is the promotion of Yang Guoping, 
commander of the People's Armed Force, from lieutenant general to three-star 
general. It signified the status rise of the armed police that was a power backup of 
Jiang Zemin. The newly promoted generals were those took up their posts during 
recent years that Jiang Zemin successfully retired their predecessors.^^ 
The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995-1996 was a test for Jiang on his status both 
in the Party and the military, in this period of leadership transition. If Jiang could not 
handle it well, there would be great impact on his role of "leadership core." The 
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failure of eight-point proposal induced more active role of the PLA and the hard-
liners. Jiang had to go with them since the August 1995 exercise. 
Therefore, two considerations directed the decision making in the Taiwan 
crisis and both related to the legitimacy of the rule of Jiang as the leadership core. 
One is the nationalism as the ruling ideology and the principle of sovereignty 
regarding “ one-China". The other consideration for Jiang laid on the strategy in the 
winning of the military support so as to consolidate the power base in the military for 
his rule. Combining the above two dimensions, the PLA was the champion in the tide 
of nationalist aspiration as they could secure their claim of a special role in the 
defense policy, particularly in the Taiwan question where they perceive as the most 
important. 
5.5 PLA's Capacity to Influence Foreign Affairs 
So long as this chapter identifies the PLA's special concern in the Taiwan 
policy, some other examples could also help in examining the PLA's capacity to 
influence foreign affairs. The PLA exerted much influence other parts of foreign 
policy such as the issue of arms sale to Taiwan by France and the United States, the 
Spratly Island conflicts, the arms sale to Pakistan and the Middle East and the 
technological transfer from Russia.^^ 
The capacity of the PLA in participating the decision-making process relates 
to some distinctive features on the Chinese military politics and civil-military 
relations. The Westem concept of civilian control over the gun could not be applied in 
the Mao's era in view of the active involvement of the military leaders in the politics. 
The purge of Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao were the case of power struggle centered on 
4 5 "Armed police rise in status as Jiang promotes 10 generals," Hong Kong Standard (28 March 1998). 
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Mao, but not wholly the civilian control over the military. Instead, the model of 
“party-army blending" describes the party-army relation in Mao's era. One can 
perceive this as the natural outcome of the revolutionary origin of the regime, the 
party-state system and the veteran "dual-role elites" who experienced the Long 
March. 
. [• 
Different channels the PLA can be utilized to exert their influences in view of 
the tradition of a revolutionary army, both formal and informal.^^ The juncture of 
leadership succession allowed more different voices within the party being heard. For 
the first time, the PLA has freed itself from the control under the system of supreme 
political strongman. The missile drill provided an opportunity for the PLA to enhance 
its declining status and boost up the morale. 
The offices of senior veteran leaders are another important channel for the 
PLA to influence the policy. In 1994, fourteen senior leaders still had their offices. 
They were Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Peng Zhen, Yao Yilin, Yang 
Dezhi, Li Desheng, Zhang Aiping, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Wan Li, Bo Yibo, Song 
Renqiong and Song Ping. Among these fourteen elder leaders, all but one (Song Ping) 
had significant military experience before 1949. Nine had served for a period oftime 
in the military. Five of them served in the PLA predominantly after 1949.48 They still 
retained some power and would participate in some critical decision making. This 
perception of party-army blending and the sense of national responsibility are the 
legacy of a Leninist revolutionary army. The more assertive foreign policy advocated 
by the PLA reflects its nationalistic institutional culture, as well as the self-image of 
4 6 For the details, see Benjamin C. Ostrov, "The PLA, Chinese Foreign Policy, and Asian 
Regionalism." 
4 7 For detailed analysis, see Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking (RAND, 1998). 
4 8 Wolfang Bartke, Who's Who in the People ‘ s Republic of China, 2"^ edition, (Munchen, etc.: K.G. 
Saur, 1987), cited in John W. Garver, "The PLA as an Merest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy," p. 
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pride and patriotism. 
Although the PLA was always under ultimate party control, gradually 
removed from the domestic political arena and concentrated in the barrel matter, the 
PLA as an institution or divided factions would participate in certain political matters, 
especially in the part of foreign policy that is directly related to their interests. So far, 
the party and the PLA have been in a relation of 'symbiosis'. Both have the same 
interests to maintain the existing regime and one cannot live without another. 
Therefore, the civil-military relations are not totally in a hierarchical power structure 
described as the "party's absolute leadership over the army". Such a relation 
flourishes an informal norm that permits the PLA to take a part in the politics. It is in 
contrast to the Western principle of civilian supremacy that the military should be 
under total control by the civilian leaders. 
Taking into the consideration of the PLA's informal norms and capacity to 
influence some aspects of central decision making, the model put forward by Alfred 
Stepan based on the experience of Latin American merits attention in the Chinese 
case. The military underwent the process of professionalism but they concerned with 
domestic threats for the state. Therefore, they can expand their role and become more 
involved in domestic economic and societal concerns. This “new professionalism" is 
different from the original concept of professionalism proposed by Huntington.^^ 
The influence of the PLA in Chinese domestic and foreign policy after the 
missile drills is hard to say now. The 15^ ^ Party Congress shows some signs of further 
de-politicizing the military. Nevertheless, the PLA would still continue to play a 
254. 
4 9 Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press,). Huntington contends that professionalization is the objective control by 
the civilian leaders to confme the military inside the technical defense matter only. See Samuel P. 
Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). 
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role.5G One cannot deny the importance of PLA's voice and action in such critical 
political phenomenon as the Tiananmen Square Incident and the Taiwan Straits crisis. 
This accounts for a difficulty to the process of formulating an institution acceptable to 
both groups to change the long tradition of flexibility of the military's role expansion. 
How to place the corporate interests of the military in order and let their demands be 
expressed are the crucial topic in the subject of Chinese civil-military relations. 
50 A source reported that Jiang was blocked by the generals to promote PLA garrison in Hong Kong. 
The generals objected Jiang's proposal to upgrade the PLA in Hong Kong to a status equivalent to that 
of seven military command area in China. They were afraid that Hong Kong will be turned into a 
personal power base ofJiang to deter the traditional factionalism in the forces. The report also says that 
the generals had vetoed Jiang's plan to promote certain garrison commander and commissar to the 
party's decision-making body, the Central Committee. However, those commanders had been 
promoted by Jiang to lieutenant generals. "General blocked Jiang's plan to promote PLA garrison in 




6.1 Summary of Findings 
No one would deny the important role of the PLA in Chinese politics, looking 
at the Lin Biao incident in the Cultural Revolution and the military involvement in the 
party ideological struggle in the Mao era. The PLA, the other state managers and 
technicians alike, should be both "red" and "expect"; in practice "red" was much more 
favorable. The death of Mao was proclaimed to be the precondition for China's entry 
into a post-revolutionary period, and the final arrangement for Deng as the leadership 
core in the Central Committee in late 1978 actually opened the way for the post-
revolutionary period by taking a firm step on the road for modernization.' 
After the tremendous change within the PLA in defining its role in politics 
under the Cultural Revolution turmoil, it was an urgent task for Deng to put the PLA 
in order. What Deng try to do was to disengage the PLA from politics and put them 
back to the barracks. But in the early 80s, the atmosphere of ideological struggles on 
the national goals still remained in the Chinese military politics. Deng confronted 
much resistance for the de-Maofication campaign and modernization reform from the 
conservative force inside PLA. The "Resolution on Certain Question in the History of 
Our Party since the Founding ofthe PRC" issued in 1981 was modified because ofthe 
military pressure as the Resolution was too harsh on criticizing Mao and the military 
in the Cultural Revolution. The discontent of the PLA also manifested explicitly in the 
‘Richard Lowenthal, "The Post-Revolutionary Phase in China and Russia," Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (Autumn 1983), pp. 191-203. 
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article “The Four Cardinal Principles Should Not Be Violated" that placed a harsh 
criticism on Bai Hua's "Unrequited Love’’，and the Zhao Yiya's article in the 
Liberation Army Daily in 1982. 
Despite of the ideological disputes with the conservative power inside the PLA 
in the early years when Deng resumed his office, Deng could conduct the military 
reforms in line with regularization, de-politicization and differentiation. A new kind 
of officer corps, better-educated, younger and combat-oriented, have been created 
under professionalization. Since then, they had retreated from central and local 
politics gradually, delineated from the past revolutionary ideology and developed their 
own military corporateness. Nonetheless, the institutional development of the PLA 
may not go to the way toward a total apolitical armed force, but a corporate group for 
institutional interest articulations in politics would be a likely possibility. 
Unlike Deng had to fight against the leftist force inside the PLA, Jiang Zemin 
had to put effort in appealing to the military institutional and personal interests in the 
post-Deng era. Despite “political up to mark" was still the key demand in the military 
camps, political ideological way alone could not secure absolute control over the 
military, 
Based on the above review of the overall changing political and military 
circumstances, this paper postulates that "placing the PLA's institutional interests" by 
the political leaders is the essence of the post-Deng civil-military relations, and that is 
a significant factor explaining the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. In a systematic way to 
link the domestic politics to the foreign policy outcome, Allison's organizational 
process model and governmental politics model are borrowed here, to identify the 
PLA's organizational interests and their channels and capacity inside the government 
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and party for their interest articulations. 
Deng's reform strategy placed defense modernization in the lowest priority in 
the Four Modernizations. Economic resources were readjusted for attaining the overall 
national goal, mainly the economic development. Thus the PLA was asked to "display 
their glorious traditions of arduous struggle and build the army through diligence and 
thrift, strive to spend less and accomplish more by cutting down military expenditure 
and strengthening economic management, thus reducing the state burden and ensuring 
combat readiness and military modernization."^ The insufficient budget would cause 
dissatisfaction among the officers and push them to call for a war-like assignment, 
particularly the up-and-coming generals and middle-ranking officers. Nonetheless, 
calculating the strategic gains and loses, the missile drills were a "threatening war", 
rather than an actual war for immediate resuming of Taiwan. But even no war was 
exploded, the PLA, unified under the war game, framed the choice set to the decision-
makers and could also take the advantage to cry out their demands for resources 
acquisitions, particularly in certain departments like the Navy and the Second 
Artillery. 
How did the PLA actualize their demands and increase their sayings in the 
Taiwan Straits crisis? In the first place, the PLA used to have a special role in matters 
concerning national sovereignty, in particular the Taiwan question. The tide of 
nationalism to fill the gap of legitimacy and the time span of power transfer in the 
post-Deng era provided a political circumstance favorable to the PLA to be in a high-
profile in the issue of territorial integrity, and to be particular sensitive to any sign of 
containment policy toward China. 
2 "PLA spent less, accomplish more in 1981," Xinhua (14 January 1982); FBIS-CHI (15 January 1982) 
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Second, the PLA grasped the opportunity provided by the situation to increase 
their capacity in the Taiwan policy decision-making, in the way of alignment with the 
hard-liners in the party. The policy incompatibility and the disagreement on the 
concept interpretation of "one country, two systems" blocked the way for further 
settlement on the cross-Straits relations, in that the cold response of Li's six-point 
proposal toward the Jiang's eight-point proposal marked the turning point. The 
military and the hard-liners in the Party criticized this soft posture and Jiang changes 
his side to hold back his initiative in the issue. At the time of the missile test, all 
factions inside the party unified against the independence force of Taiwan and the US 
intervention. 
Ironically, it was Li Tenghui and the US response accelerated the building up 
of the consensus among all groups in the party. Jiang and the PLA could then 
concretely perceive their common interests in the Taiwan issue for a tougher posture, 
by which the PLA could advance their institutional demands for a greater say in the 
Taiwan policy. 
All in all, the PLA was still positioned as a pivotal player in the transitional 
politics in the post-Deng leadership succession period. The military appeared as a 
unified national force in advancing their institutional interests and they acquired more 
capacity in foreign policymaking. The PLA behaved in a fashion of a special interest 
group in the government, both in the materialistic term of resource acquisitions and in 
the influence of the decision-making in the foreign affairs they concerned. 
In Mao Zedong era, "red" outweighed the "expect" in almost all aspects of 
party and government institutions. Political ideologies and party line correctness were 
K7-8. 
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employed as weapons in the power struggles. Professionalization delineated the 
military from the ideological politics could only begin to gain its momentum in the 
Deng era, in which "expertise" was emphasized. Despite the principle of "Party has 
the absolute command over the gun" appears to be a guarantee for a loyal party army, 
a new generation of PLA has gradually developed their corporateness and 
institutionalized demands for defense modernization. In other words, the PLA has 
become more pragmatic and the way for gaining their support is to satisfy their 
corporate interests, not based on ideological correctness and political power sharing in 
the past revolutionary period. This characteristic of interest bargaining not only 
prevails in the civil-military relations, but also in other interest bearers such as the 
governmental departments, the provincial governments and possibly, various 
emerging social groups. 
6.2 Prospects of Future Research 
This thesis intends to explore the party-military relations by the case study of 
the 1996 cross-Straits crisis and highlights the interest group behavior of the PLA in 
the post-Deng power transfer period. Future research could be conducted in various 
dimensions. While China is on her way to become more political pluralist, what is the 
role of the PLA compared to its counterparts in the other post-communist states? The 
transformations ofthe civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and the East Europe 
render much reference point to start with the Chinese case, for analyzing the inter-
relations ofregime change and the military role. The military was proved to be critical 
in the political crisis and regime transition. Many people are still puzzling the role of 
the PLA in thel989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Similarly, South Korea had the 
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Kwangu incident in which student demonstrators were killed. The soldiers in Thailand 
also have the record of firing on the pro-democracy students in Bangkok in May 1992. 
Furthermore, the pivotal role played by the Indonesian army in the Suharto step-
down and the riots in May 1998 attracts the world eyes on the "dual function" ofthe 
military officers to hold key positions in the government and parliament.^ What role 
will the Chinese military adopt if future political crisis explodes? What side will the 
PLA take? 
To have a comprehensive overview on the Chinese military, one should also 
look at the economic activities of the PLA. In past decade saw the PLA become 
involved in almost all aspects of economy — "money grows out from the barrel of the 
guns". The PLA controls a sprawling network of an estimated 15,000 business, 
including country's biggest textile and pharmaceutical manufacturers. It also has its 
own sources of foreign exchange, makes a profit, hold patents for civilian products 
and has mn the joint-venture enterprise. The growing connections with the economic 
issues brings in an excess $1 billion yearly to the PLA/ The troops in Fujian and 
Nanjing were the main forces in the missile exercises. There were no sign of any 
discrepancies on opinion in the Taiwan issue in 1996 as the Taiwan affair was 
perceived as the critical national security matter that made all military, central and 
local unified. But when the military becomes the 'economic monster，and sticks to the 
local business interests, what will be the influence on the cross-Straits relations, 
especially those coastal military regions?^ The tide of doing business within PLA will 
3 There was intense speculation that it was the armed forces gave Suharto the ultimatum that it was 
time for him to step down. Some sources also revealed that the military leaders were the persons 
behind controlled and organized the riots and gang rapes in May 1998. 
4 "Washingtonpost.com: China Special Report; Overview: Military," The Washington Post in 
http://www.wasshingtonpostcom/wp-srv/inatVlongterm/chinaAwerview/miliitary.htm 
5 The Nanjing Military Region was running 26 enterprises including factories and hotels in 1991. 
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intensify inter-regional conflicts and various problems will arise in the matter of 
central hierarchical control. The crime of smuggling committed by the PLA has set 
the warning alarm to the central authority. It is expected that the decrees for strict 
forbidden on the military business will be enforced in full scale.^ The use of strict 
administration and mle of law in controlling the PLA's discipline would be a fresh 
topic added in the "Party commands the gun", from the personal and ideological 
orientation to the institutionalized system based on laws. 
The other line of research could be done is the interaction of the PLA and the 
foreign policy. This thesis argues that the PLA favored a more hawkish stand toward 
Taiwan and exerted a considerable influence in the final decision outcome. Mansfield 
and Snyder indicate that in the earliest stage of democracy, the state may be more 
war-prone as the political competitors may gather support from different forces 
playing critical role in the authoritarian era, especially the military.? The political 
leaders in China may need to secure the PLA's support and satisfy the military 
institutional interest. How will this party-military relationship affect the foreign 
relations of China, particularly in those disputed areas?^ Notably, Beijing has been 
conceived as a key role in the regional and world stability. Any change of military 
deployment and tactics of the PLA certainly will affect the security outlook in Asia 
and the world. 
Finally, the military situations still account for one of the most decisive factors 
in the coming cross-Straits interaction. The 1996 Taiwan missile tests put the cross-
Liberation Army Daily {Jiefangjun bao) (13 December 1991). 
6 Hong Kong Mingpao (29 July 1998), p. A14. 
7 Edmond D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. 
8 cited in Avery Goldstein, "The nature and significance of China's growing power: Questions for 
international security in the 21st Century," (Paper at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American 
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Straits relations to the most intense situation and heightened the arms race of both 
sides.9 Thus, the changes in the party-military relations of both sides would add the 
variables in determining the cross-Straits relations. De-politicizing the military is the 
first step to create the truly professionalized forces.^^ Nationalization of the armed 
forces may be possible in future that the military's loyalty goes to the state, and not to 
the Party anymore. How the trend of nationalization of the military correlates to the 
domestic regime changes of both sides and the cross-Straits interactions? The answers 
of these questions would be of great contribution to the intellectual community not 
only on the civil-military relations, but also on the theory concerning the divided 
nations. 
Political Association, 29 August- 1 September 1996), pp. 44-45. 
9 According to the source, Taiwan's Defense Department urged for a significant increase in defense 
budget up to 35%. It seemed that the strong military build-up was the only protection against the attack 
from the PLA. "Strong military vital to ward off invasion: expect," China News (5 January 1996), p. 2; 
"The 1996 world dangerous zones: First goes to the Taiwan Strait," Taipei Zhili Zhaobao (2 January 
1 9 9 6 ) . Also see Hungdad Chiu, "Growth of the Chinese Military and its threat to Taiwan," American 
Asian Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1996)，pp. 87-96. 
10 For the de-politicization ofthe Taiwan's military in the post-Chiang era, see Cheng Weiyuan, "De-
politicizing the Military: The Case of Taiwan, 1988-1992," (paper presented at the 1994 American 
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